227. Memorandum by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff0

THE TASK FORCE REPORT ON KOREA

I. Key Issues

To what extent should U.S. aid be contingent upon Korean performance? To give the Korean people a sense of progress and a realization that the U.S. is shifting its emphasis to economic development and reform may require certain quite dramatic U.S. actions. But unhappy experience with past Korean inaction and the toughness of the new regime suggest the importance of making U.S. offers of assistance contingent upon specific Korean performance on needed reform measures. Under such circumstances, the dramatic impact of the U.S. action may be dissipated.

In general the revised recommendations call for a fairly tough U.S. policy of making our commitments to provide economic development assistance contingent upon Korean performance with considerable discretion left to the Ambassador to determine when performance is adequate (pars. 4, 6, 7, 12).1 Once the Koreans have taken action on a [Page 476] series of reform measures we would be quite forthcoming in offering U.S. support for economic development, including specifically power development.

How much of a commitment should the U.S. make toward meeting Korea’s electric power needs? This question is a particular variant of the question above. Power is a serious bottleneck in Korea preventing full utilization of existing industrial plant capacity. The U.S. estimates five year power needs at 480,000 kw of installed capacity. Action is underway to provide 80,000 kw of this amount, in part through emergency measures such as provision of power barges.

Debate in the Task Force centered upon the question of how far the U.S. should go in committing itself to meeting the remaining power requirement of 400,000 kw until there was concrete action by the Korean government to increase rates, to consolidate the power companies and to eliminate power losses. The revised recommendations propose (par. 4(b)) that we indicate a willingness to undertake specific projects provided action on reform measures is begun, and (par. 7) that we commit ourselves to an agreed five year program when concrete action has been completed.

Should missions and force levels for ROK armed forces be revised? The revised recommendations call for a review of missions and of alternative force and equipment structures (par. 8). The arguments of proponents and opponents of reduction are described in an attachment to this paper. ROK force levels seem better suited to meeting the Communist threat as we perceived it in the 1950’s than to dealing with present dangers and politico-economic needs.

All JCS-proposed changes in the recommendations of the report have been accepted in the revised recommendations except for two proposed changes in par. 8. One of these (JCS memo, par. 2) would make it clear that the Secretary of Defense would make the assessment of Korean force and equipment levels and that the Secretary of State would be limited to coordinating political and economic factors with this assessment. The suggestion implies too clean a distinction between the two processes. The other change (Appendix to JCS memo, par. f) would delete the word “substantial” from par. 8 (b) of the revised recommendations on the grounds that it prejudges the outcome of the force level review.2 But the wording of 8 (b) makes clear that a “substantial reduction in forces” is only one alternative that would be studied.

To what extent should we encourage and support the use of ROK armed forces for economic development purposes? The question has two aspects: (a) [Page 477] use of ROK forces to provide the leadership in the National Construction Service (a kind of CCC) and in similar public works activities; and (b) use of the ROK forces for expanded training in civilian skills. The armed forces now participate in the National Construction Service. However, it is alleged that the U.S. military in Korea has been less than completely enthusiastic about such use. The first sentence of par. 9 of the revised recommendations would direct the U.S. military to encourage greater participation. The U.S. military is very reluctant to give up time from military duties for training in civilian skills. The second sentence of par. 9 of the recommendations calls for preparation of a proposed program of increased training and the assessment of its economic and military implications.

II. Other Matters

1.
Until the final draft, the revised recommendations made the invitation to the Korean Chief of Government to visit Washington contingent upon some Korean action on reform measures. At the request of Secretary Rusk the contingent feature of the invitation was eliminated (par. 3 of recommendations) on the grounds that we were committed to an invitation and that it should not be delayed unduly.
2.
The new Korean regime seems, on present evidence, much more anti-Japanese than its immediate predecessor. Therefore, though we believe that ROK-Japanese rapprochement is of great economic importance to Korea, State is not optimistic that Japanese investment in, or economic aid to, Korea is an immediate prospect. When the Japanese seemed, just after the recent coup, to want to rush in with substantial economic aid, State suggested that they go slow fearing a Korean rebuff which would seriously set back relations.
3.
Present at the NSC meeting today will be the new first team in Korea: Mr. Samuel Berger, the new U.S. Ambassador; General Guy Meloy, presently Deputy United Nations Commander who will take over as the UN Commander on July 1; and Mr. James Killen, presently USOM Director in Pakistan who is to be designated the new USOM Director in Korea. You may wish to have a brief talk with these three immediately following the Council meeting.

Attachment

THE PROS AND CONS OF A REDUCTION IN ROK FORCES

I. Existing Forces in Korea

The ROK army of 525,000 men consists of 18 divisions plus artillery, anti-aircraft, heavy mortar and tank battalions. In addition the ROKs [Page 478] have one marine division and ten reserve army divisions. Two U.S. Army divisions are in Korea. The North Koreans maintain a total of 355,000 men under arms (compares with 600,000 for ROK), including a 22 division army. The ChiComs have no forces in North Korea but could deploy 6-8 divisions to the Demilitarized Zone within 10 to 14 days. Neither North nor South Korea has much of a navy; the North Korean air force is somewhat superior to the ROK air force.

II. The Arguments For a Reduction in ROK Forces

The direct threat of military aggression across the 38th Parallel is slight. We have a political and military plate-glass window in place there. The border is clearly demarked; the U.S. divisions are in place; the UN Command provides the structure for an international response to aggression. The Communists have greater opportunities for gains with less risk in other areas of Asia.

U.S. aid to Korea, partly because of a mistaken focus on a military threat, has been concentrated upon the support of ROK military forces and upon repairing war damage, with very little left for economic development. Meanwhile, the new tide of Korean nationalism and the submerged, but clearly present, desire for unification pose, in the face of the economic stagnation and poverty of the ROK and North Korea’s considerable economic progress, important long-run political dangers. To harness the forces of Korean nationalism to the constructive ends of economic development will require either still more massive U.S. aid (which the Korean economy would have difficulty absorbing) or a substantial shift of U.S. and Korean resources from military support to economic development.

The Chang Myon government exerted pressure on the United States to agree to Korean force reductions, but we made only minimal concessions. Though it may be difficult to force it to do so, the new military regime must be made to face Korea’s real economic problems and to recognize that existing ROK force levels make poor military and economic sense.

III. The Arguments Against a Reduction in ROK Forces

The military situation is stable in Korea because the level of U.S. and ROK forces is adequate to deter attack. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The ROK is an abundant source of low-cost military manpower which, if we continue to utilize it fully, will continue to give greater strategic flexibility to U.S. forces in coping with pressures elsewhere on the ChiCom periphery. Moreover, a considerable reduction in the level of ROK forces would be required to produce any real saving of resources. This is partly because, unless we permit ROK capabilities to decline, any substantial reduction in forces would have to be accompanied by [Page 479] increased modernization. The ROKs would probably also demand such modernization as a price for agreement to force reductions. In addition, because of the unemployment problem in South Korea, release of men from the armed forces would only transfer the burden of maintaining them to the civilian economy. Finally, it seems most unlikely that a force reduction would be politically acceptable to the new Korean military regime.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 6/61. Secret.
  2. All references to paragraphs and subparagraphs of the revised recommendations are to those in Document 230.
  3. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a June 12 memorandum from Lemnitzer to McNamara. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 6/61)