Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

224. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 42-2-61

Washington, May 31, 1961.

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS IN SOUTH KOREA

The Problem

To assess the significance of the military coup d’etat in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and to estimate probable trends over the next few months.

Conclusions

1. We believe that the present coup group dominated by Major General Pak Chong-hui will retain the principal elements of power in South Korea over the next few months at least, whether or not nominal civilian rule is re-established. (Paras. 9, 13)

2. The coup group will probably inject a new sense of drive and discipline into the ROK Government’s economic and administrative efforts, and may make some headway, especially in curbing corruption. However, in view of the magnitude of the problems the new leaders are inheriting and are themselves creating, we believe they will not make much progress, and because of their inexperience and a probable reluctance to accept outside advice, may make matters even worse. (Para. 16)

3. The coup group is composed of divergent elements and interests. Unless Pak and his colleagues can generate and enforce a greater unity than appears likely, ROK politics will probably follow a pattern of constant factional maneuvering and periodic shifts in power within the ruling military group. (Paras. 9-10, 14)

4. South Korea’s coup leaders are a new and different breed from the civilian and the more senior military people with whom the US has had most contact. Their authoritarian and nationalistic stamp suggests that they will be less receptive to US guidance. Furthermore, they will be tough, determined, and difficult to deal with. They will probably continue South Korea’s alignment with the US, recognizing their country’s dependence on the US, but at the same time will seek to assert South Korea’s independence in military, economic, and political affairs.ROK-UN military command relationships will probably be a source of continuing difficulty. (Paras. 17-20)

5. The declared position of the regime is anti-Communist, and available evidence does not support allegations of Pak’s continuing ties with the Communists. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that he is a long-term Communist agent, or that he might redefect. Also, Communist ends in South Korea could be advanced in the event of student and public uprisings against repressive government measures and probable deteriorating economic conditions. (Para. 21)

6. The coup leaders have been preoccupied with internal matters and have not yet given clear definition of their intended foreign policies. (Para. 22)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of the estimate; see the Supplement.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.