208. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- Korea
I talked this morning with the Korean desk officer in State, Donald Macdonald, in an informal effort to learn something of the status of work on Korea. He has impressed me in the past as a very able officer. He indicated that he is presently working on a paper which is intended for you. It will deal with the question of what should be done about Korea’s economic situation and will contain an analysis of Mr. Farley’s political conclusions.
He said that he did not know the exact status of the recommendation for a special mission to Korea which was being handled elsewhere in the Department. He was himself very much in favor of such a mission but feared that the idea, after starting “in a burst of glory,” was now being downgraded. Everyone concerned with Korean problems agreed that some such action was needed. The psychology that had guided U.S. aid programs in Korea since 1945 had been one which emphasized stopgaps. If there was famine you provided food, but you didn’t look beyond that to what you should do about the food problem. The Koreans themselves now recognize that this is an inadequate approach and are receptive to change. Through no fault of any particular individual, our aid mission in Korea had been characterized by too many indians, too few chiefs. There were too many people in Korea and they were of the wrong kind. The mission was characterized by too much concern with bureaucracy and petty detail, too little with the larger aspects of the program.
An adequate approach to the problem would have three characteristics:
- a.
- A special mission to Korea made up of really able people. The people sent should have real ability and prestige. We should not send retired businessmen, but people who are equipped by background for a rapid insight into Korea’s political and economic problems. I inferred that he thought that present planning in State was inadequate in this respect.
- b.
- Provision should be made for follow-through on the special mission’s recommendations. This was a defect of the Farley proposals; that [Page 440] he made no recommendations for bringing people in with the special mission who would stay on and see that recommendations are carried out.
- c.
- A smaller group of higher-level people was needed to run the aid program in Korea.
He indicated that he thought that an inquiry by you as to the status of planning for a special mission would be highly desirable.
In view of the character of some of Mr. Macdonald’s comments, they should obviously be treated confidentially.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 4/1/61-5/25/61. Confidential.↩