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184. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0

177. Reference: Embassy’s telegram 119.1 As reported in Embassy’s fortnightly “indications” telegrams and A-227 of September 3,2 we see little indication that GRC is planning or preparing for any military or paramilitary action against China mainland in near future except small team probes similar to others attempted this summer. Atmosphere in this respect much more relaxed than spring of 1962 or early this year. Moreover, evidence is accumulating that GRC high command presently very much concerned with assessing implications for GRC policy of Sino-Soviet split and possible developments in US-USSR relations following test-ban treaty. Views on these matters have not crystallized and we believe situation therefore exceptionally favorable for influencing GRC thinking.

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Recent conversations between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Chiang Ching-kuo suggest that latter more inclined than previously to give serious attention to improving GRC political action and psychological warfare directed at mainland. Therefore recommend that in discussions with him opportunities be found to urge importance and timeliness of vigorous GRC political action program to take advantage of increasing Chinese Communist isolation in world community and probable internal stresses in Chinese Communist Party resulting from Sino-Soviet split. Believe careful steering of discussions away from military and toward political action would serve our long-term interests better than repeating blunt warnings against rash military action which do not seem called for by current situation, unless latter are needed to meet proposals Chiang Ching-kuo may make.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,DEF 1 CHINAT. Secret; Limit Distribution.
  2. In telegram 119, August 20, Wright sent recommendations for Chiang Ching-kuo’s pending visit to the United States. Noting that Chiang would almost certainly play a crucial role after his father’s death, he recommended explanation of U.S. global policies by top U.S. officials and firm assurances of continuing U.S. support. Concerning GRC mainland recovery aspirations, he commented that it would be important to “strike good balance between expressions U.S. confidence in ultimate casting off of Communist rule by Chinese people and view that time not ripe for any large-scale GRC action to this end.” (Ibid., POL 15-1 CHINAT)
  3. Not printed. (Ibid.)