144. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
102. Attitude displayed by Chiang Ching-kuo1 not unexpected and may have been subtle way of conveying his fathers reaction to my two talks July 4th and 5th.2 While somewhat emotionally expressed, perhaps on certain levels there does exist a desire to force the issue of our real intentions, i.e. are we or are we not willing to provide bombers and landing craft as an earnest of our trust in GRC and our desire to help GRC [Page 295]recover mainland. If yes, then when—if no, we are to remain “good friends”.
Possibly I am expressing this thought too crudely and furthermore it may not be the desire of the Generalissimo to put the question to the test at this time.
Nevertheless it is evident that US position is thought to be equivocal with unspoken misgivings over our attitude on the “two-Chinas” question and latent concern over possibility of US support for third force on mainland or elsewhere.
Our response that request for B-57s and landing craft “under consideration” has been taken as indicating unwillingness to take positive action. Nevertheless, I see no reason to let the issue be forced upon us in immediate future. I think we can continue to delay until all implications size and import this request for large amounts war material obviously of an offensive character are fully digested. Its aggressive nature is self-evident and its release to GRC cannot be concealed.
We are making careful study here on aspects phases 1, 2, and 3 GRC plan dated 1 June 1962.3 This will take some time but we believe we see some possibility making phase 1 serve to ease tensions now incipient in delays on decision supplying debatable material and at same time we think we can put on brakes in matters of large scale drops of 200 or more so as to keep control of velocity of movements proposed by GRC. When we arrive at definite conclusions, suitable report and recommendations will be submitted.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.56/7-2762. Secret; Roger Channel.↩
- Reference is apparently to a July 11 conversation between Chiang Ching-kuo [text not declassified]. A July 12 telegram enclosed with a July 13 memorandum from Desmond FitzGerald to Thomas A. Parrott of the White House staff reported that Chiang, stating that he was speaking personally without instructions, expressed concern that nothing had come of the discussions of GRC mainland recovery planning and “emphatically expressed disappointment” in the lack of a U.S. reply to GRC requests for landing craft and bombers. He declared that nothing would alter U.S.-GRC friendship but expressed concern that lack of U.S. action in support of GRC planning would make Chiang Kai-sheks position increasingly difficult. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, China)↩
- See Documents 139 and 140.↩
- Reference is apparently to a GRC outline plan for the second stage of counterattack on the mainland, given to U.S. officials on May 23 and reported in CIA report TDCS DB-3/650, 315, May 25. Phase 1 called for airborne and maritime commando raids of varying sizes against targets on the Fukien and Kwangtung coasts to support the initiation of resistance movements; phase 2 envisioned assault landing at several points to carry out conventional warfare operations and provide a base for spreading the resistance movement; phase 3 called for the advance of GRC troops deeper into Fukien and Kwangtung. (Ibid., China, Return to Mainland, 1/62-5/62)↩