Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, July 28, 1961, 11 a.m.

220. For Secretary. USUN, Brussels, London, Paris for Ambassador only. Deptel 127.²Meeting with British and French Ambassadors reported Embtel 210³ occurred separately immediately on receipt reference telegram. They both requested we three meet together late yesterday afternoon after they had chance to consider problem. Both stated further reflection had confirmed their initial reaction and British Ambassador scribbled on piece of paper his views: “If Foreign Office were to ask for my view or advisability of similar approach by myself to Kasavubu I would advise against it because Kasavubu’s speech today⁴ has committed him to going ahead with Parliament and formation of government. He therefore can hardly now go into reverse and put off Parliament pending ‘summit’ meeting without risking his own position unduly.” French Ambassador associated himself with this statement. Both regretted disagreeing with your position and emphasized that they were speaking personally without any instructions.

Although I had already obtained negative reaction from Linner to presenting to Kasavubu information contained Deptel 119,⁵ I nevertheless saw him late last night after receiving on telecon authorization from Vance to discuss Deptel 127 with him. He also was categoric in expressing his personal view that in our place he would not make any demarche at this time.

Deeply regret inability to give you any prognostication re forthcoming developments. As you know Parliament has been cloistered in Lovanium for last week and UN has been most effective in prohibiting any contact with these men. Only information available is that given British and ourselves in great confidence by Linner who himself receives it second hand from his observers at Lovanium, Tunisian Khiari and anti-Nkrumah Ghanaian Gardiner. Some information comes to moderate elements Léopoldville via Kasavubu but even with his immediate advisers he is playing cards very close to chest.

Furthermore parliamentarians are most volatile. Gizengists unquestionably won first round by electing pro-Gizenga Kasongo⁶ as President lower house and packing house secretariat. With that victory we all assumed bandwagon psychosis would take over and would result in landslide for Gizenga in Senate. Only note of cheer at that moment was British Ambassador who noted closeness of vote and expressed some optimism. Between House and Senate vote UN spread word through its two observers at Lovanium of Gizenga’s orders to execute three Kivu provincial officials. This resulted in reportedly healthy but still unknown majority for moderates in Senate. Senate traditionally more conservative than chamber but nevertheless, press reports notwithstanding, President definitely moderate and its secretariat controlled with men sharing his political views (many of these men may have been former Lumumbists but best information available here indicates they have changed).

As already indicated all people we have seen and all US political officers here believe it would be unwise for us to make demarche at this time to Kasavubu. Reasons are difficult to set forth, but, put bluntly, seem to be that such demarche has little chance of success in view position taken by Kasavubu yesterday in his excellent speech where he repeatedly emphasized urgency of getting on with parliamentary solution to crisis. Were we now to advocate dilatory tactics we would be asking him to repudiate his position of yesterday which was accepted by standing ovation, and uncommon reaction to Kasavubu’s normally bland and boring orations. Furthermore, our advocating dilatory tactics would be reversal of line we were taking month or more ago when we were emphasizing necessity of getting on with parliamentary solution lest Gizenga consolidate his position in Stanleyville and lest USSR and Afro-Asian bloc be given strong club in forthcoming UNGA with which to hit UN policy and operations in Congo.

Finally and not mentioned by our western friends here but which I feel acutely and which I assume they do also is fact that demarche might well be counter-productive. At risk of being presumptuous I feel I must state that recently independent states certainly resent our telling them how to run their own internal affairs. They do not understand danger of Soviet penetration and are puzzled when we tell them Soviets will interfere in their internal affairs and yet at same time tell their Chiefs State when to call Parliament, whom to name as formateurs and what their foreign policy should be. Although well disposed to US, pressure from US to take positions they are reluctant to assume irritates them immensely and their irrational reactions frequently are against their best interests. French learned this the hard way in Guinea and have been rolling with punch ever since in Black Africa. We saw Sihanouk’s reaction in Cambodia when we put heat on him in relatively minor matter and he turned to ChiCom and Soviet aid. In most recent moments here we have seen complete volte face of Katangese who, when under intense UN and other pressure, are now making noises toward Moscow.

Kasavubu I fear would resent at this time what he would consider our dabbling in his internal affairs. He himself might not make such a violent turn but once our demarche known it might be used by our adversaries here in most effective and nationalistic fashion.

In more constructive vein I would suggest that we continue work closely with young team of Congolese currently enjoying as much confidence as Kasavubu gives to anyone. We can plant ideas with them and if they like them they will submit them to President as their own. We should also of course continue work closely with Linner and use him and his African advisers, Khiari and Gardiner, to disseminate our thoughts and arguments where they would do most good. Most helpful immediate action that I can envisage would be brief message from you to Kasavubu to effect that you aware of his statesmanlike efforts to solve present crisis here and that you have read his speech and feel impelled to inform him that it is fine patriotic speech opening extremely important Parliamentary session. Even such message if published might be counter-productive for it would give adversaries chance to accuse him of being pawn of US. If however you were disposed to send such message to Kasavubu I would suggest I be authorized inform Ndele that I have received such message to be delivered at my discretion and that if he and other key members of moderate team thought it advantageous, I would then present it to President and inform him that he could publish it if he thought it advisable.

Fully appreciate extremely unfortunate reaction at home and damage to our prestige abroad at this critical time if Gizenga is named next PM. Nevertheless after much thought, am convinced that wisest though perhaps most frustrating course for US now to follow is to lie low in Congo.

Godley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2861. Secret; Niact. Received at 9:55 a.m. and repeated to USUN, Brussels, London, and Paris.
2. Document 87. Godley commented further on telegram 127 in telegram 219, July 28. He stated that while the outlook was admittedly uncertain, he thought the risks of delay were greater than the risks of going ahead. He thought Gizenga’s remaining in Stanleyville would hurt his cause and that the tide which had seemed to be running in his favor might be about to turn against him. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2861)
3. Telegram 210, July 27, reported that the Ambassadors thought a demarche to Kasavubu at that time would be unwise. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–2761)
4. Kasavubu addressed both chambers of Parliament on July 27. Extracts of his speech are printed in Verhaegen, Congo 1961, pp. 410 and 411.
5. Telegram 119 to Léopoldville, July 26, stated that Tshombe had sent a further communication through Struelens asking Rusk to obtain Léopoldville’s agreement to a summit meeting preceding a Parliamentary session and to inform Léopoldville that Katanga desired to support “moderate leaders” and prevent the formation of an extremist-dominated government. Katanga wished to reach agreement with the moderate leaders on a framework of a federation or confederation within which Katanga would have a degree of political autonomy. Unless agreement was reached along these lines, Katanga would be forced to reconsider its position and seek assistance from any countries that would grant it. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2661)
6. Joseph Kasongo.