79. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Tripartite Consultations: The Congo
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary of State
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Embassy
- Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
- Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
- Mr. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy
- Mr. Pierre Pelen, Counselor, French Embassy
- Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
- Mr. William L. Blue, WE
The Secretary asked which subject the Ambassadors would like to discuss next as the time was short.
The French Ambassador stated that he would like to comment on the Congo if it were agreeable. He said that his Government considered that there was grave risk in reconvening the parliament at Léopoldville without Tshombe, as Gizenga might well have a majority. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He said he knew this was not the view of the Secretary General who was holding up 12 and 1/2 million dollars because of pressures from extreme African groups. Therefore, the position of his Government was that we should: 1) not press Kasavubu to reconvene parliament; 2) ask the Secretary General not to press Kasavubu and authorize the use of the money already granted by the United States, as the need is great; and 3) continue pressure on Tshombe to come back into line in cooperating with the Léopoldville Government. He emphasized that it was the view of his Government that if such steps were not taken, Gizenga would win out. He asked for the views of the other participants.
The British Ambassador said that they see the same danger as the French if Gizenga should win out, but the difficulty was that too long a delay would allow Gizenga to claim that Kasavubu had gone back on his commitment concerning parliament. Gizenga might in turn secede [Page 159] and gain the support of the Soviet Union, Ghana and so forth. He added that the difficulty lay in this delicate balance of timing. He also noted that the Secretary General might not bow to our pressure for the release of the 12 and 1/2 million dollars.
The Secretary suggested that perhaps our experts here should get together immediately on the risks involved in calling a session of parliament immediately. He said it was the U.S. position that the risk of a Gizenga dominated government was small whereas there was considerable risk if the moderates were blamed for stalling on convening the parliament. He stressed that not only would this cause criticism from fellow Africans, but it would also bring about pressure from the Secretary General. He cited the additional danger of the Soviets giving stronger support to the Stanleyville regime. He added that the United States had been urging the Léopoldville leaders to set up a government and put the Gizenga group in as a minority; that it was certainly not our position that Gizenga should be the Prime Minister. He said we were also trying to get Tshombe to cooperate in the convening of parliament. He concluded with the statement that everything turns on the assessment of the risks involved.
The French Ambassador added that their information was based on a telegram from Léopoldville, dated the 10th, in which Bomboko and Ileo were quoted as being very discouraged. He said he doubted that our experts here in Washington, so far away from the situation, were in a position to judge. He wondered if it would not be best to have the Ambassadors there meet and give us their concerted views. [4 lines of source text not declassified] The Secretary then suggested that we ask our representatives in Léopoldville to meet and assess the various risks involved. Mr. Tyler said we would get a message out on this immediately.
The British Ambassador then said that perhaps this would be a good time to raise the question of the financing of the Congo operation. He asked if there were any possibility of having French help in this, as the U.N. was going steadily into debt. The French Ambassador said that he would report this question to Paris. The Secretary said that he would like to associate the U.S. with the British Ambassador’s initiative, as he was having trouble with the Congress on this matter. He said that he had recently been somewhat belabored on this point in Congressional hearings.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1361. Confidential. Drafted by Blue and approved in S on August 8. The time of the meeting is taken from the Secretary’s appointment book. (Johnson Library) Other topics discussed were recorded in separate memoranda of conversation.↩