Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 20, 1961, 9:25 p.m.

2480. For Yost from Under Secretary. Believe moment propitious have general review of Congo situation with Secretary General both to assure he fully aware our views and to obtain more precise information on his plans.² In discussion you should make following points:

1. We fully agree with SYG that utmost efforts must be made ensure success UN Congo operation. Such will be measured in terms restoration political and economic unity, internal security and economic health.

2. In order achieve these objectives Congo must have viable Government and must not become battlefield for cold war maneuvers. Majority Congo leaders are moderate and want to cooperate in building a viable country. US does not want Gizenga group to be deprived of possibility participating in new Government but if there is to be unity under constructive leadership this group must not be permitted impose its views on nation or be given disproportionate influence in whatever government formed. Congo under Lumumba was unstable and political strife resulted in civil war, separatism and foreign intervention. Gizenga in power would lead country in same direction.

3. SYG should therefore use his influence towards creation of government of moderate character in which members of Lumumba-Gizenga group would be represented, if the parliamentary majority so desires, without being able to exert overriding influence on basic policies of country.

4. High priority should be given to replacement of Belgian military and political personnel in Katanga by UN officers and advisors so as to avoid possibility breakdown internal security there. Belgian concern for safety its civilians Katanga can be relieved by demonstration of UN will and capacity. Believe UNOC in Katanga should assure local Belgians this respect at once. We will continue urge Spaak effect withdrawals. However, feel he has made significant progress this respect. This could be speeded up if SYG sent rep to Congo to conduct talks with Léopoldville and Katanga leaders separately with Belgian representatives brought in on consultative basis as necessary.

5. Retraining Congo army should be speeded up by preparation of workable plan and appointment of senior officer and staff to take charge program and work out details. The essential is to restore security by retraining Congolese army units as and where feasible and not wait for a political settlement between factions. We frankly under impression UN does not yet have practical program.

6. The US Government will assist UN obtain additional contributions for the economic aid programs. A senior official should be appointed to head up an economic stabilization program. He should be person considerable stature with good measure autonomy.

7. Kivu is essentially chaotic and hence should be feasible for UN to extend present intervention Bukavu and impose order generally in province. This would permit provincial authorities reintegrate the area with central government as they wish to do. Such action would make Gizenga more amenable negotiating with central government.

8. Hiring of teachers and technicians for Congo should be stepped up and no discrimination applied against Belgians and other Western personnel. In fact, Belgium is the only adequate source French speaking technicians and teachers with necessary qualifications and willingness serve in Congo.

9. Increased UN surveillance over Orientale airfields necessary. UN should refuse permission landing of planes whose mission is either bring military supplies or achieve political objectives contrary to pacification and unification of country. We believe that the UN should not permit Ghana Government to send planes civilian supplies to Stanleyville while Léopoldville is ready to supply any such needs to that area. We believe UN military should re-enter South Kasai as soon as feasible.

10. We recognize that SYG needs the support of Afro-Asians in Congo operations. We are persuaded all reasonable persons can concur in our basic policy which, in nutshell, is not to “win” Congo in cold war sense but to create viable independent nation.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2061. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the newly-created Office of Central African Affairs Robert Eisenberg; cleared by Blue, Wallner, Williams, and Andre J. Navez of the Executive Secretariat; and approved by Bowles. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, London, Paris for USRO, and Elisabethville.
2. An agreement was signed on June 19 by representatives of Léopoldville and Stanleyville providing that Parliament should meet at the University of Lovanium outside Léopoldville, that during the session all members of Parliament should be housed in Lovanium and have no contacts with the outside world, and that the United Nations should take measures to ensure the security of the meeting. It also proposed that Parliament should open no later than June 25. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 823–824.