Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

72. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 13, 1961, 9 p.m.

3318. Congo. Deptel 2424.² Yost read pertinent parts reference telegram to SYG 13 June. SYG declared himself in complete agreement saying “we could have written it ourselves”.

SYG said since our last talk with him³ Sahbani had met with Spaak and reported Spaak taking more pragmatic approach. SYG said he and Sahbani of opinion UN should “go ahead” and see if Spaak protested. SYG believed this approach might be easier for Spaak, most of whose difficulties came in presenting problem palatably to Belgian public. SYG believed Spaak could accept more than he could commit himself to.

SYG said Spaak had been forthcoming on withdrawal of civilians. Spaak had written to Munongo and Bomboko encouraging them to discharge civilians. Both Munongo and Bomboko had answered to effect Spaak intervening in Congolese affairs. However, SYG was encouraged because Munongo had promised discharge not less than 100 civilians this week. If Munongo carried through this would start ball rolling and SYG believed Spaak would not object. Léopoldville, currently more difficult, would be unable play separate game and would have to follow suit. SYG said he did not believe in efficacy tripartite negotiations re withdrawals but proposed send Sahbani to Congo who with background of talks with GOS might be able speed withdrawal process.

SYG said UN in Katanga has been given orders to arrest two of “worst” Belgian advisers if they do not leave shortly. Brussels has ordered them leave Katanga and Munongo wants them out but they have been staying on. SYG admitted legal position UN would be somewhat curious but UN would be acting as agent of government (he did not specify whether he meant Belgian, Congolese or Katangan Government).

SYG said Gardiner had spoken Fri with Gizenga and colleagues. SYG believed as result this meeting Gizenga had submitted “good paper” containing 12 points. (Assume these were points contained our telegram 3295.)⁴

Gizenga also requested UN assistance to arrange meeting in Léopoldville to discuss modalities of Parliament. UN had immediately approached Kasavubu who agreed to meeting. Gizenga delegation arrived Léopoldville 12 June to meet with delegation which probably included Adoula. Meeting should have taken place 13 June but SYG had as yet no report.

SYG then conjectured on causes of Gizenga “climb down” from intransigent mid-May position to current appearance Stanleyville delegation in Léopoldville. SYG suggested this change indicated Gizenga had stopped listening to Soviet and Czech advisers who would surely have insisted he “stick to his guns”, as he was their last and only hope in Congo. However, SYG commented, Gizenga “had not done it for our blue eyes”. He thought UAR primary influence on Gizenga and noted UAR Ambassador to Stanleyville pro-UN as was Nasser. Nasser interest in Congo had always been preservation unity and he had supported Gizenga as strongest unifying force. Now with Kantanga separatism broken and increasing strength in Léopoldville, Nasser anxious get Congo “out of way for Angola”. Other contributing factors to UAR position might be current USSR–UAR difficulties, lack of progress in persuading Sudan to permit transit and overflight, ineffectiveness of Ghana effort, frustration with Casablanca group and ChiCom offensive toward Orientale. (Emergence of Chinese would be equally displeasing to Gizenga who “considered them as bad as the Indians”.) SYG believed UAR position and influential role brought element of stability into picture.

SYG said time threatened and stressed importance of making substantive progress because USSR would do utmost to upset situation. Fact that Stanleyville and Léopoldville had sat down together could represent concrete step even if Parliament not convened until later. He commented Gizenga’s private views were more “advanced” than his publicized views. He believed USSR would try and say UN had betrayed Gizenga but in fact UN would not betray Gizenga by making public his private views. However Kasavubu must not overestimate his chances and at this point could afford to be generous.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–1361. Confidential. Also sent to Elisabethville and Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels.
2. This telegram, June 9, instructed the Embassy in Brussels and USUN to continue their efforts to bring the discussion of the complex problem of Belgian withdrawals “down to a practical plane where prospects for solution can be found.” (Ibid., 770G.00/6–661)
3. Reference is apparently to a June 6 meeting among Hammarskjöld, Yost, and Dean, reported in telegram 3271 from USUN, June 6. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 3295, June 9, reported that Wieschhoff had informed USUN that Hammarskjöld had been indirectly in touch with Thomas Kanza, a representative of the Gizenga regime, in connection with the possibility of arranging a basis for a meeting of Parliament which Gizenga would attend. The telegram stated that Gizenga might be prepared to accept a post as Vice Prime Minister in an Adoula government. Gizenga was reportedly dissatisfied with the help he had been receiving from the Communists and ready to “cut loose from them and throw in his lot with real African nationalists.” (Ibid., 770G.00/6–961)