7. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
THE CONGO AND THE AFRICAN SITUATION
The pro-Lumumba regime of Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville has consolidated its hold over Orientale Province and adjoining Kivu Province. It has invaded Northern Katanga as far as Manono, about 300 miles from Elisabethville. Although the Katanga army is loyal to Tshombe, for the moment at least, the invaders are supported by local Baluba leaders who violently oppose Tshombe. The United Nations has attempted to block the pro-Lumumba invasion of the Katanga and we have reports of serious fighting between UN (Nigerian) forces and Congo National Army (CNA) units at the Manono airport. Tshombe has refused to attend the round-table conference of political leaders called by Kasavubu for January 25, but talks aimed at rapprochement are continuing. The situation is equally bad in Kivu with anti-white activities reported. UN contingents have been reinforced, but have taken no action to neutralize pro-Lumumba forces in the province. Long-distance firing has broken out between CNA units in Goma and Belgian forces in Kisenyi, just across the border in Ruanda-Urundi.
No effective counterforce is presently available to block the extension of the power of the Stanleyville regime, and they may attempt to move into Equateur and Kasai Provinces in the near future. The longer the Stanleyville regime continues in power, the greater is the likelihood of a permanent division of the Congo which might become another source both of protracted East-West conflict and of serious division among African states themselves.
We have approached both the French and the British for their views. The British have little new to offer, but the French might be more inclined to favor unilateral Western support for the Kasavubu regime. In this connection, a Kasavubu representative has now asked Belgium for military aid. The French have not yet taken a position on the request [Page 20] and the UK is completely unsympathetic. We believe a UN solution is still the best answer for the Congo and that the advantage of adherence to our policy of support for the UN outweighs possible advantages inherent in a program of unilateral action in the Congo.
The effect of the Congo on the Afro-Asian world has been divisive in the extreme with three basic blocs discernible. That formed by Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the UAR has actively backed Lumumba as a radical anti-colonial nationalist. Toure of Guinea and Nkrumah of Ghana have, in addition, entertained hopes of using Lumumba in their efforts to gain leadership of West Africa and the Pan-African movement. The support of this bloc for the UN effort has been in direct proportion to the amount of assistance the UN appeared to be giving Lumumba at any given time. A second group composed of India, Tunisia, Liberia, Ethiopia and Malaya has remained essentially committed to a UN solution in the Congo and a revival of parliamentary government, rather than support for Lumumba personally. The third group, which must be considered to include the United States, groups the 11 French-speaking African states which met at Brazzaville, December 15–20, and which have supported Kasavubu.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–KE/1–1861. Secret. This briefing paper, unsigned and undated, was prepared for a January 19 meeting between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy. It was enclosed with a memorandum of January 18 from Director of the Department of State Executive Secretariat Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to Staff Secretary to the President Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, which states that it had been approved by the Secretary. Kennedy’s adviser Clark M. Clifford and Secretary of Defense-designate Robert S. McNamara both summarized the discussion at the meeting in separate memoranda to Kennedy, both dated January 24; neither memorandum records any discussion of the Congo. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence, 1/61–11/63, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, respectively)↩