Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

51. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 22, 1961, 4 p.m.

2573. Congo. SYG called heads US, UK and French Delegations to urgent meeting on Congo this morning. Gist of his presentation was that UN forces will run out of supplies if Matadi is not reopened within approximately one week, that uninterrupted transit through Matadi can be assured only by presence small UN force in port area, that efforts by Abbas to obtain permission for re-entry have been wholly without result and that unless favorable decision can be obtained within next few days SYG sees no alternative but to bring whole question UN presence in Congo once more before SC.

SYG fears that there is concerted policy on part of Léopoldville authorities to “strangle” UN effort in Congo. He cites not only Matadi situation, but Mobutu’s recent closure Coquilhatville airport to UN forces, Ileo’s threat to oppose by force reinforcement of UN contingent at Kitona as well as indications of forthcoming ANC efforts to take over Ndjili and Kamina. He feels that those concerned are now confronted by three alternatives: (1) either a rapid change in present policy of Congolese authorities or (2) accumulating series of UN defeats ending in early liquidation of UN effort in Congo or (3) military action by UN. Latter he does not in fact consider to be feasible since neither Indians nor African states contributing troops are prepared to use force. If outcome is, however, either alternative (2) or (3) he believes that Soviets would gain their objectives in the Congo and that present policy of Congolese authorities is therefore, in fact, serving Soviet objectives.

He proposed that, if there is no favorable reply from Kasavubu to Abbas within next day or two, McKeown inform Congolese military authorities that he is proceeding with adequate force to safeguard UN installation at Matadi in accordance with prior agreements granting UN freedom of movement. If this movement is opposed, McKeown would not in fact use force, but SYG would bring matter immediately before SC. Latter would then have to take decision between alternatives (2) or (3). SYG believes Western powers have strong interest in keeping question out of SC at this time and hopes they will therefore exert their influence with Kasavubu to insure that McKeown movement can go forward peacefully. He considers it impossible that February 21 SC resolution can be implemented if Léopoldville authorities continue to carry out their present policy. In reply to query from Stevenson, SYG said he suspects Congolese believe they can, with Belgian military and financial help, get along without UN and can thereby recover control of Orientale by force.

Berard (France) agreed that Matadi should be opened to UN, that GOC would agree to joint use of port and that GOF will use its influence in this sense. Berard asked that SYG delay any drastic action for at least two or three days to allow time for representations to be made to GOC.

Brigadier Rikhye, who was present, pointed out that UN has under its control at Kitona sufficient arms and ammunition, formerly belonging to Force Publique, to equip two battalions and that Congolese authorities claim this equipment as a result of an agreement with Belgians. They also claim right to control former Force Publique hangar at Ndjili airport which is absolutely essential to UN operation there. In reply to query, Rikhye said 700 Indian troops have already arrived by air and 400 more expected by April 1. GOI has agreed to remainder coming by sea but they will not leave Bombay until UN position at Matadi is restored. In subsequent briefing meeting with Wieschhoff (Secretariat), latter said that SYG is fully aware that it is unlikely seven votes could be obtained in SC for any further affirmative directives concerning Congo operation but Dag is fed up with bearing full responsibility himself.

In response to query Wieschhoff said that Dayal case is on way to solution, that Dayal will go back to Congo but only for one week.² Since SYG has been unable to find satisfactory single successor, he proposes to install triumvirate consisting of a Burmese already in UN employ (as Chairman) and two Africans. However, Wieschhoff pointed out that Abbas is getting no further with Congolese authorities than did Dayal and that if GOC wishes to strengthen its case against Dayal it must at least cooperate with Abbas. Wieschhoff’s estimate was that, unless Congolese change their present policy, UN would be forced out of Congo within four weeks.

Subsequently UK suggested that three Western governments should consult urgently in Washington on this matter. Consensus of the three Ambassadors here was that strong representations to Kasavubu must be promptly made. We are most certainly of this opinion. Further comment follows in separate telegram.³

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2261. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Paris, and Brussels.
2. The New York Times reported on March 20 that Hammarskjöld had asked Dayal to remain in the Congo for another 2 or 3 months. Stevenson discussed the matter with Hammarskjöld that day, stressing the President’s conviction that Dayal’s return to the Congo would jeopardize the success of the U.N. operation. Hammarskjöld told him he was thinking of keeping Dayal in New York until April 1 and having him return to the Congo briefly until about May 1. (Telegram 2557 from USUN, March 20; ibid., 770G.00/3–2061) Stevenson reported the conversation to Cleveland by telephone, and Cleveland telephoned the gist of it to Kennedy. (Memorandum from Cleveland to Bowles, March 20; ibid., 332.70G/3–2061)
3. Telegram 2580 from USUN, March 22, declared that the “extreme gravity” of the situation could hardly be overstated and recommended U.S. efforts to urge the Congolese authorities to cooperate with the U.N. forces, specifically by authorizing their immediate return to Matadi under the joint arrangements proposed by Abbas. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–2261)