Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

430. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 10, 1963, noon–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Prime Minister Adoula ²
• Mr. Toumayan, Interpreter

After the initial exchange of greetings the President thanked the Prime Minister for the support the latter had expressed in his letter to him about the position taken by the President at the UN.³ The President indicated that the UN troops would not remain longer than six months and that by July 1964 the ANC would have to be responsible for maintaining internal order. Had the ANC reached a sufficient stage of development to that end? The Prime Minister replied that with respect to modernization of the army, from the military viewpoint the ANC was fully capable of maintaining order. The only drawback was the question of equipment. Today you could say that throughout the country the ANC was doing its duty, trying to be disciplined; the lack of transport and logistic support, jeeps, trucks, etc., prevented the army from reaching the point where it should be. Training was lagging behind because the Belgians do not want to go too fast with the reform of the army. There are some psychological difficulties which the opposition is attempting to exploit by telling the people that the Belgians will come back and take over their army; this demagogic attitude makes the soldiers hesitant. We can make them understand, continued Adoula, that there is no question of changing the leadership of the army, that they will be trained and taught how to use more modern equipment and that the aid they receive from abroad is intended to accomplish that purpose.

The President asked if it were true that there were only ten Belgian officers and those ten in staff positions only. Would they not need more officers than that? The Prime Minister agreed with the President. The President pointed out that owing to the size of the country and the guerrilla potential more officers would be needed. The Prime Minister agreed and stated that the Belgians were not prepared to send officers in sufficient numbers. The President stressed the significance of the July 1964 UN deadline and the importance of making progress before that date. The Prime Minister indicated that they were encountering difficulties with several African nations about their choice of the nations that would help them. The Arab countries in particular attacked their choice of Israel; yet 250 paratroopers had already come back from Israel, having received very good training there, and this effort would be kept up. It was essential to solve the problems of equipment for the ANC and of training abroad. The Prime Minister himself had traveled with sixteen student pilots on their way to Italy to be trained there. Norway had promised assistance to train navy personnel and Canada for training in telecommunications; these two countries had not yet acted on their promises. Nigeria had agreed to train the police force; talks were presently underway and a decision would be reached soon.

The President emphasized that the UN would not remain after an additional six months; in fact, U Thant had not originally wanted to do that much. The effort should therefore be concentrated upon modernizing the ANC, which would have to keep the peace in the face of serious difficulties. The Prime Minister responded that he fully understood this aspect of the problem. He felt that efforts would be made. They could not indefinitely take undue advantage of foreign aid, but should use it to help themselves get the country going. If during this first months they had been able to look after the security of the country they would have done so, but certain documents had fallen into their hands indicating that after the secession some circles were continuing to seek revenge; it was in order to avoid a bloodbath that the UN had been asked to remain for six months. “I pledge to you,” continued the Prime Minister, “that we will apply all our efforts to be ready when the UN departs. We think you can greatly help us by impressing upon those countries which have agreed to help us the urgency of making good on their promises.” The Prime Minister singled out Norway, Canada, Belgium, and Italy. The President assured the Prime Minister that he would personally take care of it, since he considered the matter to be of the utmost priority.

The President asked about Tshombe and what had happened to him. Adoula replied that as far as he knew nothing had happened to him and that he was in Barcelona keeping his powder dry (il prepare ses batteries) because he wanted to make a political comeback as a strong man. The President asked if he had not lost his financial means. Adoula replied that he thought so but perhaps not completely; anyway, Tshombe had something in reserve. The President asked if mining had resumed and if they were receiving the income from it. Adoula replied affirmatively and stated that they were in complete control of it. The President inquired about the state of agriculture, pointing out that the Congo used to be an agricultural exporter. What were the prospects today? The Prime Minister stated that there was a marked improvement with respect to last year. This year they were making efforts to send people back to growing crops, but in order to keep this up the rural people had to see an improvement in their standard of living, and commodities and consumer goods had to be available to them. Otherwise they would revert to a very low level of subsistence agriculture. This was partly tied to the road improvement program. If the interior could be reached, then cash crops could move. It was also related to the smuggling problem and the weakening of the currency. On the last point the Prime Minister was currently engaged in talks with the IMF.⁴

The President stressed that we do all we can to help the Congo, within the limits placed upon us by our limited sources stretched all over the world. We greatly admire the efforts of the Prime Minister over the last year or so. The Prime Minister responded that our aid had been needed in the past and would continue to be needed. The Congolese people greatly appreciated the interest the American people are taking in them. Even though some propaganda circles may attempt to distort the nature of American aid and make it appear that the US is trying to establish its rule over the Congo, the people understand that the assistance comes from the American people. While being grateful for it, the Congolese do not want to continue to rely indefinitely upon this aid; they want this aid to enable them to straighten up their own country so that they in turn can aid others.

The President asked the Prime Minister if he had anyone accompanying him and the Prime Minister indicated that his Foreign Minister and his Finance Minister were with him. The President then proceeded to the Cabinet Room with the Prime Minister [Governor Williams, Mr. Hutchinson, and Mr. Roosa were also in the Cabinet Room]⁵ where he repeated in front of the group his main points about the urgency of modernization of the ANC in view of the UN deadline. The Prime Minister responded at length, expressing his appreciation and reiterating the intention of the Congolese to do all they could to bring about a speedy recovery. He assured the President that our efforts were not in vain, that the Republic of the Congo had resumed some of the responsibilities of managing the country, and that the paramount problem was bringing about the economic recovery of the country.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. Drafted by Alec G. Toumayan of the Office of Language Services. The time of the meeting is taken from Kennedy’s appointment book. (Kennedy Library) During the last part of the conversation, others were also present (see the last paragraph). According to Kennedy’s appointment book, they included Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Robert V. Roosa, Hutchinson, Congolese Foreign Minister Kalanda, Finance Minister Emanual Bamba, Charge Mario Cardoso, and other members of the Prime Minister’s party.
2. Prime Minister Adoula visited Washington October 9–12 after attending the U.N. General Assembly in New York.
3. Dated October 2. It was sent to Kennedy under cover of an October 9 memorandum from Read to Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)
4. During Adoula’s visit to Washington, a number of formal Congo-IMF meetings and informal bilateral conversations among U.S., Belgian, Congolese, and IMF representatives were held. In a meeting with Adoula on October 11, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harriman expressed the hope that Adoula and the Fund would be able to reach agreement on monetary reform and expressed U.S. willingness to be helpful in any Congo-IMF arrangement. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, FN 17–1 The Congo) Telegram 423 to Léopoldville, October 13, stated that preliminary Congo-IMF agreement had been reached. (Ibid.) Adoula announced a program of financial and monetary reform on November 9. Further documentation on this subject is ibid.
5. Brackets in the source text.