43. Editorial Note
Fighting broke out on March 3 and 4 at Banana and Matadi between Congolese soldiers and elements of the U.N. forces. Ambassador Timberlake reported in telegram 1853, March 4, that he had been in constant touch that afternoon with Foreign Minister Bomboko and Special Representative Dayal trying to arrange a cease-fire at Matadi. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–461) In telegram 1858, March 6, he reported a meeting with Bomboko and Major General Sean McKeown Commander of the U.N. Force in the Congo, to try to reduce the tension level. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–661)
[Page 92]On March 5, at 8:10 p.m. Greenwich time, the Embassy in Léopoldville communicated by voice radio with the Commander of U.S. Naval Task Force 88, then proceeding from Luanda to Capetown, and conveyed Ambassador Timberlake’s recommendation that the task force should reverse course and proceed slowly north because of the developments in the Congo. The commander did so but informed the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Forces (CINCLANT) and the Chief of Naval Operations of his action and requested confirmation or instructions. At 10:30 p.m. Greenwich time, CINCLANT instructed him to proceed. (Notes and chronology prepared in the White House, attached to a memorandum from Kennedy to Rusk and McNamara, March 5; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)
News of the task force’s diversion appeared the next day in The New York Times. A memorandum from President Kennedy to Rusk and McNamara, March 6, reads as follows:
“Did Ambassador Timberlake notify the Department before he requested the Admiral to turn around with his ships? Did the Admiral notify the Navy Department before he acceded to the request? If neither Department was informed before action was taken, is this because of faulty communications or because of the procedures that were followed in this case. In view of the importance that this decision has been given it seems that we should take action in the future to have an opportunity to review these decisions before they are finalized.” (Rusk’s copy of the memorandum from Kennedy cited above, originally dated March 5 but corrected to March 6; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence 1/61– 11/63)
A March 7 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Penfield to Secretary Rusk outlined the sequence of events concerning the task force’s diversion. It states that the CNO duty officer had informed Penfield by telephone on March 5 of Timberlake’s request and had told him that Secretary of Defense McNamara was telephoning Rusk. Penfield replied that he thought the request should be met, provided that Rusk approved. (Ibid., Central Files, 770.5811/ 3–761) According to notes of a telephone conversation between Rusk and McNamara at 3:35 p.m. on March 5, they agreed that it was best to “take the cue from the man on the spot.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192)
Timberlake cabled on March 7 in response to a request for further information that he had advised the task force commander by radio that he saw no reason why the ships should not resume their southward course. (Telegram 1951 to Léopoldville, March 6, and telegram 1866 from Léopoldville, March 7; ibid., Central Files, 770.5811/3–661 and 770.5811/3–761) Penfield’s memorandum to Rusk states that he had recommended that the Navy instruct the task force to resume course and that it had done so. In a telephone conversation on March 7, McNamara told Rusk that the handling of the situation had been “sloppy,” in that [Page 93] neither the initial diversion of the task force nor its return to course had been cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that instructions had been issued that no orders should be accepted except through the Chiefs. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192)
Kennedy’s memorandum to Rusk and McNamara was subsequently numbered National Security Action Memorandum No. 26. Rusk’s copy (cited above) bears a handwritten notation that the Secretary had discussed it with the President on March 23.
The task force, called Solant Amity, is described in a briefing paper with that title, undated but evidently prepared in January or February 1961, as a small Navy/Marine force in the South Atlantic/Indian Ocean area with the twofold purpose of providing a military capability for use in local emergency situations requiring the protection of U.S. citizens or for assistance in local natural disasters and making a good will cruise to show the flag in African countries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, Trips File, Gov. Williams AFW Book) It had been visiting West African ports since late November 1960. Two of the five ships had been diverted in January to bring emergency food supplies to the Congo and transport Guinean troops from the Congo. Documentation concerning Solant Amity is in Department of State, Central File 770.5411.