421. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1
SUBJECT
- Status Report on the Congo2
I. ANC Retraining:
Following the failure of efforts to organize a military assistance program under the aegis of the United Nations, the Congo Government has formally requested the assistance of the United States, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Israel and Italy in undertaking bilateral programs.3 Belgian-American working-level talks are scheduled to begin in Brussels on May 8.4 We have suggested that the other four nations be informed of the talks and invited to meet with the American-Belgian teams at their conclusion.
We have been informed that as a result of the opinion expressed by the Afro-Asians during the CAC meeting at the UN, Spaak is now entertaining the idea that Belgium with United States support should handle the ANC training without the other NATO nations plus Israel. Spaak reportedly would not object if these other nations participated in this training, but he doubts the wisdom of Belgium actually urging this action on other NATO countries.
Ambassador MacArthur vigorously opposed this position and saw Spaak about it today.5 The Ambassador emphasized to Mr. Spaak that training by the United States and Belgium alone would make both countries more vulnerable to Soviet and Afro-Asian propaganda attacks than if a number of other countries participated, and that if in addition to the countries already asked, Nigeria and two or three other Afro-Asian countries could sit on a Steering Group to coordinate training, Western vulnerability would be even further reduced. Spaak finally agreed to the establishment of some coordinating committee. This question will be pursued by the Belgian-American group now meeting in Brussels.
Ambassador Stevenson is sending the Department a telegram6 in which he states that the African delegates in New York are far less likely to criticize ANC retraining conducted bilaterally by the former mother country, Belgium, with the US supplying necessary equipment. Some radical Africans oppose the heavy NATO flavor of the presently proposed trainers and the Arabs and North Africans strongly oppose the Israeli role. We may well have smoother sailing in the Special General Assembly, if we persuade the Belgians to announce their intention to [Page 854] proceed bilaterally with ANC retraining, Ambassador Stevenson argues, and then support Belgium if it is attacked.
II. Briefing of the President:
On Saturday, May 4, Mr. Carl Kaysen of the White House staff requested a memorandum on the current status of ANC retraining in the light of the fact that it was decided at the March 25 meeting with the President and Departmental officers that the policy of UN coordination or endorsement of the retraining would be pursued.7 Mr. Kaysen had noted the Secretary-General’s subsequent refusal to provide such coordination or endorsement, but he believed that a paper was needed to summarize the developments. No specific decision to depart from the earlier policy has ever been taken officially, although the trend of events has virtually excluded any other policy except proceeding on a bilateral basis.8
III. Status of ONUC Forces in the Congo:
The ONUC Force in the Congo has been reduced from a maximum strength of approximately 19,000 men in January. The level is now about 10,000 and it will reach 6,800 by July 1. In view of the serious financial limitations of the UN, it is very possible that the Secretary General will authorize the complete withdrawal of ONUC forces by December 31 or by some date in early 1964. Much depends upon the outcome of the Special UN General Assembly on Finances opening next Tuesday. The importance of ANC retraining is underlined by our objective that a minimum acceptable level of internal security be established in the Congo by the time ONUC forces are withdrawn.
IV. Internal Political Developments:
After considerable soul-searching, Adoula finally announced on April 17 the composition of a new Government consisting of 26 Cabinet members and 9 Secretaries of State. The government represents an extensive effort at compromise to include members from as many moderate parties as possible, particularly Conakat and Abako. The radical Gizenga and MNC/Lumumba elements remain excluded. The new government has already weathered one no-confidence vote. Major changes from the previous government were a shift of Foreign Minister Bomboko to the Justice portfolio, and Interior Minister Kamitatu to Ministry [Page 855] of Planning. The new Foreign Minister is a political unknown, Auguste Kalanda-Mabita, a college graduate holding moderate views.
Parliament is currently in session but has proven more unruly than useful and will continue to pose a threat to the stability of the executive branch as long as it is in session. Persistent rumors indicate that President Kasavubu may recess the present session and recall it as a constituent assembly for the purpose of taking action on the draft constitution. The fundamental law of the land continues to be the provisional constitution.
The most recent development has been a mutiny by the Léopoldville police on May 3 apparently sparked by pay demands. The mutiny was quickly quelled by the ANC and the gendarmerie with very little violence, and the mutineers are being dismissed. Mobutu’s prompt and courageous action in quelling the mutiny has added to the prestige of the Adoula government.
V. Katanga:
Ileo has done a creditable job in Katanga and relations between the central government and Katangese authorities are as good as can be expected. Katanga is receiving back approximately 80% of its foreign exchange, the amnesty has been respected and Conakat members have been given key positions in the new Adoula government. A sizeable number of gendarmes who remain in the bush pose a potential threat to the security of the area. Despite reports of Katanga mercenaries in Angola we do not believe renewed secession is a danger at the present time.
Tribal fighting in Jadotville and incidents in Elisabethville involving ANC troops have kept tension high. These incidents also point up the urgent need to get the ANC retraining program underway.
Several of Tshombe’s Ministers have been censured by the Provincial Assembly and Tshombe himself is facing increasing opposition from within his party. Under pressure from the Assembly Tshombe has transferred extremist Minister of Interior Munongo to the Ministry of Health. The Conakat and Balubakat Parties have formed a common front and a movement to reunify Katanga is gaining ground.
VI. Economic:
The Congolese economy is today in greater need of urgent stabilization measures than at the time of the Cleveland Mission in February. Inflation continues, and the Embassy predicts a continued injection of printing press money at the rate of about 1 billion francs ($20 million) a month. Until government expenditures are reduced through adequate staffing, financial management, and reduction of military outlays, smuggling is curtailed, and foreign exchange controls become more effective, there is little hope for improvement. Although the Monetary [Page 856] Council wavers on the issue of implementing a partial devaluation which the Embassy believes essential, public uncertainty has raised the Brazzaville exchange rate from 250 francs to the dollar to 320 francs in the past few weeks. We estimate a balance of payments deficit of $60 to $80 million for the present calendar year.
Efforts to obtain increased aid from Europe have been impeded by failure to resolve the question of aid coordination and the UN role. The UN, in this area also, seems very reluctant to assume the responsibility we believe it should. The Belgians are thinking in terms of about $5 million in economic assistance, although they have taken no new action, and we hope it will be possible to obtain another $30 million or so from the EEC, UK, Germany, and other countries in order to match our planned overall contribution of about $75 million. We have delayed a planned DAC discussion of Congo requirements pending clarification of the aid coordination issue.
VII. GOC-Portuguese Relations:
Adoula is showing increasing concern over the possibility of chaos in Angola and has expressed a willingness to act as intermediary between the Portuguese and nationalist leaders if this would help. Adoula told us that, although there is no doubt that Angola will eventually be independent, he would not object to a long period of Portuguese administration which provides for Angolans taking over government posts as they learn to manage their own affairs. He was not more specific about what he had in mind.
We are indicating to the Portguese in a general way that Adoula has shown an interest in entering into a dialogue with the GOP. We are not revealing to the Portuguese that Adoula appears to be thinking of trying to bring them and the Portuguese-African nationalists together.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 The Congo. Confidential. Drafted by Carlucci, Officer in Charge of Congo (Léopoldville) Economic Affairs William C. Harrop, and Officer in Charge of Burundi and Rwanda Affairs Arthur T. Tienken. The source text bears a note in Williams’ handwriting: “Believe you’ll find this worthwhile, Sir.” There is no indication, however, that Rusk read it.↩
- A handwritten note “(as of May 8)” appears at this point on the source text.↩
- For text of a May 12 letter from Adoula to Thant informing him of this, see U.N. doc. S/5240/Add.2; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 664–665.↩
- Talks on this subject were held May 8–13 in Brussels. Records of the meetings were enclosed with airgram A–1336 from Brussels. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–2 The Congo)↩
- Telegram 1679 from Brussels reported the May 7 conversation. (Ibid., DEF 19–2 The Congo/UN)↩
- Telegram 4093 from USUN, May 8. (Ibid.)↩
- A memorandum on that subject was sent to Bundy under cover of a May 7 memorandum from Brubeck. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)↩
- A May 14 note from Sam Belk to Kaysen reads in part as follows: “The result of yesterday’s meeting in the Department on ANC retraining was that we now stand solidly behind a multi-national approach. Last week there had been some talk of letting the Belgians do it alone, and it was agreed to review the whole subject.” (Ibid., Brubeck Series, Congo, February–July 1963)↩