388. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary, McGhee, Cleveland, Kaysen, Fredericks, Godley, Weiner
Secretary thought it would be worthwhile get word to Kaunda regarding impounding of planes in Northern Rhodesia and role as mediator. AF preparing telegram.
Secretary thought it would be advantageous for us to be out of touch with UN so that we could be in more flexible diplomatic position.
Secretary asked McGhee to call MacArthur and have the following message passed to Spaak from Rusk: [Page 791]
That we believe incident started by gendarmeries; that this not part of UN plan; that we, nevertheless, should be alert to possible advantages in present situation. (McGhee made this call.)
Cleveland commented on phone call from Yost, who had met with UN officials merely for informational purposes. UN told him that three roadblocks were overrun and four remaining ones will be eliminated tomorrow. Also Tunisian, Ethiopian and Irish will be put into action tomorrow—until now only Indians involved. Also UN will move to high ground along Kipushi road. One commune rescued. Gardiner going to Elisabethville to see Tshombe and tell him he has come for implementation of plan for free UN action and for grounding of Katanga planes. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Katangans intend to fly tomorrow and if they do so, UN will retaliate. UN did not mention intention to destroy airfield. Bunche also requested of Yost a letter from us confirming F–84’s would be available. Brief discussion followed as to whether we should give letter but no decision made.
Some discussion on what we should do with Adoula.
Secretary emphasized strongly his concern that Tshombe might decide to pull the walls down around him, i.e., go on a rampage and kill all Europeans. Secretary wanted thought given as to what steps Tshombe would take, if any, along these lines and what we could do. Kaysen mentioned someone in UN should tell Tshombe and/or Katangans left in power that UN objectives are limited. Gardiner’s attitude must be positive toward settlement.2 Secretary asked Fredericks give thought to [the steps?] Tshombe would take and come up with analysis.
Secretary asked if worthwhile for him go to New York to see U Thant Sunday with perhaps advance guard going Saturday.
Secretary said he spoke to President and told him we would not interfere from military viewpoint. Cleveland said someone should meet with U Thant tomorrow.
Secretary said U Thant should call all parties to agree to plan and show faith by certain concrete steps. He emphasized importance that UN must have political steps parallel to military steps. This should be done by tomorrow. If U Thant is reluctant, President should say something.
[Page 792]Secretary aware we could not afford loss of morale of UN forces by stalemate situation developing. Secretary said we should have something in writing tonight for U Thant to say tomorrow regarding conciliatory efforts. (Cleveland drafting in the morning.)
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2216. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.↩
- Telegram 976 to Léopoldville, December 28, 8:59 p.m., declared that the Congolese Government and United Nations had a unique opportunity for “effective psychological action to take advantage current actions to further Katangan reintegration.” It suggested that it was time for a political-psychological initiative, such as a statement by Kasavubu or Adoula that they were not seeking unconditional surrender, and requested that the Embassy discuss this with Adoula or Kasavubu and with Gardiner. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/12– 2862)↩