Office of the Historian

385. Telegram From the Army Attache in the Congo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

Léopoldville, December 24, 1962, 3:15 p.m.

C–413–62. Reference—USARMA msg cite C–411–62 dtd 22074Z.2

1.
Consultation with officials here tends to confirm information received in New York and indicated to you in ref message regarding U.S. emphasis on negotiated settlement.
2.
Furnishing additional equipment and airlift to UN forces will be meaningless unless there is a clear indication to the UN that the US Government is prepared to permit this equipment to be used.
3.
Desirability of reaching a peaceful solution to situation is recognized. Threat of force is desirable to make negotiation meaningful. However, continued recalcitrance on the part of Tshombe is liable to cause outbreak of hostilities. If this occurs U.S. Government must be prepared to accept situation and support UN military action against Katanga as long as necessary to achieve U.S. and UN objectives.
4.
Urge prompt arrival of at least one other air contingent to overcome Swedish air contingent reluctance to act alone. Artificial restrictions on use of aircraft must be lifted.
5.
Present instructions of UNOC force commander from UN are that his air can attack KAF in the air only when positive KAF attack in north Katanga. Also can follow attacking plane to base and destroy on ground. Also can shoot down any KAF plane in north Katanga which refuses to land on direction. Force commander indicated that upon receipt of additional aircraft he expects to receive instructions from UN that UNMCAF will be permitted to attack all KAF bases in event of further KAF attack. However, there is no definite indication here that such instruction will be forthcoming.
  1. Source: Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Congo. Secret.↩
  2. Telegram C–411–62 stated that Truman had gained the impression in Washington that U.N. inaction in forcing the Katanga issue was due to the U.N. mandate and its execution or to poor leadership and management. Thant and Bunche had told him, and Yost had confirmed, that the United Nations had been restrained from taking action by the U.S., Belgian, and U.K. Governments, which hoped to bring about reunification through negotiation and economic pressures. (Ibid.)↩