Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, December 24, 1962, 3:03 p.m.

949. For General Truman.² As indicated from number of our previous messages, we planning to go to Adoula at appropriate time, after consultation with Spaak and UN giving him our appraisal of the present situation, and indicating our willingness to make further major military contributions in support of the UN effort on the condition that Adoula will show considerably more flexibility in reaching a peaceful agreement with Tshombe than he has demonstrated in the past months.

We would expect that Adoula would take certain conciliatory steps in return for which we would agree to support the UN in its efforts to bring about earliest possible reintegration of the Katanga into the Congo. We intend at the appropriate time, in concert with the UN, to outline specific steps which we would expect Adoula to take and assuming his agreement, Tshombe would then be approached. It would be indicated to Tshombe that if he had not taken certain steps, certain measures would ensue. This represents our tentative thinking at moment.

For decision that will have to be made at highest level, we would like to have your judgment as to whether the UN has the capabilities to achieve the following or what steps would be required in order to develop such UN military capability. Our assumption is that if such a UN capability is either present or can be developed, that it would make military resistance on the part of Tshombe undesirable and therefore help achieve our objective: reintegration of the Katanga into the Congo by peaceful means. Request your judgment therefore on military capability required for UN to get Katanga authorities to do the following:

a. Tshombe should immediately authorize the commencement of UMHK payments of all foreign exchange and appropriate customs revenues to the Monetary Council and both Tshombe and UMHK would immediately send representatives to Léopoldville to work out satisfactory arrangements with the Monetary Council. In the event that Tshombe does not comply with the foregoing within seven days of being advised of this program, the UN will introduce and assist GOC Customs officials to make such collections and if necessary stop railroad cars moving within the Elisabethville perimeter;

b. Tshombe should agree to an immediate standstill of all Katangan military forces in the north Katanga and no forces shall be moved to the north Katanga border. If Katanga does not comply with this point within 24 hours of notification the UN aircraft will harass Katangan troop movements in north Katanga except as they withdraw to south Katanga.

c. All Katangan aircraft capable of military use should be grounded under UN observation either in Kamina, Albertville, or Elisabethville. Any such aircraft not grounded under these arrangements which in fact undertake flight missions will subject all Katangan military aircraft to destruction wherever they are by UN aircraft (rationale: these Katangan aircraft were introduced into the Congo contrary to UN resolutions).

d. Within 48 hours after the reissuance of an amnesty by the GOC, General Muke and several other top gendarmerie officers should go to Léopoldville to take an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic. Other senior officers of the Katangan forces will take an oath where they are located. The UN will transport Muke and the other officers to Léopoldville and will assure them security.

e. Tshombe should terminate the services of mercenaries and effectuate their departure from Katanga within 14 days. All such mercenaries will be permitted to depart the Katanga freely and without any penalty if they do so within these 14 days, following which those caught will be turned over to Congolese Government.

f. After 14 days the UN will exercise its right to freedom of movement in order to assure itself that all the provisions set forth above have been carried out.

In connection with the foregoing, hope you will be prepared to advise Secretary on UN capability and military feasibility various means move to occupy, isolate, or neutralize Jadotville, Kolwezi, Kipushi. Also possibility cutting Eville-Dilolo railroad either by destruction bridges by air or ground action or by “locomotive busting” west of Kolwezi.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/12–2462. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Beaudry and Cleveland, and approved by Williams. Repeated to USUN for Stevenson and Brussels.
2. According to a note from Cleveland to Kaysen, this telegram was intended to provide “political input for the Truman Mission report.” Cleveland’s note, dated December 24, transmitted a paper of the same date, entitled “Congo Operation Plan,” used as a basis for a meeting with Rusk that morning, but with subsequent handwritten revisions. It called for assuring the United Nations and Adoula of U.S. support for U.N. implementation of Phase IV of the U.N. plan, provided that U.N. officials agreed to take no coercive action without U.S. agreement and that Adoula took certain steps. Tshombe would then be required to take action or face consequences along the lines of paragraphs a-f of this telegram. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo, December 1962) A later draft of the paper, dated December 24 but with a drafting date of December 28, is in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2462.