Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

38. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 24, 1961, 9 p.m.

2274. Subject: Congo; Department telegram 1525.²

1. Stevenson called on SYG this morning to present Dept’s views contained reftel. SYG referred to long meetings of Congo Advisory Committee which have been held since last res passed by SC. (Ritchie-Canada has offered to give Plimpton full account of these meetings tomorrow morning.) SYG said he now had extensive mandate which he described as “open ended” as to what might be done and “indefinite” as to who should carry it out. He had been going over res carefully with CAC members to make them understand problems of carrying out res and, though asking their advice, make them take some responsibility for implementation. He said Afro-Asians were very restless under strain of long AC meetings and his insistence that they must be involved with (and by implication responsible for) his decisions.

2. SYG illustrated by referring to operative para 1 of SC res authorizing use of force. He said under this para SC “passed the buck” to SYG as to when force was to be used. SYG had told AC in these circumstances he would have to refer every occasion for use of force to SC for decision which would of course mean no action would be taken. AC had to be willing to provide advice on when force might be used if they expected SYG to act without referral to SC.

3. Among members of AC there was no unity on interpretation of res; SYG said he had presented his views to them as follows: UN forces had been volunteered by member states on certain conditions; in cases of Tunisia, Ethiopia and Sudan each had said troops must not become parties to internal conflicts. In SYG’s view such conditions had to be honored. This did not mean that soldiers could not fight under any circumstances; it did mean they could use force only under certain conditions, i.e., only if they were attacked. If they initiated combat they would thereby become parties to internal conflict. SYG could not be certain what limits of res were, but he did know what limitations were on use of troops as stipulated by contributing govts.

4. In short, SYG commented to us, interpretation he had given CAC was essentially same interpretation on use of troops he had given last Aug. Troops could take position to keep apart contending forces. They could use force to hold such positions against attack; they could not initiate fighting to remove local forces.

5. SYG said Jha (India) after hearing his interpretation had commented that SYG did not seem to see increased power that had been given by new res. SYG said he had made Jha and others present realize that res, whatever else it may have done, did not change his legal position as far as use of troops was concerned.

7. In response to question from Stevenson, SYG said he was trying to get AC to take responsibility as group for decision in implementation of res. Only way he could act was by some agreement among Africans which would offset Sov pressure. CAC meetings on res was on way to get support and understanding for what he had to do. He said an example of problem he faced was Mali whose rep no longer attending AC meetings. Maiga (Mali) came to first meeting and charged that SYG only using CAC to take responsibility in advance for his decisions. SYG said he replied that Maiga unwilling to give advice but would be anxious to criticize whatever was done under res.

8. Turning to specific measures SYG called attention to note verbale (ourtel 2271)³ he had sent to Belgians “for the record”.⁴ He commented to Stevenson: “The real story, of course, is your pressure.” SYG referred to proposal in note that senior UN official be stationed in Belgium to consult on withdrawal of Belgian personnel.

9. Stevenson suggested to SYG desirability of phasing out Belgians by replacing them with UN personnel. SYG said that CAC had accepted without any protest his idea of UN official to deal with Belgian Govt in making arrangements but he had not yet brought them to consider problems involved such as need for phasing out instead of complete and immediate withdrawal. He said this medicine must be given to them slowly. As for consultations with Congolese, he said de facto consultations would be carried out.

10. SYG then summarized his estimation of problem of Belgian withdrawal. In Léopoldville area he said all Belgian military officers and personnel could leave overnight without any serious impact on law and order. As for political advisers, these too could leave immediately without any damage being done since their advice had only hurt UN effort. SYG said he, of course, drew distinction between foregoing classifications and civilian technicians who were needed in Congo. In Kasai he said withdrawal of Belgian military personnel would be harmful to Kalonji’s political fortunes but would not affect law and order. Bunche⁵ observed withdrawal from Kasai might in fact make area more quiet.

12. SYG said Katanga was key problem. Gendarmerie would be nothing without Belgian personnel and Tshombe would collapse without gendarmerie. SYG said his military experts believe UN should put six battalions into Katanga to maintain law and order since gendarmerie would be of no use following withdrawal of Belgians.

13. Stevenson asked SYG about UN replacing Belgian officers for gendarmerie and using it as law and order force. SYG was not favorable to idea though he did say UN might and could replace some Belgian officers in gendarmerie. He was insistent that UN troops must take responsibility for law and order directly and implied gendarmerie as main support for Tshombe was part of political problem of Katanga. It could not therefore be left in Tshombe’s hands as effective force staffed with UN officers. SYG expressed opinion Tshombe would approach Léopoldville for reconciliation only when he could no longer rely on gendarmerie to maintain himself.

14. As for problem of political advisers in Katanga, SYG commented that no difficulty would result from their immediate withdrawal (except for Tshombe).

15. SYG then turned to military implications of new mandate. He said his advisers estimate 25 battalions (23,000 men) are necessary to maintain law and order, of which 6 will be in Katanga. This is on assumption troops would be used as SYG interprets his mandate; i.e., UN forces do not initiate use of force. UN forces would be responsible both for maintenance of law and order and prevention of civil war.

16. In short run, to stop civil war, UN would act to prevent troop movements. This, his advisers tell him, can be done with 19 battalions, which is size of present force if Moroccans and Indonesians stay (SYG said on Wed. he sent renewed urgent appeal to Morocco and Indonesia to leave their troops in Congo). In addition to 19 battalions for short-run, SYG is putting to Africans need for 5–6 battalions within next 2 weeks to be ready for Katanga.

17. In response to Stevenson’s question, SYG said he thought he would get Indian troops and had also sent letter to present contributors asking for additional battalion. He thought he might get single battalions from Ethiopia, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Madagascar. He did not feel he could ask for troops from Pakistan since it was member of military pact.

18. Stevenson then asked about techniques for carrying out UN operation and offered US assistance in providing equipment to to increase mobility of UN forces. He suggested to SYG idea of joint patrols in which Congolese and UN forces worked together. SYG said he had tried to bring this about last fall and felt it would be possible when Léopoldville and Stanleyville regimes had “merged.” This SYG considers definite possibility.

19. Stevenson then noted close consultation which would be necessary between UN and Congolese authorities and noted absence of communications between Dayal and Congolese. SYG said he would have to have effective means deal with Kasavubu and for that reason he might have special rep in Léopoldville specifically on problem of Belgian withdrawal. When Stevenson suggested desirability of replacing Dayal since current contract about ended, SYG said Dayal would have to stay until “we are around corner” of present crisis. (Considering SYG’s strong concern for holding together Afro-Asians, he may have this in mind in not replacing Dayal.) SYG gave no indication he had in mind replacing Dayal at end of his present contract; rather, that it would depend on UN action becoming stabilized.

20. In response to Stevenson’s suggestions of possible candidates, SYG reviewed his efforts to find replacement for Dayal. He said PM Abboud (Sudan) had refused to allow Adeel (Sudan) take job. SYG said he then had asked Pachachi (Iraq UN Rep) to take job but Kassim (Iraq) had refused. SYG said Pachachi had been strong and constant supporter for UN effort in Congo from beginning and was independent, intelligent and able man. SYG said Burmese be very desirable but unlikely that Burmese Govt would make anyone available. As for Abbas (ECA Executive Secretary) he did not feel he could ask him to take job in view Abboud’s refusal to allow Adeel take position. Re Sule (Nigeria), SYG and Bunche did not feel he was sufficiently strong to take such heavy responsibility. Iyasu (Ethiopia) appealed to SYG, but both he and Bunche noted this would mean two generals in charge of UN operations in Congo. SYG emphasized he would appoint Bourguiba, Jr. “within the hour” if his father would ever release him.

21. At end of conversation SYG turned to problem of Belgians. He said in view of compromising Belgian actions last summer re troop withdrawals, he hoped Belgians would issue statement soon saying they would abide SC resolution. He expressed hope US would make known its views supporting Belgian withdrawals in Paris as well as Brussels in order to prevent Belgian reliance on French assistance in face of UN and presumably US pressure.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–2461. Confidential.
2. Telegram 1525, February 22, set forth U.S. views on the Congo, which Stevenson was to discuss with Hammarskjöld. They included: 1) the U.S. belief that Dayal’s successor should be selected and announced as soon as possible; 2) the recommendation that Hammarskjöld initiate discussions with the Belgians and Congolese looking toward phasing out all Belgian military or political advisers, with U.N. personnel replacing Belgian military advisers; and 3) suggestions for strengthening U.N. military forces and offers of U.S. assistance with communications and transportation. (Ibid., 770G.00/2–2261)
3. Telegram 2271, February 24, transmitted the text of a February 22 note verbale from Hammarskjöld to the Belgian Representative to the United Nations. (Ibid., 770G.00/2–2461) The text of the note verbale is printed in U.N. doc. S/4752 and in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 368–369.
4. For texts of letters dated February 24 sent by Hammarskjöld to a number of African countries, see U.N. doc. S/4752 and Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 377–379. A text with variations for individual countries indicated is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 784–786.
5. U.N. Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph J. Bunche.