Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 18, 1962, 5:14 p.m.

1690. For Stevenson. Following is confirmation of telephonic instructions² for your meeting with U Thant today:

1. As SYG knows, we are determined that early practical reintegration of the Katanga into the Congo will take place. As Stevenson and Cleveland stated to the SYG on Sunday evening, the US is fully committed to the success of the UN Plan and we want, before the UN runs out of money, a quick resolution of this question and to close off the alternative of maintaining Katanga’s secession by military resistance.

2. Last Sunday we discussed how much military support is required in order to bulwark the UN and create conditions conducive to immediate steps being taken on key elements of the Thant Plan (for example, standstill, amnesty, cease-fire, practical arrangements on division of power, integration of forces, immediate payments to GOC in accordance with UMHK payments plan). The UN buildup is proceeding. The Saabs are moving in, there are the Italian fighters which we hope to get in before the end of the year, the Indonesian troops are already at Dar-es-Salaam, our internal airlift of vehicles and supplies is proceeding expeditiously.

3. The SYG’s assessment is that, with the added help he has asked us for, he can “dispose of the problem” by end of February and that, with such a force, it should be possible to immobilize Katanga’s forces and make military resistance seem very unwise to Tshombe.

4. We are therefore ready to respond soonest to UN request for additional equipment and supporting assistance to UNOC. Since there will naturally be technical problems in each of the categories SYG has mentioned (armored personnel carriers, heavy trucks, combat aircraft, and bridging materials), the Department of Defense will be available for immediate technical discussions with UN Secretariat to see just what is required and what we can provide on what schedule. FYI. While question of a US air unit is pending we will probably not proceed with provision of US aircraft to be flown by non-US crews; in any case, F–86’s and Mustangs are probably unavailable. On bridging operations, we are dubious about inserting an American engineering unit, which would typically be partly composed of combat troops; this would raise all the same problems, for UN and US, that are raised by proposal for US air unit, without having the dramatic effect. End FYI. We will move as rapidly as possible in getting the six Philippine aircraft from Manila to Congo.

5. This should help show Tshombe we mean business and, in the meantime, we are going to make a further military assessment of our own. The President is dispatching a Major-General and a small group to make a quick military appreciation as to what additionally would be necessary in order to make the US and UN resolve credible. We would wish to determine as precisely as possible what would be needed to protect a US air squadron and to make our own estimate of the present capabilities of UN forces. Please ask SYG to arrange full cooperation with this survey team.

6. We are also apprising Spaak of the steps we are taking in concert with Thant and we will discuss with him also our willingness to consider sending a US fighter squadron to the Congo in support of the UN if necessary and if invited to do so by Adoula.

7. The President intends to inform the British in general of our plans at Nassau.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1862. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco and Cleveland, cleared in draft by Rusk and by Kaysen, and approved by Cleveland.
2. The instructions originally dictated by telephone to Stevenson’s office were revised by Rusk. A paper headed “Draft tel for Amb. Stevenson from Secy,” is identical to paragraphs 1–7 of telegram 1690 except paragraph 4, which states that the United States would respond immediately to Thant’s request and would make available all the equipment he had requested. A paper headed “Drafted Approved by Secy with Substitution of Para 4” contains the substitute paragraph 4, identical to paragraph 4 in telegram 1690. (Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Stevenson Papers, Embargoed Files, Box 2, Congo)