Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, December 8, 1962, 5:41 p.m.

859. Eyes only for Ambassadors and Consul from Under Secy. McGhee. Spaak’s willingness face show-down with Tshombe on UMHK payments (Brussels’ 804²) gives us what is perhaps final opportunity make voluntary progress towards end Katangan secession along lines envisaged in UN Reconciliation Plan. If accompanied by forthcoming attitude on part of GOC, it is believed that there is real possibility that Tshombe will acquiesce in the proposal and that the back of his secession will be broken.

In any event Dept. still feels strategy outlined in Deptel 792 to Leopoldville, repeated others,³ is still valid. Since success in what we seek depends on cooperation of a number of different governments and other elements, each of which has its own particular interests, objectives and evaluation of situation, our odds can be greatly improved if we can persuade them, insofar as possible, to adopt our strategic concept so that our efforts will be self-reinforcing.

Unless you perceive some reason why this should not be done in your particular situation, you should take earliest opportunity have full and frank discussion with whomever you normally deal in such matters going over fully our concept of strategy outlined in Deptel 792 (which must of course be modified in Elisabethville) and attempting persuade government or other element concerned to take actions along following lines. If we are to take advantage of present opportunity we must induce some movement along these lines within next few days.

1. UN. We must persuade the UN to give conciliation phase of Plan another chance, even as we move on to economic pressures. Gardiner should again play an active mediatory role between Adoula and Tshombe on all aspects of the Plan. He should urge Adoula to make conciliatory statements, to get a top level negotiator back to Eville and discussions going again in Mixed Commissions. The UN should adopt a firmer attitude toward Adoula, now that he has taken Kongolo, to activate Tripartite Observation Teams and stop further military ventures. Every effort must be made to obtain a real standstill and cease fire on the part of both parties. The UN should realize the great importance of a change in UMHK payments to the GOC and give this every support. The UN should understand that the other purely economic sanctions they propose will have less effect, and may not in themselves be decisive in forcing Tshombe to capitulate, or even to negotiate. We will, in any event, expect to approve in advance individual sanctions they wish to apply. We must make it clear that we will take a careful look at any UN proposals for forceful action, either in Eville or elsewhere, which would lead to hostilities. We will not support the unprovoked use of force by the UN.

2. UK. We must continue to keep the UK advised of our plans, and express the hope they will at least continue to acquiesce in actions we, the UN and the GOB may feel impelled to take and not unwittingly make moves which would inhibit our actions. In particular, we should discourage the UK from making unnecessary statements of opposition to economic sanctions in the Congo even when qualified by assurances that they do not intend to oppose them.

3. GOB. We must continue to persuade the GOB to force change in UMHK payments to the GOC, with or without approval by Tshombe and without waiting for specific political concessions from Adoula. The alternative is across-the-board sanctions against Belgian companies in the Congo, with strong possibility for shut-down of plants in the Katanga and attacks against Belgians there and damage to plants, which is much the greater danger. We must assure them of our willingness to share in any losses incurred as a result of UMHK cooperation. We hope the GOB will realize their responsibilities, both from a historical standpoint and from the standpoint of their trade and investment in the Congo, to make a substantial contribution to the UN Import Program for the Congo and the carrying out of the Greene Plan.

4. UMHK. We must persuade the UMHK that their long-range interests lie in effecting unity of the Congo through the Plan; that they must be willing, as requested by the GOB, to take considerable risks to this end, at least to the point of making change in their payment to the GOC with or without Tshombe’s approval. We must convince them of the inevitability of the end of the Katangan secession and that there is less danger to their personnel and interests through change in their payments to GOC than through more severe economic measures which will inevitably come if there is no progress, or hostilities which could come at any time through miscalculation. We must convince them of their obligations toward GOB and Western interests in the Congo. We must make it clear we are willing to help them with what losses they may suffer, but only if they cooperate with the Plan.

5. GOC. We must persuade Adoula that positive action is required on the part of the GOC if the Plan is to be accomplished. He must arouse himself and his government to make a last effort to carry out the Plan through conciliation. There is a limit as to what the UN can do without his cooperation. The UN will not initiate use of military force to achieve its objectives. Although we are prepared to go forward with economic pressures, there is no proof that they alone can assure Tshombe’s capitulation. The GOC must always be ready to talk to Tshombe if and when he begins to feel the pressure. We must urge upon Adoula his obligation, in the light of what we and the UN are doing for him, to give more heed to the suggestions we make. We must urge him to stop further military actions, to activate Tripartite Observation Teams, to send a high level representative to Eville, and to reestablish discussions in the mixed Military and Economic Commissions.

6. GOK. We must recreate a situation which would induce Tshombe to resume negotiations under the Plan. We must make it clear that this route is still open to him and that security will be provided to him and his associates. We must urge upon him the necessity to negotiate flexibly under the Plan. We must make it clear that we are not against him and that he is free to achieve anything in the Congo politically that he is capable of achieving on his own. We must convince him that he has no real support in Western or African countries. We must convince him of the determination of the UN, USG, and GOB to see an end to his secession, no matter what the cost or how long it takes. We must convince him to acquiesce in the change in payments by UMHK to the GOC as being the only way of avoiding more severe economic measures.

7. Katanga Europeans. We must persuade the Europeans in the Katanga of the inevitability of ending the secession, and that this can best be done by peaceful means; i.e., through agreement by Tshombe or the change in UMHK payments scheme, rather than through the more severe economic measures which will inevitably result if there is no early progress. We must convince them that not only the interests of Katanga but their own can best be served by urging Tshombe to negotiate under the Plan and to carry out the Plan in good faith. We must attempt to reinforce their loyalty to GOB and Western interests in the Congo as a whole.

Rush

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–762. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by McGhee and cleared by Williams, Sisco, and Burdett. Also sent to London, Leopoldville, USUN, and Elisabethville.
2. Telegram 804, December 7, reported that Spaak had told MacArthur he was drafting a message to Tshombe in which he planned to say that Katanga faced the likelihood of U.N. military action unless it accepted a change in Union Miniere payments from the Katangan Government to the Congolese Government. Union Miniere officials had agreed to the proposed financial arrangements, and Spaak was seeking their agreement to send a representative to Elisabethville to join in urging Tshombe’s acceptance. The Belgian Cabinet had approved the plan that morning. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–762) The text of Spaak’s draft message was transmitted in telegram 842 from Brussels, December 12. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1262)
3. Document 344.