345. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1

1268. Called on Adoula to do what I could about prospective Cabinet changes. Since Thomas Kanza had been rumored for Foreign Minister, reminded Adoula Kanza had been excluded from U.S. at GOC request and his nomination could be embarrassing. Adoula said Kanza would not be named.

Adoula then painfully revealed that Cabinet had taken decision to suspend administrative punishments for accused persons. In great embarrassment, [Page 702] he confirmed my estimate that this meant freeing Gizenga. He claimed latter would not be allowed to leave Léopoldville and will be under surveillance until he is tried. (Release orders for other detenus, including Bisukiro, contain similar provisions. We doubt that they will be observed after first few days.) He also said Gizenga could occupy no government post and could not appear in Parliament.

I observed that he knew well grave effect this news would have in my country. Said it was noteworthy Isvestia again agitating for Gizenga.

Adoula said it was no coincidence Isvestia spoke for Gizenga. As to effect on foreign opinion of letting Gizenga go, he knew it all too well, but said sorrowfully that I must be aware that his failure to unify country by procrastination on UN resolutions had brought him to this pass. He had been told to be patient until all patience in Parliament and country had run out. He had been obliged to take this step to forestall Parliamentary vote for outright liberation and even now was not sure that it could be prevented. At this point he said he was in despair of working with Parliament. He commented that measures U.S. and UN were now talking about were coming too late even if we meant them. Government and Parliament were becoming unmanageable and he was about “used up.”

Adoula said he had tried to dispose of Gizenga every legal way he knew how, even to discussing managed escapes with interested powers; he had asked Belgians to supply the Higher Tribunal projected under Loi Fondamentale for cases like Gizenga possibly but Belgians had abstained; Parliament could create Tribunal but this would require two-thirds majority.

I said I still hoped some way could be found to get Gizenga to Switzerland for medical reasons and prevent his return. Adoula agreed but asked how it could be done. I could give no concrete answer. (Comment: Department will note that Gizenga not yet released and there may be slim hope that release may yet be avoided.)

I remarked Tshombe would hail the news as proof of weakness of government and Communist influences on it. This drew only spark of day from despondent Adoula. He said he would like to [see?] Tshombe try such claim. After all it was Tshombe who had called for release of Gizenga by name and it was he (and West) who had so agitated the amnesty issue which opposition had seized upon.

As I left, Adoula said he was preparing a note for Bomboko to give to President describing grave situation of GOC and its relation to Katanga problem.

During conversation Adoula received call which he said gave him information that signatures were being gathered for Senate motion of no [Page 703] confidence. He said he could beat it but he lamented having to repeat excruciating process of last few days.2

Comment: Adoula is in sad state at present. Says he is sick and attributes it to “fatigue.” He is much of a family man and is concerned for wife who is still in hospital.

I would guess that he is apprehensive about deals he had to make to get through Parliament vote and that Kamitatu forced his hand on Gizenga.

It is still doubtful whether Adoula can stay in office during next few weeks or whether he can do so without excessive concessions to left/right opposition.

Department should continue to bear in mind alternative of suspension of Parliament or convocation of constituent assembly. Kasavubu or Adoula might ask or seize authority to rule by decree during interim. To do this Adoula would have to make extensive promises in economic and political fields, particularly to assure recovery of Katanga. Before he could make such promises he would have to have something more concrete from U.S. and UN than he now has including something more than UMHK payments scheme. A military success would also help him.

In an effort to find out if Bomboko had informed Adoula about proposed confrontation in New York, I asked Adoula if he contemplated a visit to U.S. or UN. He missed drift of question and replied that if Communists took over country he would have to get out and would seek aid in United States.

Gullion
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–3062. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:58 p.m. and repeated to London, Brussels, USUN, and Stanleyville.
  2. Adoula had barely survived a vote of no confidence on November 28. Telegram 1245 of that date reported that Adoula’s narrow victory had left him seriously weakened; the government had been “chastised and humiliated” and Adoula’s authority had been “severely shaken.” It concluded: “Department should note that Embassy was deployed full out on this operation at considerable risk to future relations with opposition groups. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Doubt if pitcher could go to well this way one more time.” (Ibid., 770G.00/11–2862)