Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

343. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 29, 1962, 9 p.m.

2034. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee. Eyes only Principal Officers. Policy. Subject: Congo. Reference: USUN 2015.² Prior to meeting with Bunche this morning, Rothschild, Loridan and Davignon met at mission with Yost and MacArthur. Rothschild said text of new proposal agreed on last night (USUN 2015 [2016])³ was still satisfactory to Belgians but that Spaak thought best not present it to Bunche since it might necessitate new consultations by Bunche with SYG. This was agreed. Belgians accepted without reservations redraft of text done this a.m. in USUN, which has purpose of tightening up previous text and adding reference to conveying decisions reached to Tshombe. New text, which approved by McGhee in telecon with Pedersen, follows by separate telegram.⁴ Understanding is that it will be used only internally by US and Belgians. In place this text group approved brief talking paper for discussion with Bunche. Text this paper also follows by separate telegram.⁵

Meeting in Bunche’s office at 11:30 a.m. revealed major transformation overnight in UN attitude toward new proposal, with both Bunche and Gardiner much more enthusiastic about it than previous evening. Bunche said his impression of understanding reached last night was that Gardiner would proceed Léopoldville, inform Adoula of talks here, “sound him out” on second of two proposals, e.g., “consultations” which would be called by SYG and would include Adoula, Spaak, Rusk and high representative of UMHK but not UK Foreign Minister. Loridan broke in to say the Belgians thought UK should not be excluded. They should be invited but they might not come. Bunche explained UN view that if UK invited this would present difficulties because UK had accepted only phase one of courses of action and had reservations to remainder. This would be known to Adoula and Gardiner’s approach would thus be handicapped. Bunche added confidentially that British had further damaged their position with respect to Congolese by suggesting to some UN delegates that Tshombe should replace Adoula as Prime Minister. MacArthur suggested that UK need not be invited but could be called into consultations later if needed. Loridan suggested that Gardiner therefore need tell Adoula only about US and Belgian participation.

Bunche then continued with summary his understanding which was that after Gardiner had approached Adoula, US and Belgian Ambassadors Léopoldville would support proposal with Adoula. Gardiner would tell Adoula that from discussions here had emerged idea that since consultation was provided for in plan, it was desirable that SYG confer with Adoula and representatives of interested governments. This was simply practicable step in context plan and not a new proposal.

Yost suggested Adoula be told that plan having encountered obstacles it now necessary consult on moving forward. SYG would therefore invite Adoula come and consult with him and would also request presence Spaak and Rusk. Gardiner pointed out that plans were being made on assumption Adoula would agree to proposal. Gardiner said he would do his best to get Adoula’s agreement. However, he wanted to know what he was supposed to do if Adoula did not agree. Yost replied that it would then be necessary to consult again. However, we hoped Gardiner could convince Adoula of desirability of consultations which would have effect of strengthening Adoula’s position. MacArthur suggested that Gardiner point out to Adoula that powers concerned wish agree with SYG and Adoula on measures to be taken, then if Tshombe would not agree, powers would be committed to move forward. Consultations would assist Spaak vis-a-vis own government.

Bunche then said he had understood yesterday that there was no question of inviting Tshombe to New York. Said SYG wanted make very clear he could not invite Tshombe. Gardiner must be clear on this point in talking to Adoula. This was in fact key to winning Adoula agreement to come to New York. Moreover SYG objected Tshombe’s coming because of sure negative Afro-Asian reaction. Davignon alluded to possibility that, after consulting, group might feel best way to persuade Tshombe accept decisions would be summon him to New York. It was finally agreed that if Gardiner were asked whether proposal included invitation to Tshombe he could tell him this not at all contemplated during period of consultation and would only occur if Adoula himself subsequently considered it desirable.

It was further agreed that sooner consultation in New York could take place the better. Gardiner said he could arrive Léopoldville December 2. How soon Adoula could come would depend on situation with parliament. Consensus of group was it unlikely consultations could begin before end of week beginning December 2, but that they should be held soon as possible.

Yost then reviewed talking paper developed in morning (see above) which US and Belgians suggested be used by Gardiner as basis for his conversation with Adoula. Davignon called particular attention to paragraph D(2),⁶ pointing out this had not been mentioned in yesterday’s meeting. Said Belgium anxious participate in action proposed in D(2) if agreeable to UN. US said it also would like participate. Gardiner wondered about inclusion point D(5). He thought Adoula would take position he had done everything he had to do on constitution. Rothschild pointed out that purpose of giving Gardiner paper was so that he could give Adoula some idea of what would be brought up in consultations. Purpose was avoid Adoula’s feeling cheated when he arrived in New York and someone raised subjects such as constitution. It was agreed that Gardiner should mention question of constitution to Adoula but not lay too much stress on it at this time.

Since Gardiner had no further questions concerning his mission, Loridan and Yost then asked Bunche if he could give them paper containing 16 measures which Bunche and SYG had mentioned on several previous occasions as being actions which UN might be able to take to further implementation of plan. Bunche explained that there were 17 and [not?] 16 items involved, and that these had resulted from an internal exercise of UN. It had started with 30 or 40 possible steps and had been distilled down in terms of practicability and feasibility to 17. However, SYG had not agreed to release list to anyone since he had not discussed steps with CAC. Steps covered all phases of action inside and outside plan, were a catalogue of measures from which selection could be made as required. Yost said we hoped discuss measures in detail with SYG before consultation with Adoula began. MacArthur pointed out that there might be time element in some actions which might require legislation, therefore it reasonable discuss them now. Bunche said SYG might be willing to discuss with US and Belgium but had been concerned about possible leak. Subject was then dropped without agreement as to when SYG would reveal measures to US and Belgium.

Comment: Meeting resulted in clear understanding that Gardiner would take lead in presenting new proposal to Adoula, basing himself on talking paper which, however, would not be given Adoula. Paper would be transmitted by USUN to Gullion and given by him to Belgian Ambassador. Both Ambassadors would await Gardiner’s arrival and consult with him on how best support latter’s approach to Adoula. UN is clearly committed to proposal and Gardiner apparently ready do his best to sell it to Adoula without suggesting any alternative measures. Consultations will begin as soon as Adoula can arrange be absent from Léopoldville. UK will not be initially invited and decision on Tshombe will await developments with Adoula having veto over invitation to Tshombe to come to New York. There appears little prospect in any event that SYG will favor this course, though it remains open as possibility.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:25 a.m. on November 30 and repeated to Brussels, London, Léopoldville, and Elisabethville.
2. Document 342.
3. See footnote 3, Document 342.
4. Telegram 2037 from USUN, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962)
5. Telegram 2039 from USUN, November 29. (Ibid.)
6. Paragraph D listed elements to be included in the prospective consultations in New York, including: 1) arrangements concerning foreign exchange and taxes, 2) steps that might be taken to equip one or two ANC battalions, 3) additional economic measures to implement the plan, 4) formulas for application of the rest of the plan, such as military oath, amnesty, and military integration, 5) proposals that the Congolese Government declare its intention to give careful consideration to proposed amendments to the constitution, including those from Tshombe, consistent with the U.N. plan, and 6) methods of conveying the decisions of the consultations to Tshombe.