Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

33. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 20, 1961, 11:01–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
• M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand said he wished to discuss the Congo situation and first to say that Paris agreed with the U.S. position regarding the urgent need to prevent the Sudanese from offering passage and transit rights to the UAR, the Soviets and others for materiel for the Gizenga regime. He said he thought our three Ambassadors in Khartoum were cooperating on this score. The Secretary said that the Sudanese were still holding firm so far as we knew but that they were under heavy pressures. He was glad that the three Western powers were working closely together.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French also agreed with the U.S. estimate of Soviet intentions in the Congo and their desire to dominate this area. He said the French did not believe that getting rid of Hammarskjöld was the main Soviet objective but rather the Soviets wish to gain a bridgehead in Central Africa. What they seek in New York, Ambassador Alphand continued, is a good compromise from their viewpoint. On the spot, he thought, there would not be so much direct Soviet intervention as UAR support for the Gizenga regime on behalf of the Soviets. The French feel that Gizenga is weak and that it is essential to prevent his reenforcement.

Ambassador Alphand then inquired as to the story in the New York Times of February 20 by Raymond as to U.S. military plans for the Congo. He wondered how this jibed with the U.S. position in New York that there should be no outside interference in the affairs of the Congo. The Secretary said the story was untrue. Ambassador Alphand thought that we should in fact use the U.N. as a flag and as cover for assistance to the legal Government of President Kasavubu. If this failed, it might be necessary to undertake direct aid to the Congolese Government. The French did not think that any new U.N. resolution was required to provide for U.N. assistance to Kasavubu. He continued saying he knew that Ambassador Stevenson was working to obtain a resolution but thought that maybe the results would be bad. The cessation of hostilities, according to Ambassador Alphand, would assist the Gizenga regime. Furthermore, the text which was being worked on was a bad one in that it contained no reference to the legal Government of the Congo. The French felt strongly it was better to have no resolution at all.

Ambassador Alphand said that Paris’ view was that the three Western powers should work together and perhaps closely with some of the pro-Western Africans to assist Kasavubu, either through the U.N. or bilaterally. The Western powers must give the Soviets the idea that they cannot dominate the Congo. Ambassador Alphand thought that the President’s press conference statement on the Congo²had been extremely good and that it had been well-received in France. He thought it would be most unfortunate if the Soviets should think that they could obtain a compromise which would permit continued existence of the Gizenga regime.

Ambassador Alphand then added that France believed Kasavubu should receive assistance but not Tshombe. France was, however, willing and indeed desirous of seeing the Ileo Government broadened.

The Secretary then noted that we had really two Congo problems; one inside the Congo and one outside. Inside, it was true that Gizenga appeared to be fairly weak and there seemed to be a fair chance that his regime might collapse. Therefore, it was important for the U.N. to have the authority to stop any outside assistance which could prop up the Gizenga regime. Although it was possible that the Secretary General might already have this authority, this was not his view and he thought he needed a strengthened mandate through a new resolution. The Secretary regretted that inside the Congo there was so little independent moderate Congolese leadership. Ambassador Alphand then inquired as to our views on the eventual form of government of the Congo and as to whether we favored a confederation. The Secretary said that we would accept the loosest and most tenuous confederation or even be satisfied if we could say that meaningful discussions toward obtaining such a confederation were under way. He said we were trying to assist Kasavubu, and it was difficult to do so when he sent political prisoners off to Kasai where they were murdered.³

The Secretary continued saying that the problem outside the Congo was one of strong African nationalist views on this subject, whereas inside the Congo there was not even sufficient Congolese nationalism to overcome tribalism in that country.

The Secretary then discussed the UAR resolution in New York⁴ which he said had major weaknesses, particularly in its absence of any references to the Secretary General, its absence of recognition of the Congolese Government even though the U.N. has already seated the Kasavubu delegation, its absence of a ban on introducing arms as well as forces and the wording of the section on the U.N. use of force if necessary.⁵ The Secretary said there were other things we did not like about the resolution too but maybe we could pay this price if the specific points which he mentioned above were somehow taken care of. Ambassador Alphand asked what the Soviet reaction to this resolution might be. The Secretary thought that they were under some pressure not to veto if some substantial African and Asian support for the resolution developed. The Secretary commented that the resolution was also badly drafted. He thought if it were improved along the lines which we desired the Soviets probably would veto it. The Secretary thought it was very likely that no resolution would emanate from the Security Council session. Ambassador Alphand said that this was not only the French view but the French desire as well.

The Secretary thought that if a resolution could interdict outside assistance this would be helpful. Ambassador Alphand said that it might be necessary at a later date to envisage bilateral aid and that such a resolution along these lines might hamper us if such a bilateral program in effect became necessary. The Secretary said that in the event of a collapse of the U.N. effort to the degree which would require some bilateral effort, the resolution would have been overturned in any event by the situation. The French Ambassador said that for the time being the French position did favor a U.N. effort over a bilateral one but the French were wondering what would happen if the U.N. failed. The Secretary said this, of course, would depend on the situation existing at the time. Should suppliers from the other side be coming in in large quantities, we would of course be obliged to take steps, but at that time it would be important to show that we had made every effort to achieve a solution through the United Nations. The Secretary thought this was very important. Ambassador Alphand said he was not sure that Paris really understood this point. Ambassador Alphand said, however, it was important not to exclude the possibility of a bilateral program. The Secretary said he hoped we would not come to this point. Ambassador Alphand reiterated that Paris did not rule out expanding the U.N. mandate provided it was still thought that the U.N. had some chance of succeeding. However, he thought it was important secretly to prepare for bilateral programs.

The Secretary said that all we had done here so far was a staff review of the situation. We have forces in the United States in a high state of readiness but we would certainly deny publicly that we were making any preparations along the lines of those reported in the Raymond story. We did not have any forces on alert status but had had standby forces available for some time.

Ambassador Alphand said that perhaps at some time we would need to use Brazzaville as a staging area and also would want the support of our friends in the French Community. He thought a joint effort should be planned in advance. The Secretary said that there was the problem of leaks and that anything along these lines should be done most carefully. Ambassador Alphand said in effect then that we considered planning of this type too dangerous for the time being, particularly given present Sudanese firmness and the serious logistic problem facing the Soviets. Therefore, for the present time, the Secretary thought it would be better for each to think out these problems on his own. It would perhaps be better not to make any firm plans now and then it would be easier to deny stories of the Raymond type.

The Secretary said that he would want to be talking with the French in the next few days in order to discuss what Ambassador Thompson might say to the Soviets about the Congo when he returned to Moscow. Ambassador Alphand said he thought we should be very tough with the Soviets and tell them frankly we would not accept a Communist regime in the Congo. He added Khrushchev anyway was not in a good logistic position vis-a-vis the Congo. The Secretary agreed and said that sometimes he thought we were over pessimistic about our own position in the Congo since the Soviets were having troubles too.

Ambassador Alphand reiterated that the French would not recognize Tshombe or Kalonji. He said France had not been responsible for sending any planes to Katanga. The Secretary said he understood that the three French planes which were delivered had been flown by an American company with an office in Luxembourg.⁶ Ambassador Alphand said the French were also being tough with Col. Trinquier and were taking steps to prevent recruiting activities by the Katanga in Paris.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on March 5. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s appointment book. (Johnson Library)
2. At his press conference on February 15, Kennedy commented on the Soviet statement the previous day on the Congo. He stated: “I would conceive it to be the duty of the United States and, indeed, all members of the United Nations to defend the Charter of the United Nations by opposing any attempt by any government to intervene unilaterally in the Congo.” For the transcript of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 91–99.
3. Hammarskjöld informed the Security Council on February 20 of a report of the execution of six Lumumba supporters who had been sent to Bakwanga by the Léopoldville authorities. The text of his statement is printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vol. V, pp. 355–356.
4. Reference is to a draft Security Council resolution that Ceylon, the UAR, and Liberia had submitted on February 17; see Document 34.
5. In February 18 messages to Nehru, Balewa, and Liberian President William V.S. Tubman, Kennedy urged revision of the draft resolution. (All in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–1861)
6. See footnote 2, Document 31.