Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

305. Telegram From the Consulate in Elisabethville to the Department of State¹

Elisabethville, October 4, 1962, 8 p.m.

545. Leopoldville for Ambassador. Department for Secretary and Under Secretary from McGhee. During first substantive meeting with Tshombe this morning, after obtaining permission make first exposition, I attempted make explicitly clear purpose my mission to Congo.

My introductory remarks which followed closely talking paper² prepared in cooperation Ambassador Gullion and others in group here included following argumentation:

1. As evidence strong US interest in resolving this problem, President Kennedy asked me to review situation first hand. Tshombe may be assured there no animosity toward Katanga or him. We do not wish be in conflict with him. We would like help him build stable, prosperous Katanga within Congolese unity. I have no new plan or propositions, am not negotiator or mediator, and arrive with open and sympathetic mind to hear whatever he has to say.

2. US Government impressed by increasing moderation Adoula government and believes all Congolese can benefit from reconciliation between moderate elements represented by GOC and similar elements within Tshombe government. Such rapprochement would have advantages of further reducing opportunities for extremist elements come to power in Congo.

3. US Government deeply concerned at current intrigues to bring down central government and absence of any foreseeable moderate alternative should this come about. Chaos which would probably follow fall Adoula government would invite Communism and other extremism. It would thus be only matter of time before Katanga would face militant, extremist and Communist backed enemy on her northern frontiers.

4. There virtually universal support among free world nations of U Thant plan. There no responsible minority in non-Communist world in opposition to plan itself. This particularly true in US where, e.g., Senator Dodd wholeheartedly supports plan.

5. If plan fails, Tshombe may be able retain present position for short time but his position will inevitably deteriorate. He can expect continued isolation from Western countries on whom he depends economically. Foreign capital and markets will be in doubt. Present routes to world countries lie across African countries whose future is not assured. Would be short-sighted try create bloc with these countries. Moreover GOC cannot let continued independence Katanga go unchallenged. GOC may, if unable obtain adequate help from West, turn to extremist African nations and East with dire consequences to Katanga and rest of Congo.

6. US seeks no special advantages for itself re economic interests in Katanga. Our interests lie in assuring unified Congo which can become strong enough politically to maintain law and order, provide economic opportunities for its people, maintain its independence, and ultimately become economically vital enough obtain nothing from Katanga which vital to us.

7. Tshombe has unique opportunity now to demonstrate to world statesmanlike attitude in carrying out plan which will earn for him widespread admiration and appreciation for making possible creation of unified Congo. He has opportunity to reestablish himself and Katanga within African family of nations and free world community. These associations much more congenial than his present position of isolation.

8. Draft federal constitution reportedly contains provisions which provide for reasonable autonomy and ample judicial and other protection against arbitrary actions. Tshombe’s ideas taken into consideration by drafting experts. Tshombe thus need not fear consequences of integration of Katanga and its structures into federation.

9. Only way plan can succeed is for both parties to proceed, step by step, on assumption that entire plan will be carried out in fairness and good faith on both sides. It not possible carry it out by bargaining performance on one aspect against performance on another or to hold up on start until execution of another. We convinced of impartiality of UN in this process. Tshombe must have confidence we mean what we say when we undertook assure plan will be carried out impartially.

10. Important element in Tshombe’s decision is timing. His best time is now. Future uncertain but it difficult see how Tshombe could ever achieve better terms than at present. Renewed fighting may bring physical destruction and embittered relations difficult to overcome.

11. US cannot continue tolerate divided Congo and is determined support carrying out of reconciliation plan by every appropriate means. Main question is whether or not Tshombe will make adjustments on issues outstanding in carrying out plan within time available. Actions up until now have not been convincing. If I go back unable convince my government of Tshombe’s willingness carry out plan, we will of necessity have to consider alternatives of policy available.

Tshombe expressed pleasure over President’s having sent high-ranking official to Katanga. He said US and Katanga pursue same objectives, but he differs with methods of US Government which tend not to support America’s real friends. He contended that he better qualified than most other Congolese to judge Communist opportunities in Congo, having learned from American Bishop Booth and others many years ago realities of Communism and having preached anti-Communism at roundtable, in Washington, and elsewhere. He reviewed his and his father’s political and commercial experience, which he contrasted with US Government’s “superficial knowledge” of Congo situation. He protested he never opposed union of Congo and was federalist as early as two years prior to independence.

Meeting ended as he stated “constitutional problem was at base of all difficulties”.

Shall meet with Tshombe later in day at which he will continue.³

Dean

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–462. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, and USUN.
2. A copy was enclosed with airgram A–137 from Léopoldville, October 11, which also enclosed memoranda of McGhee’s conversations with Tshombe and his ministers in Elisabethville October 4–6. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1162)
3. Telegram 547 from Elisabethville, October 5, reported this conversation, in which Tshombe presented the Katangan case. Speaking of the possibility of sanctions (although McGhee pointed out that he had not used the word), Tshombe said that “if economic boycott initiated Africans would return to manioc economy, nothing would be solved, and possibility of another Algeria would arise. He added that UN military initiative would lead also to destruction in process of which all including Adoula and US would lose heavily.” (Ibid., 770G.00/10–562) Telegram 559 from Elisabethville, October 8, reported on a dinner given by Tshombe for McGhee on October 4. It concluded: “Tshombe made sharp attack on Ambassador Gullion and Secretary Rusk. I said I could not accept this criticism of these gentlemen whom he misjudged.” (Ibid., 770G.00/10–862)