Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

290. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, September 13, 1962, 8 p.m.

633. Had tense and difficult discussion with Adoula concerning possible ANC troop movements within and in direction of Katanga.² While I received few tangible assurances from him, I at least impressed him with difficulties that would be created for US understanding of problem and support for him if at outset of conciliation effort rash movements by ANC should come to world attention. I referred to issues before US Congress and UN at this particular time.

When I expressed myself in this sense, Adoula’s mood switched to indignation. He found it painful that Americans should think it was GOC and not Tshombe who was responsible for psychological climate unfavorable to plan. He pointed out that when he accepted plan he had taken occasion to reiterate that this acceptance did not derogate from sovereign rights of Congo. Whether he moved troops from Stanleyville to Léopoldville or from Léopoldville to Luluabourg to Bakwanga was not concern of UN nor Tshombe nor US. He had not moved any troops into Katanga since Kamina.³

I recalled Adoula had told me soon after June 25 break with Tshombe that ANC had planned retake Kongolo. That plan was conceived in different circumstances and it was too late to put it into effect just as new conciliation effort started. I pointed out that UNSYG’s press statement⁴ had said there was no need for movement of troops by either side in Katanga. While SYG had not mentioned movements elsewhere in Congo he did appear to include not only movements toward Katanga but movements of troops actually within Katanga. Moreover this halt on movements was part of plan just transmitted to him and Tshombe. Adoula first questioned that SYG press statement concerned movements within Katanga. He then said in any case he and I and certainly US knew Tshombe was constantly and at moment moving his troops within Katanga, both north and south. He asked why SYG should refer to “Katanga” when there were two Katangas.⁵GOC had months ago called on Katangese troops to leave north Katanga.

Adoula then said General Mobutu had given orders to halt ANC column which had moved past Katanga [Bakwanga?]. (Whatever may be general intention and actual movement of ANC troops I am confident Adoula is really uncertain as to whereabouts and deployment of many of them.)

Adoula said detailed plan had not yet been accepted by Tshombe or GOC. I asked when he was going to name GOC members to commissions.

Adoula said he had picked them but first his government had to answer Tshombe’s letter. (I received impression this may take more than day or two.)

I said there was indeed difference in moving troops in Kasai and in Katanga. I asked point blank whether movements had relation to “Kalonji affair”.⁶ He resented term; said there was no “political affair”; that Kalonji had escaped and he was escapee until he was recaptured. However, he refused to be drawn with respect to where or when he might be moving troops in Kasai. (While he was vague on movements in Katanga he was evasive about Kasai. I have impression he is finding it difficult to move troops; perhaps for lack of transport or for fear of stripping other areas.)

I said I hoped there would be no delay on getting ahead with Constitution and measures required by plan on behalf of GOC. Adoula said that Constitution would be presented no later than [September] 25; that he had gotten Presidents of Assembly to state that session had been open since third and that Parliament awaited Constitution. He would again issue appeal for submission by provinces of their views on Constitution.

He cited statement by Léopoldville Province published here by newspapers.

I indicated desirability of showing that Katanga had full chance to present its views on Constitution. Adoula indicated he growing increasingly irritated at criticisms on this point. Tshombe had already presented his views on Constitution in exchanges with him over past year and through work on constitutional commissions. He could now present his views in way offered all provinces and GOC was extending dates for submission particularly to accommodate Tshombe. Thereafter he had still further opportunity to express his views in Parliament and in ratification process.

I asked about having Katanga constitutional expert meet UN jurists. Adoula emphatically rejected this. Said Léopoldville has not named its experts but taken those elected by UN. Why should not Katanga do same?

I considered it wise not to press this subject since it seemed likely to provoke Adoula into categoric position from which he would find it difficult to retreat. UN officials are quite aware of need of convincing public Katanga has had opportunity for consultation and Gardiner and Khiary think Adoula can be brought round. Gardiner however asks that US or Belgians refrain from indicating he is “convoking” any Katanga experts to meet with commission. His present efforts are more in nature of smuggling in experts, e.g. Gardiner tried to get Clemens up from Elisabethville but so far without success.

Comment: Adoula was tired after his barnstorming trip in Bakongo and irritated by Tshombe’s blast on roadblock incident.⁷ I think habitual Congolese procrastination and difficulties in transport together with sharpened appreciation of effect on public opinion will cause Adoula at least to try to curb movements for present. We should not, however, underestimate his difficulty in making his intentions effective at long range nor fact that ever since inconclusive Adoula-Tshombe talks in June many Congolese here (and doubtless on Katanga side) have been increasingly dubious of any UN solution and feel that with or without UN sooner or later issue may be decided by arms. Even if there is agreement both are determined that its conclusion should find their military presence in north Katanga. If there is no agreement and UN pulls out they think this deployment all the more vital.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.54/9–1362. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN, London, Paris, Brussels, Elisabethville, and Brazzaville.
2. Telegrams 609, 622, and 626 from Léopoldville, September 11, 12, and 13, transmitted reports that the Congolese army was preparing to move troops into South Kasai and perhaps to attack Kongolo in northern Katanga. (Ibid., 770G.54/9–1162, 770G.00/9–1262, and 770G.5/9–1362, respectively)
3. A contingent of Congolese troops had been placed under the U.N. Command in the Congo in late August and sent to the U.N.-controlled base at Kamina. A U.N. press release of September 3 stated that Adoula and Bunche had agreed months earlier that the troops would be provided to the U.N. Command and stationed at Kamina but the troops had not been available until August. (Telegram 654 from USUN, September 3; ibid., 770G.00/9–362)
4. Reference is to a press statement of September 5; for text, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. VI, pp. 166–167.
5. In July, the Congolese Government had created several additional provinces, including North Katanga.
6. Telegram 594 from Léopoldville, September 8, reported that Albert Kalonji, self-styled “emperor” of South Kasai, had been released from prison by Léopoldville provincial authorities under mysterious circumstances and had departed for Bakwanga. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–862)
7. Tshombe had charged that U.N. forces had killed two Katangan gendarmes in a September 12 incident, reported in telegram 435 from Elisabethville on that date. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–1262)