Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

287. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, August 31, 1962, 8 p.m.

522. Eyes only for Secretary from Ambassador. Re Deptel 351.² Appreciate guidance and background in reference telegram. Agree our maximum effort must now be concentrated on getting agreement to reconciliation proposal and wish to reassure you we here have not come to conclusion there is no possibility of peaceful settlement.

If the past is any guide we are not likely to get rejection from Tshombe. He will say “yes, but” or “maybe” or “do I understand that”. However his response is couched, he will probably describe it as acceptance. But what will he have accepted and what will he execute?

Answers to these questions are vital since GOC politically unable to engage in further negotiation with Tshombe unless concrete steps of integration as provided in US plan are carried out in soonest possible time. Neither Adoula government nor UN presence is likely to survive another run-around from Tshombe such as followed Kitona and marked the close of recent marathon Adoula/Tshombe conversation.

One possibility is that Tshombe who is well aware of UN financial straits will accept enough of plan and go through motions in effort to encourage UN to leave country after which he will secede again. Afro-Asians would hardly let UN pull out unless some irreversible steps toward integration had been taken.

But there is possibility Tshombe will not take those concrete steps as provided in UN plan (e.g. merging his army with ANC) until he knows what constitution will provide. He may consent to symbolic measures which do not really commit him to anything. If he can brush aside the time limits he will then sit back prepared to discuss a constitution ad infinitum.

If GOC and UN would fall in with such a plan a new Congo crisis might be suppressed a while longer. But I doubt very much that GOC would continue negotiations on this basis and U Thant has already declared UN cannot indefinitely last out the course financially and politically. Your message indicates that “key countries” would not be able to go along in application of economic pressures if Tshombe should renege. We do not know which countries these are or what technical difficulties amount to. We already know position of Britain and France and, of course, understand Belgium’s reluctance but so long as latter will follow through the program should be sufficiently effective.

If we and the Belgians fall out and the fact is known in advance what will be effect? The consequences, I submit, would be grave:

(A) For chances of peaceful integration, and

(B) For our own policies and for our faith and credit.

If Tshombe apprehends no pressures and no time limits he will feel free to drag feet on the practical steps of integration which are the real payoff while he engages in debate on semantics of federalism.

Adoula would not negotiate further although he will probably present a constitution to Parliament. He would prepare more actively for civil war.

The UN would try to turn over its responsibilities to him and a responsible legated government but it is more likely that Adoula would quit or give way to a government prepared to do business with the Casablanca bloc and committed, with USSR support, to military liquidation of Tshombe and of British/Belgian enterprise.

Of course we all abhor possibility of further bloodshed but collapse of UN plan because nations fail to take steps in a time of less risk may well cause blood to flow later.

Even now, as Tshombe senses deliquescence in the front opposing him there is a risk of collision as he moves his forces about in effort to confirm some countries in their worry about his reactions.

Possibly the worst effect of failure or flouting of UN plan will be failure of UN itself with implications which transcend Congo.

You will recall that it was only by description of possible pressures that Adoula was brought to accept the UN plan. (We let UN carry ball most of way on this one.) Certainly U Thant was persuaded that courses of action were married to proposal as integral part of new plan. Other countries were officially advised in their respective capitals of the possibility of pressure.

If Katanga reneges and none of these pressures comes into play it is US who will be blamed. As leader of West we will be held accountable for collapse of what is considered an American and a Western plan. Many new African nations do not believe we and West would sincerely apply sanctions to what they consider the creature of one of our number. I think this is one reason why they have so far been silent about the plan.

There can be no sure prediction of the effect of pressures. UN appears to believe that Tshombe will never integrate without them and that they carry less risk than their foreclosure would. UNOC has therefore maintained time limits in effect, sanctions in readiness, and their own forces in full view. It has rejected those recommendations for relaxation in certain particulars which I have repeatedly made to it in full accordance with my instructions. I assume these recommendations were also made to UNNY which has backed UNOC. UNOC estimates its firmness contributes more to a peaceful settlement than adjurations alone would do.

I understand that in our own planning the “courses of action” are not wholly rescinded but deferred while we wait and see what Tshombe does. I fear, however, that it may be difficult to revive the idea of pressures once they have been suspended and brought into question. Our chance for influence may thus be lost.

Tshombe may just possibly be coming to realize that international opinion in favor of integration is building up to irresistible degree. I hope so but I doubt it so long as he thinks he has more to gain by separatism than integration. I do not think therefore that we should let sanctions slide out of sight, this course contains risks but I am convinced that if the Congo question is not resolved under responsible auspices of UN and West it will be settled by others less responsible and not at all deterred by bloodshed.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–3162. Secret; Priority.
2. Document 284.