Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

28. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 14, 1961, 10 p.m.

2201. Subject: Congo. In conversation with Stevenson this noon SYG said he had had three different approaches from Afro-Asians yesterday. General consensus developed, especially with Morocco, at end of day was that following program needed:

1. Full-scale investigation of death of Lumumba²and his companions. SYG commented that until such UN investigation had been held issue would never die down.

2. Clear endorsement of UN responsibility to protect civilians. SYG in response to question said such provision would be supported by Afro-Asians.

3. UN intervention “by peaceful means” to prevent clash between armed units. SYG said he had explained to Afro-Asians why UN intervention could not be by forceful means.

4. Target should remain same as in original program, i.e., army should be gotten out of politics.

5. There must be some formulation re getting Belgians out. He said Afro-Asians had referred to “Belgian combat formations.” He told them there were no such formations in Congo. SYG specifically told Stevenson he could even accept fact that Belgian Government was not behind Belgian nationals in Congo. He had pointed out to Afro-Asians problem was individual foreign nationals serving in Congo military units. He told them he had no means to enforce their withdrawal. Anything he did on this point would therefore have to be by negotiation. He thought they were beginning to see this.

SYG was asked whether he thought new mandate was necessary for these points. He replied he did not think it was but what he needed was maximum support of Afro-Asians. He did not exclude res at this point, however, as he wanted to ascertain Afro-Asian reaction coming from further discussion this afternoon. Late this evening he could give us advice on whether res necessary or not. He thought Nigerians would press hard for one.

SYG seemed unconcerned about Soviet announcement their refusal to recognize him any longer,³ noting primarily that it would make Sov veto any res highly likely. In order to avoid certain Sov veto on any res which authorized SYG to do things he suggested that any provisions in res simply “urge” or “call for” without referring to SYG.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–1461. Confidential; Priority.
2. See Document 6.
3. A February 14 Soviet statement declared that the Soviet Union would no longer recognize Hammarskjöld as a U.N. officer and that it was prepared to give all possible help and support to the Gizenga government. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4704; extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 765–766.