Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

258. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, July 13, 1962, 7 p.m.

113. Adoula-Tshombe talks. Discussion on resuming talks deadlocked. Adoula told Gardiner flatly he would not name personnel to commissions unless and until goal of these organs was defined in terms of integration as final communique was supposed to do. He has made similar assertions to me and to other diplomatic representatives. He has pointed out that Gardiner himself and also Tshombe had all along contended that without communique mandates were in suspense.

Although Adoula’s reaction was predictable, Gardiner seemed shocked. He has communicated Adoula’s demurrer to UNNY with special formalities having invited Adoula to read and edit his telegram. His present intention (subject to change) is to sit tight and let pressures build up on Adoula.

I am concerned at indications that Department also may think this course will produce results. Earlier I gave Gardiner as merely my own personal assessment view that it would probably be impossible to get Adoula to start up again as if nothing had happened.

Tshombe’s tactics on final communique were hard to dismiss as mere bargaining tactics. Breach revealed by debate on communique so wide that institution of commissions seen in new light by GOC. Neither Adoula nor any other head of GOC could accept Tshombe conception.

Moreover, all chancelleries here had upheld Adoula’s line at time of break-off and condemned Tshombe’s. Implication is that Tshombe owes some concession if talks are to be renewed. I thought Gardiner ought to see Tshombe and get something out of him which would warrant Adoula in resuming, at very least a time limit and some unilateral statement paying a first installment on final communique. Said I regretted I could not easily dream up formula but one had to be found. If Adoula tried to move into talks without formula, his political goose was cooked.

Gardiner rejected these views out of hand. Said if Adoula not such “a silly man” he would see where his opportunity lay. This was in constitution military commission which would then ask to be represented in Kolwezi, Jadotville, et cetera. If refused, said Gardiner, admittedly oversimplifying, “I fight.”

I doubt very much that the issue would ever become so clear cut or that UN or our allies or USG could back action thus conceived. I am confident Adoula would share these doubts. In fact, he sees in whole Gardiner-Tshombe commission apparatus merely device for stifling and fuzzing issues until revelation of Tshombe’s ultimate refusal to integrate would be deferred until UN is bankrupt and the will to cope with secession has evaporated.

In meantime, he has not made it easier for Adoula to come to him. His offer of tribute in phoney money to GOC to help the hungry; his nomination of a turncoat Congo general and Belgian Ultras to commissions; his “independence day celebrations”; his bribes; his campaign against Bomboko; and his cohabitation with far left have all widened breach.

We here still puzzling as to what next steps should be, especially in light of multiple consultations in so many capitals. We will try to communicate our ideas fairly soon. As of now I am inclined to feel that we will not get simple transfer of negotiations to commissions on a “bygones are bygones” basis, nor should we push it.

Some version of the “package” should be made the framework in which commissions work. But we repeat we must know now how far UN and Belgians are really prepared to go in support of sanctions component of package. And finally Union Miniere must be jolted out of its ostrich-like stance before it seals its own doom and drags everybody into crisis.

We in Congo greatly appreciate Spaak’s understanding of this need.

As Department aware we think UMHK must be prepared accept UN protection. UN must be militarily prepared to give it.

As to threat of sabotage, we cannot prove it, but suspect this is bogus. Should have thought hard headed UMHK managers would themselves have taken measures. It is not inconceivable, however that there are die-hards in company lower ranks who might themselves be involved in sabotage plans. (The mercenary who blew Lubilash Bridge seems to have had cooperation from within Societe Generale companies.)

N.B. Foregoing written before latest Katanga roadblock episode.²

If this affair takes path toward solution it may collaterally produce formula to get talks going. On other hand, believe it defers Gardiner trip to Katanga at least until roadblock issue is settled without loss of face.³

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1362. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Elisabethville, Paris, London, and Brussels.
2. On July 11, 2,000 Katangan soldiers entered Elisabethville for Katangan “Independence Day” celebrations, in violation of an agreement between Katangan and U.N. forces limiting the number who would participate. On July 12, U.N. forces established a roadblock, or checkpoint, at the only entrance to the city without one; Katangan troops dug in opposite it, and tensions rose. On July 17, a demonstration by approximately 3,000 Katangan women and youths at the checkpoint ended in violence, with 2 deaths. Telegrams reporting on these incidents are ibid., 770G.00. For text of a U.S. statement of July 17 and Katangan and U.N. statements on the July 17 incident, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 874-875.
3. Telegram 76 to Léopoldville, July 16, stated that in view of Gullion’s comments, it would be useful for him to come to Washington for consultations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1362)