Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

203. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, February 8, 1962.

PROPOSED ACTION PROGRAM FOR CONGO

I. Reintegration of Katanga and Other Provinces

A. Task

Reactivate Central Government administration in Katanga, South Kasai and Kivu and make these provinces again part of Congo’s economy and eventually bring them fully into the framework of the Republic of the Congo.

B. Proposed Actions²

1. Parliamentary revision of constitution. This process should be speeded up with the help of constitutional advisers supplied by the UN.

2. Administrative reintegration of Katanga and other provinces. This is to be achieved on a step-by-step basis by discussions between technicians from Léopoldville and from the provincial governments involved with appropriate UN help. The objective would be, at first, coordination and eventually integration in such areas as border and customs controls, postal services, radio, inland transportation, civil aviation, tax administration, public expenditures and money and banking, foreign exchange administration, technical education, external aid, public works programs, etc. The GOC with UN support should make a massive attempt to open discussions on as many of these subjects as possible and broaden the scope within their technical ability to handle such discussions. Within this program, for example, use should be made of Brussels’ tax and customs offices as administrative agents for all of the Congo.

3. Settlement of basic economic questions through negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe with appropriate UN assistance. One of such questions might be division between the Central Government and the provincial governments of the tax and foreign exchange proceeds realized in Katanga. Pending the new constitution an interim arrangement is necessary either on the basis of pre-1960 data or of a new formula which might be worked out with UN help. This interim arrangement would not prejudice the final decision in the constitutional framework.

4. Creation of overall situation, military, political, diplomatic and economic, which will ensure that Tshombe lives up to the Kitona agreement and to reduce danger of renewed hostilities.This involves adequate UN military presence in Katanga, settlement of mercenaries issue, diplomatic pressure by U.S., UK, Belgium on Tshombe, assistance by UN in GOC policy to assure administrative integration of Katanga and other provinces by way of discussions (paragraphs 2 and 3) or as last resort by legislative action enforced with UN help and with appropriate protection assured for companies operating in these areas against use of force by local authorities.

5. Specific steps. We are attempting to put pressure on Tshombe through the UMHK and the Belgian government which should make clear that payment of export proceeds and taxes solely to Katanga government cannot be continued but that the companies have to satisfy their obligations to the Central Government.

II. Military Reorganization

A. Tasks

1. To define the role and the concept of the Congolese armed forces, of the provincial gendarmerie and the local police, and to outline organization and training programs for each of them and interrelation of missions and functions of the three security elements.

2. Reorganization and retraining of the existing army directed toward development of an effective Congolese military establishment responsive to competent civil authority and adequate to maintain internal security and border control, resist local aggression and, through civic action programs, contribute to the betterment of the economy and society. The nucleus of the new army would be newly drafted men and only fully retrained elements of the existing army would be eventually included.

3. Reduction of the ANC through a selection-out process and retirement of excess personnel with the help of economic incentives to facilitate transformation of these soldiers into workers, factory guards, provincial employees and/or their return to tribal areas.

4. Reorganization and training of provincial and local police forces and gendarmerie.

B. Action³

1. U.S. to send special mission to Congo to study military, social and economic aspects of military reorganization problem or appropriate programs and prepare recommendations to be submitted to GOC.

2. Tripartite talks between GOC, UN and U.S. to facilitate working out of program covering above points.

3. Provision through the UN of funds to facilitate economic integration of former military personnel with the help of contributions of U.S., Belgium and other nations. The fund might be used, for example, for economic development projects with high labor intensity, to assist in setting up small businesses, etc.

4. Establishment of a training mission under UN auspices preferably staffed by officers of one nation. Similar missions should be established for other training tasks.

5. As part of the UN sponsored programs, foreign military advisers should be made available to assist Congolese officers in selected units to speed up process of reforming army.

III. Foreign Aid

A. Task

Coordination of aid programs, increase of funds and technical assistance personnel and securing capital funds for restoration of industrial plants and agricultural plantations.

B. Action⁴

1. All aid to be channeled through the UN or coordinated by the UN. Prime Minister to create committee for aid coordination in his own office to cooperate with the UN and act as administrative instrument.

2. UN technical assistance to be substantially increased, in particular in the fields of administration and internal security.

3. Belgium to be asked by the GOC to supply technical assistance, import credits and grants, and capital funds for reopening of industrial and agricultural enterprises.

4. UN to work out mutually satisfactory method under which Belgian technicians could operate in the Congo.

5. The U.S. aid program to the Congo will be continued in the current fiscal year in the form and at the magnitude presently outlined ($55 million per annum). The U.S. Government will consider sympathetically Congolese needs for the next year. The educational and training facilities available to Congolese youth financed from U.S. funds will be increased and the U.S. Government will attempt to achieve an increase in the facilities made available by private foundations. Furthermore, technical arrangements will be worked out between U.S. and Congolese authorities to improve the scheduling of American food shipments.

6. U.S. to help UN to obtain additional contributions to finance its technical assistance and import programs.

7. Special fund to be set up for military resettlement outside of the present aid programs.

IV. Financial Stability and Economic Recovery

A. Tasks

To set up a budget at a reasonable level taking into account the needs and the available funds including foreign aid, establish and administer the framework for effective control of public expenditures, improve tax collection, and finally prepare development plan as basis for recovery and renewed growth and create basic conditions for increased production and exports.

B. Actions⁵

1. UN and IMF assistance should be obtained by the Government of the Congo to work out a budget program and a foreign exchange program and to improve the administrative framework and establish controls responsive to the Prime Minister’s direction.

2. The Government of the Congo should give full support to the Congolese and UN officials who will be charged with the administration of these two programs. Creation of a Central Bank should be deferred until the programs are in effect.

3. The IBRD should be requested by the GOC to draft an economic development program for the Congo as a whole indicating in which way to obtain maximum benefit from the existing national wealth and suggest ways of financing development needs.

4. A special program should be worked out by the UN to improve transportation within the country and to create adequate security conditions in centers of productive employment.

5. A public works program should be initiated rapidly by the GOC with UN assistance in Léopoldville and later in other cities in order to alleviate the burden of unemployment and reduce the danger of political upheaval in these centers. Limited distribution of foodstuffs to unemployed should also be initiated for the same purpose.

V. U.S.-GOC Diplomatic Relations

A. Proposed Actions

The Congolese Embassy in Washington should be opened as soon as possible and an Ambassador appointed who would effectively represent the Congo in this post where there is a considerable amount of inter-African diplomatic contact.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. Notes on the cover sheet indicate that the paper represented a consensus in the Department of State of steps that might be taken with regard to the Congo and that it was submitted for discussion to the NSC Standing Group on February 9. The Record of Actions at the Standing Group meeting states that Williams presented the proposed program and it was discussed and “approved in general.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, February 9, 1962) For information concerning the NSC Standing Group, see Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, p. 51.
2. Typewritten notes in the margin next to paragraphs 2 and 3 below read: “GOC ACTION.”
3. A typewritten note in the margin next to paragraph 2 below reads: “GOC ACTION.”
4. Typewritten notes in the margin next to paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 below read: “GOC ACTION.”
5. Typewritten notes in the margin next to paragraphs 1–3 and 5 below read: “GOC ACTION.”