175. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
1615. Paris for CINCEUR. Following is first take evaluation and comment on Adoula-Tshombe accord. Chronological highlights follow in subsequent message:2
- 1.
-
The eight points indicated by Tshombe in his letter to Bunche as agreed between him and Adoula center on key constitutional issues, e.g. Loi Fondamentale, unity of Congo, Katangan participation in constitution making and in Parliament.
In addition a hard-fought compromise was achieved on maintaining gendarmerie in existence by placing it under Pres of Republic; there was also a significant undertaking by Tshombe with respect to application of UN resolutions.
- 2.
- The biggest monkey wrench thrown in works at late hours was Tshombe claim he had no full powers to negotiate despite some measure of accord reached during two days. Meeting actually broke down on this point at midnight, plane engines warmed up, cars aligned and baggage stowed when Tshombe agreed to negotiate on points enumerated which are essentially a paring down and editing by Bunche and me of Adoula’s formulations to make them more palatable. Tshombe insisted on adding first an additional point indicating agreement was ad referendum his govt. This he eventually watered down to footnote saying he intended to explain his personal acceptance to his assembly. Adoula govt spotted this as characteristic Tshombe formula for welshing (vide Coquilhatville), would have none of it. Conference was again in collapse. Participants informed UN and me jointly of their inability to agree. Then in one of series of feverish last minute huddles Khiari and Gardiner came up with idea of including Tshombe’s reference to consulting Katangan authorities in a transmittal letter to Bunche. Adoula accepted this formula with regret and under pressure from US only because he said it was “en dehors de moi.”
- 3.
- It is possible that Tshombe may say he was coerced by US and UN and may actually court repudiation by his govt. Nonetheless he has been brought to a negotiation at his own request. He has committed himself before UN and US reps to integration of Katanga in Congo. It should be hard for him to get out from under this undertaking and still [Page 336] retain credence especially among groups in Western Europe and US which have been sympathetic to him.
- 4.
- Thought expressed in above para is also that of UN. Bunche has commented on agreement for press in most glowing terms and considers it a great triumph for UN (as well as for US, the Congo and Katanga) showing that peacemaking capacity of organization is not less than its police ability.
- 5.
- All participants at close praised “initiative” and good offices Pres Kennedy. Adoula and Tshombe somewhat grudging toward each other, although former made a good Lincolnian speech to close the engagement.
- 6.
- This meeting of minds although admittedly precarious can be considered as milestone in US policy re Congo. This policy has been pursued not without risk and some alienation of our allies. It has involved a) refusal to put wraps on UN military action when in retaliation Katangan provocation Dec 5; b) prognostication that this would result in control of Eville and breaking Tshombe’s teeth appears to have been correct although process has been attended by regrettable afflictions on civilian population, c) bringing operations to close at just right time, which was practical result of Pres Kennedy’s initiative in seizing upon Tshombe peace feeler; and e) finally the accord itself which resulted from bitter and arduous marathon negotiation.