Office of the Historian

158. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation1

December 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Congo

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Acting Secretary Ball

The President and Acting Secretary Ball spoke to Secretary Rusk in Paris over the open telephone line. Before the President joined the conversation Mr. Ball said that he wished to give a situation report on the Congo. The Secretary interjected that he understood the UN offensive was to start today. He went on to say that there had been a heated discussion in NAC on the subject. He though that we should not accept responsibility for all that the UN was doing in the Congo. It was estimated in Paris that there could be real trouble in London in Parliament on the issue. Mr. Ball confirmed that the UN offensive was set to start on Thursday.2The Secretary thought that this was bad timing. Mr. Ball stressed that the UN intended to seize just the key points, then there would be a cease fire. The Secretary inquired whether on Thursday there might be a call for a cease fire and then the UN might be given two or three days to get its military action over with while arrangements for the cease fire were being worked out. Mr. Ball suggested that the UN operation might take longer than two or three days. The Secretary expressed the hope that it would be done fast and that it would succeed.

The President joined the conversation at this point. The Secretary said the Congo was the most pressing item of business in Paris. He was having dinner that evening with Spaak, Lord Home and others. The Congo operation was considered our war. The President suggested that he might talk by telephone to Prime Minister Macmillan. He could mention the Volta Dam decision3 which might help. He said it was difficult to get a precise understanding about Congo matters. The Secretary cautioned against overestimating the UN military capabilities. The President [Page 310] expressed the view that while we had an understanding with the UN in New York, other UN personnel wished to go much further than was in our interests. He said our Western friends should use their influence with Tshombe. The Secretary agreed that they should work on Tshombe while we worked on Adoula, then Bunche might get the two parties together. The President concurred. He expressed the opinion that the Belgian-British proposal for an agreement between Tshombe and Adoula was a good basic document; however, it did not include mention of Adoula. If this were added it could become a basis for agreement. The trouble was the military action in the next few days.

The Secretary thought the Congo could be a major question in London on Thursday; it could really topple the government. Prime Minister Macmillan might have to say some pretty extreme things. The President said that he understood that. The purpose of the operation was to get Tshombe to move. Everyone seemed to agree on this objective.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Burdett. Filed with an undated covering memorandum from Battle to Bundy. The conversation apparently took place between 4:35 and 5 p.m. Washington time. The President’s appointment book indicates that Ball, Cleveland, Williams, and Dungan were with him at that time. (Kennedy Library)↩
  2. December 14.↩
  3. Documentation concerning this is scheduled for publication in volume XXI.↩