Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

155. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris¹

Washington, December 11, 1961, 9:33 p.m.

Tosec 16. From Ball for Secretary. In light our most recent info from Katanga and following our telephone conversation,² we have reviewed current situation. Our conclusions are:

1. Our information is that so far, UN military action has not proceeded beyond attempt to achieve limited military objectives set forth in USUN’s 2060 (rpt Paris 256).³ However, we are watching situation carefully and have insisted on getting from UNNY and UNOC not only current situation reports but forward operational plans.

2. We are persuaded here that the UN should continue its effort to achieve these limited military objectives. Seems essential for UN to arrive at least to stage where its forces solidly entrenched at key points, demonstrating impossible for Tshombe’s Government to dislodge them by harassment. If this can be accomplished by ceasefire negotiations, so much the better, but to accomplish this it would be necessary for Tshombe to accept conditions substantially equivalent to those U Thant has transmitted to him via the British.

3. We should continue press for beginning conciliation process. We believe efforts at negotiation must follow parallel track with military efforts achieve limited objectives outlined by U Thant. On this, it largely up to our allies—it is particularly UK, Belgians and French who have leverage with Tshombe to make him see he has no reasonable alternative but to negotiate in good faith with Adoula. We also continue stress this point in our discussions with UN officials.

4. Latest information from New York (being wired to you separately⁴ suggests Union Miniere is pressing Tshombe to go with Bunche to meet Adoula. If this actually happens, we would then reappraise ceasefire conditions in light of military situation then prevailing around Elizabethville.

5. We do not believe that forcing the UN to capitulate by agreeing to premature cease-fire or by withdrawing Western political support provides a real alternative. To do so would have direct consequences on the UN organization itself, on our relations with a number of African and Asian countries, would invite prolonged civil war in the Congo itself with probable eventual Soviet involvement and would result in the fall of the Adoula Govt and the re-emergence of Gizenga in Stanleyville.

Following are brief specific observations regarding current developments which may be useful to you in any further conversations you may have.

Current Military Position: The UN has virtually completed buildup of forces in Elizabethville which now total nearly 5,000 men. UN expects to make major move in city by Wednesday. We now attempting clarify UN plans but we believe major component UN attack will be encirclement of military camp near city and attempt capture its garrison. Apart from this contemplated action, UN has largely neutralized Katanga Air Force by strafing airfields and has prevented re-enforcements from arriving Elizabethville.

Linner Statement: We know UK concerned that statement attributed to Linner has made it appear that UN going far beyond limited objective outlined to us. We have checked this carefully with Parsons, and we find that Linner misquoted, that Linner himself issued categorical denial Saturday night. UK, by now should be reassured since, according to Yost, reporter who reported Linner statement has also stated publicly that Swedish newspaper did not print his report accurately as he had sent it. Parsons is repeating from Stockholm full details this aspect to you.

Brigading of ANC troops with UNOC: We are instructing Emb Léopoldville, as well as USUN, to express hope there will be no ANC participation in UNOC operations in Katanga. We would regard such participation as undesirable since joint ANC–UN operation would be heavily criticized by European allies as evidence UN objectives not of limited character but rather to impose political solution by military means.

Activities of Indian Charge: Indian Charge Rahman, now in Elizabethville, reportedly goading Indian General Raja to take severe measures against Katanga. We will discuss this problem with Bunche who arrives in Elizabethville Dec 12 on conciliation and political and military fact-finding mission. Unless he able remedy situation, we can expect hear more and more from Belgians and British of nefarious Indian influence in Congo.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1161. Secret. Drafted by Tron, Buffum, Sisco, and Ball; cleared by Vance and Burdett; and approved by Ball. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris.
2. Rusk had expressed concern about the situation in the Congo in two telephone conversations with Ball that day, pointing out British concern and inquiring about the possibility of a U.N.-declared cease-fire. (Telephone conversations, December 11, 9:10 a.m. and 2:40 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers)
3. Telegram 2060 from USUN, December 11, reported that Narasimhan had told Yost that he had sent a message to Tshombe [text not declassified] with the U.N. terms for ending military operations in Katanga: 1) U.N. occupation of the strong points in Elisabethville it had occupied in September, such as the post office and fire station; 2) all other troops on both sides to be confined to barracks, with law and order to be maintained by police armed only with truncheons; 3) U.N. establishment of garrisons in Jadotville and Kolwezi; and 4) U.N. forces to have freedom of circulation throughout Katanga. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1161)
4. In telegram 2070 from USUN, December 11. (Ibid.)