Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

148. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 5, 1961, 5:05–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Honorable David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
• Mr. Vance—AFC

The British Ambassador called on the Secretary regarding the Congo. He stated that his instructions pertained to bringing Adoula and Tshombe together and that these were not current in light of the fighting in Elisabethville.² He added, however, that UK–UN had just reported that the Secretariat stated fighting had ceased towards the end of the day. The Ambassador was informed of the latest telegram from Elisabethville which also contained an indication that fighting had died down.³

The Ambassador raised Tshombe’s attempt to obtain Costa Rican recognition which had been reported from Brussels and asked if the United States Government believed it would be able to persuade Costa Rica of the wisdom of avoiding such a course. The Secretary stated we had approached our Latin American friends generally and Costa Rica more specifically, and that we were hopeful none would take action which would subject them to criticism in the UN.

The Secretary asked how the British estimate chances of getting some sense into Tshombe’s head. We have all endeavored to educate him of the need to drop his pretensions, apparently with little effect. The Ambassador stated that he believes Tshombe genuinely fears for his safety were he to go to Léopoldville under UN protection. This is why the British have sought some way to guarantee absolutely his safety, hoping that pressures would then be effective relative to his substantive position. The Ambassador added that he understands the United States is concerned that an attempt to bring the two together under present circumstances would be too dangerous for Adoula. The Secretary replied that we think pressure on Adoula to meet with Tshombe as two Chiefs of State would be politically dangerous for Adoula. In effect we seek an Adoula-Tshombe axis and believe that in order to make this possible, Tshombe must come to heel to a certain extent. If it were agreeable to both parties the United States presumably could help in arrangements for a meeting, such as in an aircraft at Kamina. The Ambassador commented that an aircraft would have less of a connotation of extra-territoriality than would a vessel.

The Secretary inquired whether the British and Belgian Governments believe they have been able to work out a memorandum outlining some basis for an Adoula-Tshombe meeting.⁴ The Ambassador replied that they had been trying to separate out reasonably acceptable aspects of Tshombe correspondence with the thought that they could then induce Tshombe to resubmit them as proposals to Adoula. They added that their effort had not got far to date.

The Ambassador referred to Home’s letter to the Secretary⁵ which described the British impression that the GOC was of the opinion it could conquer Katanga, a notion the British regard as desperately dangerous. The Secretary remarked that no conquering is needed or desirable and that it would probably be impossible for the GOC and difficult for the UN. Adoula wisely recognizes the limitations of the Congo army. His efforts to obtain an air force are indications of this. The Secretary indicated his belief that Adoula would not be inflexible if Tshombe would meet with him on a basis less than as Chief of State or its equivalent.

The Ambassador indicated his understanding that Adoula had informed U Thant that mediation would be undesirable. The Secretary indicated this probably was because mediation has the connotation of being between two sovereign states, which is unacceptable. In the Secretary’s view, a quiet behind-the-scenes intermediary is more what present circumstances call for, perhaps Khiari, who is already in the Congo with the UN and apparently is acceptable to both sides. The Secretary expressed hope that today’s events might persuade Tshombe that he had better abandon his pretensions and accept reintegration.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/12–561. Confidential. Drafted by Vance and approved in S on December 20. The time of the meeting is taken from Secretary Rusk’s appointment book. (Johnson Library)
2. On December 5, U.N. troops forcibly removed a roadblock set up by Katangan forces on the road between Elisabethville and the airport. There had been a number of incidents in the Elisabethville area in the previous days. For Linner’s December 6 report, see U.N. doc. S/4940/Add.16. A December 6 memorandum from Williams to Ball summarizing these developments was sent to Bundy with a covering memorandum of the same date from Battle. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)
3. Telegram 733 from Elisabethville, received at 4:19 p.m., referred to “sporadic firing.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–561)
4. Spaak told MacArthur on November 28 that he had concluded the best way to bring Adoula and Tshombe together was to draw up a memorandum setting forth the elements that would provide the basis for an agreement and then sell the solution first to Adoula and then to Tshombe. (Telegram 948 from Brussels, November 28; ibid., 770G.00/11–2861) On December 1, he told MacArthur that he had discussed this proposal with Lord Home in London the previous day and that he was sending an officer from the Foreign Office to London to participate in drafting such a memorandum. (Telegram 976 from Brussels, December 1; ibid., 770G.00/12–161)
5. In the November 29 letter, Lord Home declared that the United Nations could not “take over the task of government in these huge and unruly countries where the primary task for years ahead will be to prevent civil war” and predicted that the U.N. operation in the Congo would “end in disaster unless U Thant can bring Tshombe and Adoula into alliance with each other.” He urged closer U.S.–U.K. consultation “on these U.N. matters which can broadly be lumped under the heading of colonialism,” declaring that “if in our desire to please some of the Afro-Asians we get every element of stability pushed out of East and Central Africa we shall have done a great disservice to the African continent.” (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Rusk)