Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

101. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, August 31, 1961, 7 p.m.

509. Yesterday when discussing Deptel 311² with Linner speaking personally, I chided him a bit on his failure inform certain key diplomats here re Katangese operation once it had begun. Said I recognized necessity highest security before operations began but that once underway he should have convoked British, French (Belgium protecting power Congo), ourselves and briefed us on intentions, et cetera. Said it was a bit annoying to read in press or hear over radio of major UN action in a country we were supposed to report on.

Linner smiled and said he would never do so in a major operation of this nature because once we were informed our governments would be pestering him or his superior in New York and that he then would be obliged spend valuable time answering inquiries rather than direct operations. Said he also thought O’Brien had kept Consul Elisabethville informed and felt this was sufficient. Also said that he had not informed Hammarskjöld extent of military operations for that would have bound his hands too tightly.

I pointed out he had taken major risk re security Europeans and could have somewhat reduced possibility of his losses by tipping off certain key people. Linner only remarked that he felt he was paid to take risks and assume that responsibility.

Just before I left him, he said in line with tipping people off I should not be surprised some morning to find similar but less dramatic steps being taken Leopoldville against Belgians here. Said this was for my own information and not to be reported.

Am considerably concerned re this possibility in that once such action were to begin here it might well get out of control. I do not refer here to insecurity in Léopoldville but rather to extended arrests and deportation Belgian advisers which could mount to some 100 or 150 key men in all branches of government who currently assuring some semblance of governmental administration. Action might also extend to technicians who keep public works, communications, transport operating. This fear based on one of Linner’s few blind spots, i.e., disgust with Belgians plus prodding by Khiari who while extremely able sees Belgians at base of all Congolese problems. View confidence shown by Linner, am somewhat at a loss as how to proceed but unless Department desires otherwise, plan endeavor suggest Linner avoid “dramatic” action Léopoldville and limit arrests to the 12 or 15 unquestionably bad elements here.³

Godley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–3161. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Secretary Rusk commented on this telegram in a September 1 telephone conversation with Cleveland. Notes of the conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau read in part as follows: “The Sec thinks this attitude of Linner’s is unacceptable particularly when he talks about taking action there to throw out Belgians working there on various administrative jobs. He is not playing completely clear with the SYG because he does not want his hands bound too tightly. He is not a sovereign state and we have a lot at stake. C thought it was extreme in Katanga even though there was provocation. The Sec said to look at it and he thinks we should have a serious talk. He is not the responsible party here and we have a tremendous stake here—we expect to be kept informed and expect the SYG to be informed. If you can mask it in a friendly way, fine.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192)
2. Telegram 311 to Léopoldville, August 28, suggested that Williams ask Linner about U.N. plans to follow up the Katanga operation, specifically what steps it envisaged to effect Katanga’s reintegration into the Congo and protect its economic viability. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/8–2861) Williams visited Léopoldville on August 29, in the course of a trip to southern and central Africa. His discussions with Linner, Adoula, Bomboko, and Kasavubu were summarized in telegram 492 from Léopoldville, August 30. (Ibid., 110.15–WI/8–3061)
3. Telegram 345 to Léopoldville, September 2, approved Godley’s assessment of the situation and the line he proposed to take with Linner. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–261)