Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

65. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)⁰

Washington, December 6, 1961.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Action regarding Indian-Portuguese Tension over Portuguese Overseas Territories on Indian Sub-Continent

REFERENCE

• Embassy New Delhi’s telegram No. 1611 of December 5, 1961¹

1. There has been mounting pressure on the Government of India to take positive steps to incorporate the remaining Portuguese Overseas Territories on the Indian sub-continent (Diu, Daman, and especially Goa) into India. Indians generally are unable to accept any differentiation between these territories and those already given up by the British and the French.

2. The pressures on the Government of India stem principally from:

• (a) Goan “nationalists” resident in India, especially in Bombay, who keep the agitation alive on a national scale, who regularly raise the issue in the central Parliament, and whose demands for positive action are reaching a crescendo in this period before the general elections in February 1962.
• (b) African nationalists, generally, and Angolans particularly, who have been questioning India’s professed anti-colonialism because of India’s do-nothing policy in relation to Goa.
• (c) The opposition parties in India, who are attacking the Government of India for a weak foreign policy in relation to Chinese Communist occupation of Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh, and the do-nothing policy in Goa.

3. After calling off the “satyagraha” campaign of 1955, the Government of India was able to resist the pressures of the Goan nationalists, and to maintain a stance of peaceableness regarding Goa. Time has been running out on this policy, as Portugal has shown no sign of weakening its hold on Goa. Action in Africa for freedom for Angola has made the Indian Goan policy appear comparatively pusillanimous. Indian influence on the new African states appears to be weakening, as was evidenced at Belgrade. India would like to correct this situation. The Indian Government lacks the force to drive the Chinese Communists from Ladakh. Thus the Government is tempted to answer its foreign policy critics by making at least a demonstration of force against Goa.

4. It is likely that the Indian Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, now running for Parliament, personally feels all the above pressures keenly; but the pressures exist and would be felt by the Indian Government quite apart from his personal involvement.

5. A widespread press campaign is now underway in India for government action on the Goan issue. Two recent incidents off the Portuguese island of Anjidiv (just south of Goa) have been widely publicized; Portuguese military reinforcements are alleged, as well as Portuguese “atrocities” against Goan “patriots.” It is public knowledge that troop movements from Northern India to the vicinity of Goa are being organized. We have learned that a movement of at least a division is being planned and the logistics for this move were being arranged as of Dec. 1.

6. It should be our objective to counter these pressures for military action, and to get the military activity halted well short of the possibility of a full-scale military action. It can be argued with Nehru that to attempt to resolve the Goan issue by force will do enormous damage to Indian prestige and friendship where India most needs friends (among the developed nations) to further the Indian economic development drive. Such a resort to force would only tend to promote further chaos in Africa, where India has done so much to try to restore order, as in the Congo.

7. At the same time, public pressure is so great in India, and the less-publicized international pressure so strongly felt, that purely private U.S. counter-pressure is likely to be ineffective. Should such U.S. pressure take a purely negative form (e.g., “please stop your military moves”) it will put the U.S. in the position of defending reaction and, insofar as it becomes known, will provide highly emotionally-charged ammunition to the Indian Communists and other left-wingers in India with which they will attack U.S. policy.

8. Maximum possible U.S. public support for ultimate freedom for Goa from Portuguese rule will be required to enable the Indian government to respond favorably to U.S. pressure to resume a peaceable policy on the Goan issue. Ambassador Galbraith has outlined the nature of such support.

9. Without addressing the question of the desirability of the Ambassador’s suggested position from the viewpoint of history, NEA believes public U.S. support of the principle of self-determination in Portuguese overseas territories would be adequate to enable U.S. representations to Nehru to have some effect, and might dull the edge of the expected left-wing attack on the U.S. in India. U.S. public support should come from the President, and it should contain clear support at least for a greater degree of self-government as the immediate goal the U.S. favors for Goa, and the other Portuguese territories in South Asia.

10. We recognize the possible disadvantages, vis-a-vis the Portuguese, of taking a public position in support of self-determination for a Portuguese territorial unit, and we recognize the difficulties inherent in equating our NATO relationship with Portugal with this phase of our relations with India. Nevertheless, it may be argued that recognition of the principle of self-determination, and practical application of this principle to the extent of granting a greater degree of self-government or at least holding a plebiscite, could rebound to the advantage of the Portuguese. Since Nehru undoubtedly realizes that his government does not possess a God-given right to take over Goa but is supporting the ideal of freedom from colonial rule, Portuguese measures to grant a greater degree of self-government should relieve Nehru of the necessity of yielding completely to the extreme agitators. This in turn would place the Portuguese in a more nearly tenable position. While the Portuguese will undoubtedly condemn a U.S. Government statement as intervention in their internal affairs, such action may be defended on the ground that it is part of the peace-keeping process.

11. It must be remembered that a declaration in support of self-determination for Portuguese territories in the subcontinent would undoubtedly have repercussions throughout the Portuguese empire in other parts of Asia and Africa. On this point, however, we are inclined to agree with Ambassador Galbraith that the time has come to deal with this issue as a whole.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/SOA Files: Lot 64 D 240, Goa-Internal Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Weil and Rogers B. Horgan.
1. In telegram 1611 from New Delhi, December 5, Galbraith argued for a “bolder and more dramatic” U.S. stand on the Goa issue. He saw the Portuguese colony as an anachronism, and felt that the United States should anticipate logical change and be prepared to accept and publicly endorse the incorporation of Goa into India. (Ibid., Central Files, 753D.00/12-561)