Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, November 16, 1962, 10:22 p.m.

524. Deptel 506.¹ We mindful difficulties for Ambassadors Hart and Macomber by our proposals, especially in light peripheral royalist military successes recently. We also recognize that conciliatory UAR attitude may stem in part from pinch caused by casualties and drain on finances occasioned by Yemen operations. However, we estimate as Nasser has indicated, UAR prepared commit additional forces as necessary to stem royalist advances, and we fear UAR willing carry battle into heart of Saudi Arabia itself rather than accept defeat. Thus we think it important take immediate action freeze situation on basis which will cause least loss of face and create atmosphere for early withdrawal from costly and dangerous conflict for all parties concerned.

Dept believes priority objective is to get UAR on public record re disengagement and YAR on public record re normalization relations neighboring states. It would also be highly desirable if the UAR could be persuaded to announce a limited withdrawal of forces as a token of its sincerity with future withdrawals contingent upon reciprocal Saudi and Jordanian disengagement. Modalities of disengagement likely be complicated but soluble if proper atmosphere created by foregoing actions. Following instructions based on this concept:

For Jidda

1. In transmitting soonest to Faysal personally letter from President (immediately following telegram)² you should note President’s regret at Saud’s illness. Also convey gist Cairo Embtel 728³ to Faysal and state that in context considerable evidence our moral and material support to SAG which now on hand (including previous letter from President which he or we can publish if he deems useful) we believe he can see wisdom our going ahead on basis suggested. He may be assured that we will insist on implementation by UAR and YAR of their commitments. Strong pursuit of domestic reforms is best counter to republican revolution Yemen. Re modalities effecting disengagement, our order of preference would be (a) SAG reception of YAR emissaries; Sallal mentioned possibility to Stookey and we will urge in Taiz and Cairo that proposal for despatch mission be made publicly; (b) our good offices; or (c) observation or supervision through UN. Desire know Faysal’s preference now but decision best made after UAR and YAR on public record. You might note that type military operation in which UAR involved easier to observe than SAG-Jordan activities.

2. When delivering letter please tell Faysal that President wants him to know he has been very conscious of difficulties in which Yemen affair has placed HRH, and has decided proceed on this course only after most carefully considering Saudi and Jordanian interests. Judging all aspects of this regrettable business, President genuinely and firmly believes course he proposes will serve their interests better than any other course.

For Cairo

You should see Nasser earliest, present letter from President, and express regret certain difficulties have precluded meeting optimum schedule for implementation of proposals explored week ago through Ambassador Kamel. Formula presented in letter adheres closely to those proposals. Certain refinements introduced and timing of US recognition retarded slightly but we believe this perhaps even helpful to UAR.

Reference points raised Embtel 728: (a) believe accounts of intervention from Beihan exaggerated but in any event our formula would serve to quiet that area; (b) we cannot necessarily control movements of Badr nor can SAG, but with cessation external support Badr unlikely be able mount effective long-term campaign; (c) our plan envisages eventual relations between SAG and YAR. Believe preferable this problem be settled bilaterally by Sallal renewing offer send emissaries to Faysal which we would encourage Faysal accept. If this not feasible our good offices available or some UN offices might be feasible.

You should stress importance conciliatory nature its public statement and need for actions to match words. You should make clear to Nasser that our recognition dependent upon satisfactory statements by YAR as well as UAR and that in light recent inflammatory words from Sanaa we think it imperative Sallal be forthcoming. We request UAR press Sallal to issue conciliatory statement including offer to send emissaries negotiate basis neighborly relations with SAG. Department would be reassured if UAR would consult us re its statement. You should also frankly tell Nasser you think our formula is very helpful to UAR and we believe to underline good faith he should consider including in public statement that first withdrawal of military unit will occur in four or five days if others agree to proposals. It question of good faith on all sides that is principal problem here. Finally, you should express willingness consult Nasser’s designee on modalities of disengagement using material from other portions this telegram.⁴

FYI: We prefer not make public statement re economic assistance. However prepared continue present TA program and to consider reasonable PL-480 requests from YAR. End FYI.

For Taiz

You should deliver Presidential message to Sallal soonest and strongly urge that he incorporate into statement all elements proposed therein. You should remind Sallal Aden and Persian Gulf just as important to US as to UK. You may say we fully intend continue AID program. In addition seek his views on modalities of disengagement and remind him our recognition dependent on establishment normal working conditions for AID mission.

For Amman

You should deliver President’s letter to Hussein and brief him and Prime Minister on US proposals. You should note Department considers Jordanian pullback of its aircraft and army technicians an essential element in disengagement process. You should use with Hussein language in paragraph two of instructions to Jidda.

For London

You may pass copy of President’s letter in confidence to Lord Home along with substance this telegram and add that part of package involves termination of any intervention in Yemen by local rulers.

For USUN

You should inform SYG or Bunche in confidence generally of our proposals. We hope transmit shortly for exploration our thoughts on possible UN role if this proves best for all concerned.

All parties should be reminded these discussions should be held in strictest confidence.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1662. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Strong, Davies, and Barrow; cleared by Cleveland, Rogers, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Jidda, Amman, and Taiz and repeated to Dhahran, London, and USUN.
1. Document 94.
2. Document 100.
3. See footnote 3, Document 94.
4. In telegram 529 to Cairo, November 17, the Department of State sent additional instructions: “In your initial discussions with Nasser and Sallal or if they have already occurred, in your later negotiations, you should stress desirability of specific mention by YAR of Aden and Federation of South Arabia in order avoid possibility YAR may later seek interpret ‘neighbors’ as not applying them.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1762)