Since other items on the United Nations Special Political Committee agenda
have been disposed of more quickly than expected, we have at most only a
week or ten days before debate commences on the future of UNRWA. This will inevitably include
discussion of broader aspects of the refugee problem, particularly the
actions (Johnson mission) taken by
the Palestine Conciliation Commission in response to the specific directives
of the last three Assemblies.
Following a middle ground tactical approach generally similar to that
employed successfully last year, we wish to use this forthcoming debate to
advance the extremely valuable work which has been done. The first task will
be to use our influence with Israel to move its position away from its
private (but incipient public) opposition and into parallel with the
objection-but-no-rejection stance of the Arabs. In exchange for this shift,
we would agree that the general elements of the Johnson approach should from now on be carried forward by
the PCC rather than continue with the
Johnson label. This metamorphosis
should help Israel off the horns of the dilemma on which it finds itself by
virtue of the
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opposition it has
generated to the Johnson Plan per se.
It will also help deal with Arab objections.
The enclosed “Analysis of Current Situation and Proposed Actions” describes
the present state of play and our planned actions designed to utilize the
coming debate to greatest advantage.
Enclosure2
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SITUATION AND PLANNED ACTIONS
Present Situation
With authorization of the PCC members,
Dr. Johnson took up his proposals
in confidence with the parties in early September. Predictably, there
were objections on both sides resulting from the fact that neither found
in the proposals a reflection of all its demands. The reactions
differed, however. The Arabs assured Dr. Johnson that despite their objections they did not
reject his proposals. Israel both objected and rejected. At one point,
Israel came dangerously close to public statement of this, but retreated
when it was brought to understand that such action would leave it
bearing the full onus of responsibility for resisting progress.
Thereafter, with the objective of keeping the plan in play until we
could have a somewhat freer hand, we induced Israel to sit down with us
for a more patient examination of elements essential to any realistic
approach to solution. The specific balance sheet of where we now stand
with each of the parties is as follows:
- (A)
-
With the Arabs: The Arabs have not
been cohesive on this. The UAR’s break with the Arab League has been
reflected in its refusal to join in intra-Arab discussion of
Johnson’s
proposals. UAR
representatives have been dubious about the viability of
Johnson’s ideas
and, particularly, Israel’s willingness to take back any
refugees. But in accord with the generally unperturbed,
wait-and-see attitude Nasser displayed when we told him about the
proposals before they were floated, UAR representatives have been passive and
non-obstructionist.
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Of the three Eastern Arab states which have been reacting in
consultation with one another, Syria came very close at one
point to jumping the traces in a public statement of
apparent rejection by Prime Minister al-Azm. Subsequently,
Jordan and Lebanon induced it to back away from the brink
and Syria joined with these states in submitting to Dr.
Johnson on
October 15 a Note Verbale. This said that further discussion
of Johnson’s
proposals would be of no avail unless Israel accepted in
principle the refugee “right” of return. However, the Note
avoided rejection, and from some of the Arabs we received
signals that this stance was to some extent for public
consumption. Unfortunately, this same domestic concern
spilled over into one or or two defiant public utterances by
Arab leaders, but their position of record remains as
submitted to Dr. Johnson in the Note Verbale, and no Arab
action taken thus far, either public or private, would
conclusively preclude acquiescence in the Johnson approach,
particularly if a way can be found to show that this derives
from the principle of refugee choice that the Arabs insist
be honored.
- (B)
-
With the Israelis: In four detailed
talks between Assistant Secretary Talbot and Ambassador
Harman over the
last month,3
agreement has been reached on a dozen or so “building
blocks” as essential to any attempt at solution. These cover
such factors as (1) The need to tackle this problem, which
is getting worse not better, separated out from the issue of
a general peace; (2) The improbability of a negotiated
settlement in view of the insistence by each party that the
other make the first concession; (3) Unavoidably, we are
seeking progress within a UN
framework which establishes the principle that the true
wishes of the individual refugee, when confronted with a
real choice without outside pressure, must be ascertained
but this process must have effective controls; (4) There
must be full recognition of sovereignty, security and the
economic rights and interests of the parties; and (5) The
only fair and realistic solution lies in resettlement of
most of the refugees. (A full listing of these is included
in the Annex to this paper.)
In our talks with Harman, we have sought to demonstrate the
extent to which these are realistically embodied in
Johnson’s
approach. We have tried, also, to show that this approach is
fully consistent with the broad lines of the President’s May
1961 conversation with Ben-Gurion.
We have been partially successful in getting the Israelis to agree to
these propositions. However, we have run again and again into Israeli
insistences which would in effect preclude any progress, inter alia, (1)
that the Arabs must recognize in advance that no more than one refugee
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in every ten can return to
Israel;4 (2) that
Israel opposes any operation for free expression of refugee preference;
(3) that the Arabs must cease all hostile propaganda; and (4) that in
any case our talks bear no relation to the Johnson Plan, which they consider dead. In rejoinder, we
have made it clear that we do not regard the Johnson proposals as dead and that we think there is
significance and hope in the fact that Israel has been unwilling to
translate into public rejection its initial, precipitate private
opposition and continued vigorous lobbying against Johnson’s proposals. We have stressed,
also, that Johnson is a free
agent and were Israel’s attitude to oblige him to report that it had
rejected his proposals without even the courtesy of careful scrutiny,
while the Arabs have not rejected, Israel would have to bear sole
responsibility for its appearance of intransigence and resultant
isolation in the eyes of an international community which has
overwhelmingly endorsed this endeavor.
While Ambassador Harman has so far
stuck to his hard line that the Johnson proposals are dead, we continue to receive
indications at other levels which lead us to believe that, if Israel
cannot get us to drop the Johnson
approach, under appropriate circumstances and with some firmer
assurances on specific points of concern, it might be prepared to make a
deal. (Our willingness to drop the Johnson label will go a long way to smooth the path for
Israel.) Obviously, Israel’s first objective remains the burial of
Johnson’s approach or in fact
any approach involving repatriation and there is no chance of its being
persuaded to deal in serious terms unless our firmness persuades it that
we cannot be diverted.
As we see the present situation, our leverage to induce acquiescence in a
procedure following the general lines suggested by Dr. Johnson is at a high point. Both
parties are highly sensitive as to what Dr. Johnson might report; both parties urge us to come up
with an innocuous PCC annual report;
both would like to slither through the debate with no result except an
extension of UNRWA financed by the US;
both hold in reserve (or may intend to introduce) resolutions designed
to put the other at disadvantage (Arabs—appointment of a custodian of
refugee properties in Israel and PCC
reconstitution, Israel—direct peace negotiations); both threaten public
rejection if the debate is carried on in such way as to place additional
pressure on them to go along with what Dr. Johnson proposes; and both hold out the lure of
leisurely constructive talks on the refugee problem following this
year’s debate if only we will refrain from rocking the boat. Both sides,
in short, alternately threaten
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and cajole in an effort to persuade us not to use the debate as a means
of advancing this effort. Our problem is that if we do not so use it,
our cumulative leverage will be dissipated and the parties, finding the
heat off, will go back to the starting line.
Our Specific Objectives:
Our tactical objectives in and before the forthcoming debate are to:
- (1)
- Shift gears from a ”Johnson Plan” to a ”PCC approach” without losing momentum on the valid
principles for any solution of the refugee problem which Dr.
Johnson has
identified.
- (2)
- Create generalized international support for the proposition
that the broad lines of the ”PCC
approach” are realistic, equitable, consistent with previous
UN directives, and in the
interests of the refugees, the parties, and Near East stability;
and that the PCC should carry on
further consultations with the parties in an effort to move
forward along these lines.
- (3)
- If possible, avoid having the specifics of the PCC approach subjected to
debate.
- (4)
- Avoid building up so much pressure that one or other of the
parties feels it must publicly come out in opposition.
- (5)
- Prevent introduction of unproductive partisan resolutions, if
possible, or at minimum prevent their adoption.
- (6)
- Provide for a modest (presumably one year) extension of UNRWA; i.e., from June 30, 1963
to June 30, 1964.
- (7)
- Incorporate objectives (2) and (6) in a resolution as simple
and non-controversial as possible, and win broad support for
such a resolution.
Planned Courses of Action:
- A.
-
Our first critical hurdle is to move the Israeli position
into parallel with that of the Arabs; i.e., to persuade them
to “clarify” their reply to Dr. Johnson and inform him that despite
such-and-such objections and apprehensions, they do not
entirely reject, under appropriate circumstances, the
possibility of cooperation in a PCC operation along these general lines.
A fifth meeting between Messrs. Talbot and Harman is to take place November 13 or
14.5 To bring about the desired shift,
we plan to talk firmly in terms of: (1) our belief in the
merits of Dr. Johnson’s general approach; (2) our inability to
prevent his reporting the parties’ reactions as he
understands these; (3) the dangers of exposure and isolation
which Israel will incur, on its own responsibility, if it
translates its initially
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expressed opposition into public
rejection; (4) the contradiction in terms apparent in
Israel’s statement that it shares our desire for progress
and its insistence on prior Arab agreement to conditions (a
repatriation ceiling and a cessation of propaganda) of a
nature which could not be accepted, which are unmatched by
parallel prior Israeli concession to the Arab demand for a
recognition in principle of the “right” of return, and which
would therefore preclude any progress; and (5) the problems
for our relationship with Israel which would inevitably
arise if it disdains this very earnest effort to remove a
festering sore that precludes Israel’s acceptance by the
Arabs, particularly when we had gone to such lengths
recently to create an atmosphere in which Israel could take
this step in confidence and safety.
At the same time, we propose to facilitate this desired shift
on Israel’s part by assuring Ambassador Harman at this fifth meeting
that (1) we would seek to dissuade Dr. Johnson from including in
his final report any mention of Israel’s peremptory first
response and virtual refusal to discuss his proposals; (2)
we would take the lead in bringing about a metamorphosis of
the Johnson proposals
so that their ingredients would be retained but they would
drop the Johnson
label and become a PCC
approach (our willingness to do this is one of our strongest
bargaining counters); (3) we will not press for a “do or
die” resolution on implementation of the proposals, but
rather a palatable directive to the PCC to seek through continued consultation with
the parties initiation of a PCC operation consonant with the broad
principles charted; (4) if Israel wishes, we would be
willing to put in writing the background assurances we have
so far given orally, in exchange for firm Israel assurances
of cooperation in an operation consistent with the “building
blocks” which our recent talks with Israel have identified;
and (5) we would undertake to tell Nasser, and other selected
Arabs of our choice, of what we see as the probable
numerical result of this operation, in terms of
repatriation-resettlement.
- B.
- If the Israeli position can be moved, we would urge Dr.
Johnson to make an
appropriately brief report to the PCC, noting (1) the essential elements of his
approach to a solution; (2) the parties’ concerns as expressed
to him; (3) his judgment as to how these concerns are met by the
elements of his approach; (4) his gratification that despite the
grave doubts recorded neither party had entirely precluded the
possibility of acquiescing in an approach of the general nature
suggested; and (5) his belief that it would be worthwhile for
the PCC to consider favorably
the merits of seeking, in further consultation with the parties,
progress by a process along these general lines.
- C.
- The third hurdle is the required annual PCC-to-Secretary-General report.
The Turks and French have caught the
above-all-don’t-rock-the-boat line being urged by the Arabs and
Israelis, and their backs will need strong diplomatic stiffening
if we are to win their assent in the sort
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of report we would hope to see.
This (1) would be brief, (2) would commend Dr. Johnson and refer to the
elements he had identified in his report as being a very
valuable contribution to progress on this problem pursuant to
Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194, and (3) would state the
intention of the PCC to carry on
further consultations with the parties in an effort to move
forward along these lines.
- D.
- The nature of the simple resolution we would be enabled to
introduce in the Special Political Committee, if these previous
steps had gone smoothly, has been described. We believe such a
resolution would command overwhelming support, as did ours of
last year. The result would be to give renewed and more sharply
focused impetus to the PCC
effort, without having brought such great pressure to bear as to
have impelled a rejection by either of the parties.
