86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Yemen0

167. Legtel 142.1 You may at your discretion convey to Prime Minister Sallal or other appropriate YAR official all or that portion of following which in your judgment can be safely held in YAR confidence:

USG is gratified at: (1) Prime Minister Sallal’s assurances to Charge re YAR desire for US friendship; (2) YAR’s expressed intention concentrate on internal reform and progress; (3) YAR’s evident desire maintain independent policy and eschew undue outside influence; (4) YAR officials’ statements to effect YAR will refrain from foreign adventures (e.g. actively pressing claims to Aden Protectorates and Colony); and (4) YAR desire establish friendly relations with Saudi regime in Saudi Arabia.

We believe foregoing are welcome indicators of good intentions on part republic regime and are pleased they are matter of record. We wish YAR confidentially to understand, however, that reasons for continued USG delay in extending recognition are found outside Yemen and relate to need avoid damage to our interests in Arabian Peninsula flowing from Yemen conflict. We must first assist in creating situation in which others can gracefully disengage from conflict. One step in this direction is reduction in area tensions. In helping reduce these tensions we wonder if YAR intends to proceed with course of action proposed to Charge Stookey re dispatch friendship mission to Saudi Arabia.

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We believe, therefore, YAR will appreciate necessity further delay before extension USG recognition while other Western states such as West Germany are doing so. As Charge Stookey has informed Prime Minister Sallal, continuation of AID projects is earnest of US desire assist people of Yemen.

FYI. We are still undertaking talks with UAR re possibility reducing tensions between UAR and Saudi Arabia. At same time we must give Prince Faysal time appoint a cabinet, familiarize himself with developments and cope with internal stresses flowing from SAG commitment Yemen conflict. We are seeking ways assist him in latter endeavor and have assured him of our support.2 End FYI.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86H/10-2262. Secret. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Strong, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Jidda, London, and Aden.
  2. In telegram 142 from Taiz, October 22, Stookey reported on a conversation with Prime Minister Sallal that took place in Sanaa on October 19. (Ibid., 786H.02/10-2262)
  3. Telegram 1559 from USUN, October 30, confirmed that in response to a telephone call from Seelye, an officer of the U.S. Mission gave to YAR Foreign Minister El Ainy the substance of telegram 167 to Taiz with the exception of the third sentence in the third paragraph. El Ainy expressed gratification and said he would relay the message to Sallal. (Ibid., 611.86H/10-3062)