390. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary of State
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. Tyler
- Mr. Manning
- Minister Jones
- Mr. Lampson
- United Kingdom
- Foreign Secretary Butler
- Colonial and Commonwealth Secretary Sandys
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Sir Patrick Reilly
- Sir Geoffrey Harrison
- Mr. Henderson
- Sir Bernard Burrows
- Mr. Cheetham
- Mr. Crawford
- Mr. Peck
- Mr. Hadow
SUBJECT
- Yemen
Yemen
Butler said this was both a foreign affairs problem and a domestic political problem for the British Government. The simple-minded backbenchers could not see why [sic] shouldn’t restore the Royalists. He thought there were two problems to consider. The first was what could be the composition of a broadly based Yemeni Government. The second was how could influence be exerted on Nasser.
Rusk said that Spinelli’s estimate of the number of Egyptians in the Yemen was about 10,000 lower than US estimates. This discrepancy should be checked up on. Rusk, however, for the time being trusted US estimates. Sir Geoffrey Harrison said the British thought there were about 30,000 Egyptians still in the Yemen.
Butler said that the Yemeni Government must be acceptable to the northern tribes if it is to serve as a basis for a settlement in the Yemen. The problem was how to get sufficiently strong representation of the tribes into a coalition government and get the democratic elements to acquiesce and keep Nasser from sabotaging the settlement.
Butler urged Rusk to use American influence on Nasser. Points could be made that the prestige of Nasser with the US was being undermined. [Page 850] If Saudi Arabia took the issue to the UN it would be very difficult for the US not to support Saudi Arabia. Rusk said he had no thoughts as to who should be in a coalition government. He doubted whether any government in which leading Royalists served would be possible. He said Faisal had not insisted on any particular people being in a government. Butler replied that the northern tribes’ interest, not the interest of the royal family, was what the UK was concerned about. Rusk said they should encourage Spinelli. He hoped that January 4 would not be a terminal date. He thought the military presence would cease but a UN civilian presence might continue. He thought there might be some advantage in letting Egypt know about the UN angle which Butler had suggested. He then added that the US was more interested in Saudi Arabia than in the Yemen itself. This had been made clear to Nasser. Six or eight months ago Faisal’s position had been precarious. But he believed his position now had been somewhat strengthened. He thought that action should be taken along three lines: (1) to encourage Spinelli; (2) to press for troop withdrawals; and (3) to emphasize that attacks across borders must stop. Butler said their main interest was Aden. They were trying to get a neutralization agreement for the border between Yemen and the Aden federation. The Aden Government had made a proposal and the Yemeni Government had replied with an unacceptable counter-proposal. The Aden Government was studying it to see whether it could be used as a basis for negotiation.
Rusk said that there were signs that both sides were beginning to be fed up. Butler commented that Egyptian resources were beginning to be stretched to their limits. He hoped economic pressures could be applied to Egypt. Rusk replied that US legislation which cut off aid to countries engaging in aggressive actions—although it had been drafted with Israel as well as Egypt in mind—would apply to Egypt. The US could press this point in Cairo. Butler asked whether the Hickenlooper resolution had been designed to build up pressure against Egypt. Rusk said he thought that it would be kept in the Foreign Relations Committee for some time. It has been drafted with the knowledge of the State Department. Rusk hoped that means could be figured out to bring Yemenis in contact with one another in the hope that they could work out a coalition without being inhibited by Egyptians. Spinelli might play a role here. Meetings might be arranged outside of the Yemen. Rusk was optimistic that the UN diplomatic mission would continue but thought the military mission would be terminated. Rusk and Butler agreed to keep in touch with U Thant about the continuation of a UN diplomatic mission.
They agreed to keep in touch on this question and operate together as much as possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Lampson and approved in S on January 3, 1964. The meeting was held at the British Foreign Office. The source text is labeled “Part VI of XIII.” Secretary Rusk was returning from Paris, where he attended the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.↩