Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State⁰

Jidda, November 30, 1963, 1 p.m.

561. Disengagement: The decisive days. Dept Circ 971.1 Pending instructions re proposed course of action being developed in Department I feel impelled make now following comments and recommendations which I had planned to discuss with Amb. Badeau and Minister Cortada at Asmara Dec¹:

Comments:

1. Disengagement is not succeeding. UAR troops not only are not being withdrawn but process is now reversed and according most estimates UAR has as many troops in Yemen as at any time previously. There is no real prospect reducton total to 21,000 by end Dec as offered in October by Nasir, who has in any case juggled figures so often and impeded UNYOM efforts to verify departures and arrivals to degree that certified withdrawals before Jan 4 must considerably exceed 5,000 if we are even to get back where we thought we were Nov 4. Instead UAR appears to have made decision keep large military forces in Yemen “for years.” (British Amb. Crow has just shown me copy report from Beeley in Cairo of Oct. 31 conversation with Anwar Sadat who made this remark twice.)

2. This is in defiance of commitment made to President Kennedy via Amb. Bunker as clearly understood here and as understood by Faysal. Bunker on instructions and with my full support promised for President effective application such US influence and pressure as might be necessary to get UAR to comply. I have repeatedly reaffirmed we were applying pressure. If we have now decided we can no longer exert necessary leverage then my influence with Faysal is decisively undermined. By same token if we continue to try but are able accomplish no substantial and verified results before Jan. 4, then I see no present basis on which I can argue Faysal into another renewal of UNYOM. His stockpiling of arms in south has been increased [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that I am therefore 90 percent sure of failure. Furthermore, US Govt has been unable to pressure Nasir into compliance while we continue massive aid programs to UAR cannot be made credible to SAG. It can only mean we unwilling.

3. Threat of withdrawal Hard Surface will not be sufficient to induce Faysal again renew UNYOM in absence UAR compliance. Faysal prepared take his pounding although it may be worse than he supposes. Resentment against US for withdrawing Hard Surface will surely be high. I am sure Faysal’s position will be weakened by these attacks and by fact we will have failed help him in his defense. Nevertheless he will take his chances on basis requirements for self defense as he sees them.

4. Failure UAR withdraw troops appears to be generating some anti-UAR reaction in responsible YAR circles. UAR military presence now serves UAR and no other interest.

5. If, as indicated Deptel 428 to Madras,² Dept now focusing its efforts primarily on seeking establishment broader based govt in Yemen, such a course, while unquestionably necessary and should be continued, is operationally too slow of realization to preserve disengagement and peace by Jan. 4. Establishing such govt in next four weeks now appears quite unrealizable even if it had full UAR blessing, which no longer appears be the case, given UAR fears that broadened YAR may be anti-Egyptian. Nasir has apparently made decision force return to Yemen of Sallal, a man who does not want to go back, whose support in Yemen has eroded, who has long known his only bulwark was Egypt (and, if possible, union with it) and whose return will operate decisively against SAG recognition of YAR or even authorization of discussion with YAR delegation representing Sallal.

6. From here it is apparent quiet diplomacy has not evoked any meaningul UAR response. Instead it has been met by temporization with successive attempts place blame on SAG for alleged violations of disengagement (unsupported by UNYOM), on British interference from south, on SAG “moral” support of Royalists and finally on SAG stockpiling of arms in southern Saudi territory. It has been said that US should not place US-UAR relations on line because of Yemen. In fact, it is Nasir, with every indication he has taken full measure of our unwillingness “confront” him, who has placed those relations on the line, not really over Yemen but over Saudi Arabia. This in cool defiance of most able and vigorous presentation by Ambassador Badeau end of October. UAR has not heeded our repeated requests tone down anti-Faysal broadcasts or “enemies of God” program and has been heard Nov. 27 to attack President Johnson. Quiet diplomacy with Faysal has also about run out. With latest UAR overflights and bombings of Saudi territory it has ceased to have real meaning. On Nov. 28 Prince [garble], just back from Riyadh, made this clear. We may now have to take some real risks with UAR-US relations if we are to keep the peace. As I see it we have no choice. When peace collapses we shall face this problem in worse form. In absence very sizable withdrawals UAR troops before Jan. 4 we may not be able save peace at all but we have a chance if we lay full record on disengagement before UN. Our public exposition should be a full airing of all essential facts with a proposal for action. UAR will not like it but judicious statement of what has happened and constructive role UAR could have played—and might still play in Yemen would appeal to the impartial. Some of material in USIS Midston cable number 3 “peace in Yemen”³ would be useful.

Experience 1952–61 US-UAR relations in which I had closest uninterrupted contact shows conclusively Nasir had early chance for good relations with US but chose bring them almost to point of break in 1956–58. He recoiled from break while throwing entire propaganda and subversive machinery of UAR against US interests and US friends in area with almost entire Arab (even Saudi) popular sentiment heavily on his side. Nevertheless he failed seriously to impair single important US interest and with his enemies in Arab world now far more numerous than in earlier years I do not believe he can do so today.

History of US-UAR relations over this period also shows that Nasir has repeatedly tested our intentions for firmness. If words and threats of diminished aid are insufficient we are left, as I see it, with the public forum. Like any other leader with desire for wide acclaim he cherishes his image. I am not suggesting we destroy it but rather we let him know that private counsel having repeatedly failed, we are not fearful of his reaction as we make public a program to preserve the peace which goes against his own strategy and splashes him where he earned it. By same token a fair expose will not leave SAG entirely unblemished, but it will let SAG know we are not [garble] and are prepared face UAR in open debate. SAG will be more inclined preserve its own relatively good record and weigh disadvantages of renewal aid to Royalists. I think there is a chance this could succeed.

7. We have a bare 3 weeks at most before UNGA disbands until after January 4. Spinelli is taking his time, as no doubt he must. I believe we should move at once on action in UN since it may involve reference to present GA before it recesses.

Recommendations:

1. USG take policy decision at highest level to preserve disengagement before it lapses January 4. This should be given priority over all other considerations in US-UAR, US-YAR and even US-SAG relations at present juncture.⁴

2. USUN consult al-Ayni in New York and via Minister Cortada YAR leadership in Taiz saying that YAR must be broadened if US and other free world help to be forthcoming. Urge YAR (using US cryptographic channels if need be rather than those of UAR) to instruct al-Ayni to cooperate with USUN in requesting UN undertake soonest supervision over referendum within Yemen of tribal and other leaders to set up nationally-based government including all major tribes now dissident.⁵ UAR to quickly withdraw sizeable force and regroup remainder to ensure against interference with this referendum.

3. If feasible an adjunct to 2 above, YAR be asked to appeal for small UN force to cover key cities San’a and Sa’ada during period of referendum, thus relieving UAR troops which would be totally withdrawn.⁶ Fact of UAR troop withdrawals and prospect of referendum should serve to abate Royalist attacks (which already at low level) and make task of UN military force relatively safe one. It is realized that YAR support would be minimum requirement if resolution is to carry, and that other considerations may rule it out. Nevertheless, idea should be studied.

4. Regardless of YAR reaction to proposals 2 or 3 above, USUN might initiate preparatory discussions with UK delegation and others friendly to success of disengagement and then, preferably within first week December, initiate disengagement debate in USUN by reference to SYG’s last report. USUN could say all parties favored latest extension UNYOM, hoping for progress in reducing threat to peace. SYG’s report had cited unsatisfactory compliance by one party. Month having passed, we regretted to note that compliance by that party now worse and disengagement failing. We therefore consider threat to peace of area to be fast approaching and likely overtake UN during Christmas recess. We would lay bare most essential facts re Bunker agreements and status of compliance by parties in thorough expose, let the chips fall where they may. USUN might state belief positive UN role in Yemen now urgently required and would voice need for UN-supervised referendum at earliest possible date. We could refer to US willingness in principle to engage with UN and free world countries in coordinated long-term program economic development to begin only when UN-sponsored referendum completed and UAR troops withdrawn.

We might then circulate draft resolution calling for withdrawal UAR troops, maintenance disengagement by Saudi Arabia and other neighbors, and UN-supervised referendum. If vetoed by USSR, we could still seek action in UNGA under Uniting for Peace procedures before Christmas recess.

Conclusion:

It is realized foregoing course presents difficulties and risks. We may get no help from indecisive or weak YAR. We may lack votes in UN for our resolution. We may have to face charge US “interfering” to protect “feudal Saudi interests.” I see no way of avoiding these risks, and find no course but to face them. By early public airing of this very real threat to peace, we may forestall breakdown of disengagement. Otherwise I see no way to do so in month which remains.

Hart

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Dhahran, London, USUN, Cairo, and Taiz.
1. Dated November 27. (Ibid., ORG 8-2)
2. Not printed.
3. Not further identified.
4. A marginal notation in an unidentified hand at this point reads: “concur, but under new guise.”
5. A notation at this point reads: “al-Ayni already so doing (?).”
6. A notation at this point reads: “add UN agree?”