Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

353. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 36.7–63

Washington, November 6, 1963.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN YEMEN

Conclusions

A. The Sallal republican regime, through the support of some 30,000 UAR troops, controls about two-thirds of Yemen. The royalist northern tribes, which have been supplied from Saudi Arabia, remain in control of the mountains in the north and northeast. A decisive military victory by either side appears unlikely. (Paras. 1, 4–8)

B. Many Yemeni leaders feel that major changes in the republican regime are required to end the civil war, establish a central government acceptable to most Yemenis, reduce tribal dissidence to manageable size, and cut down UAR domination. (Para. 9)

C. Nasser is under various pressures to reduce his commitments in Yemen. He is tied down in an inconclusive war which is costly in money and casualties and he is facing a growing challenge from the Baath in the Arab world. He would insist that any settlement preserve a Yemen government republican in form, friendly to him, and subject to a considerable measure of Egyptian influence. (Paras. 10-11, 18)

D. Saudi Arabia wants to see the UAR out of Yemen and relies primarily on the US to force Egyptian withdrawals. We believe Faysal is not likely to resume large-scale aid to the royalists in the next two months or so, but that unless there is a substantial reduction of the UAR presence by the end of that period, he may resume it. (Paras. 12–13, 15)

E. Under the best of conditions, the situation during the next few months will be fragile and fighting could resume on a wide scale at any time. We believe that if there is no resumption of large scale aid to the royalists, with a consequent upsurge in the fighting, and if the various pressures on Nasser to facilitate a settlement increase, he will in time be forced, though reluctantly, to effect a sufficient diminution of the Egyptian presence to permit a political settlement as described in C above. (Para. 19)

F. The USSR has won considerable good will in Yemen by its prompt military and economic support. The Soviets are likely to maintain a significant presence in Yemen for the foreseeable future, although the indigenous Communist movement is small and the population is difficult to manipulate. The USSR will probably get civil air rights and perhaps be able to achieve a small capability to render clandestine support to operations in nearby countries. The Soviets will probably continue to have an edge over the West in Yemen, but we do not believe the Yemenis would grant military base rights to them. (Paras. 27–28)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the Estimate, which is included in the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.]

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Near & Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 6, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.