346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 0
315. Following is text oral message from President to be delivered by Ambassador when he sees Faysal:1
“Royal Highness:
“I have been informed by my Ambassador of your conversation with him of October 12. You read to him an exchange of messages with your mission to the United Nations concerning the possible termination of the United Nations observer operation on November 4. I fully comprehend the critical problems this would pose for you and I am keenly aware of the dissatisfaction which you entertain, and which I share, with the one-sidedness of the observance of disengagement during recent weeks. I wish to assure you categorically that whatever may have been said to your representative in New York, it continues to be our firm policy to see disengagement carried out and the United Nations Observation Mission remain until this is achieved.
“We intend to exert strong pressure on President Nasser and expect to be able to see the results shortly. The UAR has meanwhile agreed to a further prolongation of UNYOM and in other interested quarters we are working to be sure that this essential element in the disengagement structure is preserved. I am reasonably confident of success if you also will continue to give it your full support.
“You have asked Ambassador Hart what we will do if the effort fails and, resuming aid to royalists, you are attacked. There can be no question of our abiding concern with the integrity of your country nor of our support for your leadership of it as expressed to you in my letter of a year ago. For that very reason disengagement must not be allowed to fail nor should you and I ever contemplate finding ourselves at cross purposes in seeking to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and area peace. We have long since agreed that fulfillment by both sides of the commitments undertaken in the disengagement agreement was the only feasible route for obtaining the peace and stability in the Yemen which is a prerequisite [Page 751] for peace and stability in your country. We must keep this formula. To do otherwise would be to lose all the benefit of the relative quiet we have won. It would reopen the crisis and prolong it indefinitely, with attendant suffering in the Yemen and renewed enlargement of the area of conflict.
“We considered it necessary to recognize the YAR largely to preserve the stability of Saudi Arabia.2 Having established relations with the YAR we cannot be an accomplice to renewed attacks upon it. As a leader with the highest sense of Arab honor, you will readily see in what an impossible position this would place us. Similarly we would not condone aggression against Saudi Arabia. We cannot permit the problem to be posed in this fashion, particularly since we believe in the feasibility of a reconciliation of forces within Yemen. I hope, therefore, that you will join us in support of that reconciliation which alone seems to offer the hope of eventual peace for that unhappy land.
“I am gratified that you have expressed your readiness in principle to participate in economic assistance for Yemen. I take this as another sign of your statesmanship. The achievement of political stability in the Yemen may take some time. However, recent developments show that a broadening of its present base is recognized as a necessity by the Yemenis themselves. What this may lead to eventually is for the Yemenis to decide, as we have both agreed. To this end, therefore, let us bend our efforts to make disengagement work. Your own posture in the international scene has been greatly strengthened by your adherence to disengagement and support of UNYOM. I am confident you agree that maintaining this posture is of great importance to the long-term interests of your country and its future generations.
“I take this occasion to renew to your Royal Highness warm expressions of my personal admiration and enduring friendship.”3
Separate telegram contains detailed instructions.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hart and Killgore on October 18; cleared by Sisco, Grant, Komer, Symmes, and Marvin; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Cairo, London, Dhahran, and USUN and by pouch to Taiz, Kuwait, and Aden.↩
- In telegram 426 from Jidda, October 21, Ambassador Hart recommended some changes in the text of this letter before delivery to Faysal. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN/UN) Rusk approved Hart’s recommendations and made an additional change in telegram 318 to Jidda, October 21. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476, Saudi Arabia) The approved changes are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4 below. No single composite text of the final message has been found.↩
- The following sentence was inserted at this point: “Had we not done so we would have yielded our position within the Yemen to forces which could threaten that stability unchecked by any moderating pressures whatever from the United States.”↩
- The following was substituted for the final paragraph: “I take this occasion to congratulate your Royal Highness on measures which I have learned were recently taken toward modernization of provincial administration of Saudi Arabia and to expedite development plans on a wide scale. I am confident that within the near future the efforts which you are vigorously expending on uplift and construction will be a source of pride to the Saudi people, setting the example of an enlightened monarchy with interests inseparable from those of its people and energies dedicated tirelessly to them.”↩
- In telegram 313 to Jidda, October 19, the Department of State reconfirmed the course of action described in telegram 77 to Istanbul, Document 340, as modified by Talbot’s comments in telegram 82 from Istanbul, Document 342. It also directed Hart to deliver the President’s oral message to Faysal and presented additional talking points. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.↩