334. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 0
Our Yemen enterprise is in danger of coming unstuck, partly because with all our other problems we’re not policing it vigorously enough: (1) the SYG, for largely financial reasons, is thinking of scrapping UNYOM—another Congo-type problem; (2) Yugos, who provide half the force, want to pull out; (3) Canadians, who provide most of the rest, are again getting goosey; (4) Faysal is sore because UAR isn’t pulling out; (5) UAR itself is in a quandary, but Nasser’s latest talk with Badeau suggests UAR will play ball in working out some kind of compromise regime (Cairo 779 attached).1
But such a compromise will take time to work out; to get this time we need to keep UN buffer between Saudis and UAR/YAR. If we let UNYOM fall apart we’re back where we were five months ago, with UAR tempted to bomb Saudi supply lines and Saudis then screaming for our planes to shoot UAR jets down. So we’ve got to keep disengagement limping along. (Note: Nasser says he’ll pull out some more troops shortly.)
[Page 726]We need a sharp word from on high to get people focused again on keeping this non-war damped down. Otherwise we risk another flare-up (with our planes out there). So I’d like your approval to put out the following as your view:
- 1.
- Let’s keep UNYOM going, through whatever pressure on UN, UAR, Saudis, or Canadians is necessary.
- 2.
- Let’s keep pressing UAR and Saudis to live up to disengagement.
- 3.
- We should keep our 8 jets in Saudi Arabia a while longer, but tell Faysal delicately we’ll do so only if he plays ball.
- 4.
- We should sort things out with the UK, so they don’t undermine us by working at cross purposes.