Office of the Historian

287. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, July 2, 1963.

Since we reserved your rights, we need your final approval to send the eight fighters to Saudi Arabia. We are in effect committed to do so because:

1.
Saudis finally accepted our proposed way out on screening issue.
2.
Your letter to Faysal (delivered Monday)1 said that now UN observers were moving into position, “we have therefore dispatched the air unit which I undertook … to send … once disengagement was fully established by UN observers.”
3.
So unless we send the fighters promptly, Faysal may again accuse us of breaking promises. Our Ambassador is very worried about further delays. We’ve already deployed practically everything but the fighters themselves, holding latter in Spain till UN observer teams could deploy to border area. Main UN element is arriving in Yemen 3 July and scheduled to deploy on 5 July. There may be some delay in this God-forsaken area but I share State/DOD feeling that we had better finally go ahead.

To reassure you, rules of engagement permitting us to fire on aircraft committing hostile acts (e.g. bombing) are strictly standby and not to be authorized without your express approval. The only authority our aircraft now have is standard one of firing back in self defense if they themselves are shot at.

To further limit risk of any confrontation, we’re telling Cairo about squadron and will do so again with Nasser personally within the week. UAR did conduct one “raid” (last Sunday) after disengagement officially in effect, but UN observer believes after viewing scene that pilot jettisoned bombs by error.

Meanwhile, YAR fortunes again seem on upgrade and Royalists weakening. Sign of times is that UK met Yemeni terms for release of 16 servicemen. In sum, we are still moving slowly, haltingly, but distinctly toward a successful exercise.

R. W. Komer
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Saudi Arabia, 7/63–8/63. Secret. An undated note by Komer attached to the source text reads: “JFK approved pronto. We’re going to send squadron to Dhahran on 5 July, since observers not arriving in forward area till 5th. We’ll hold at Dhahran (far from trouble area) and not send up to Jidda until observers confirmed in place and we’ve warned Nasser off again.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CINCSTRIKE and other components on July 3 to proceed with deployment to Dhahran, but not proceed beyond unless authorized. (JCS telegram 1512, DTG 032235Z Jul 63; ibid.) At 4:30 p.m. on July 5, Komer telephoned the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense to inform officers there of the President’s decision and of the caveat that the President would not approve the fighters moving beyond Dhahran until the Yugoslav element of U.N. observers was in place and Badeau had notified the UAR of the fighters’ movement. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7275, #7 Hard Surface—March thru Aug. 63—Volume I)↩
  2. Document 286.↩