Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

271. Memorandum From V. H. Krulak of the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)⁰

SACSA-M 349–63

Washington, June 13, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Subversive Insurgency in Iran

1. In the memorandum which forwarded you a copy of the DIA appraisal on the subject for your reference in connection with the Special Group (CI) meeting of today,¹ it was noted that a detailed discussion would be forthcoming. This memorandum is designed to meet that requirement and for use in possible discussions with USCINCEUR on your forthcoming trip.

2. DIA’s study is attached at Tab A.² Additionally the views of USCINCEUR and CINCNELM were solicited by DIA, and are attached to DIA’s appraisal as independently prepared studies. USCINCEUR’s on-the-spot appraisal (at Tab B) is a most valuable, pertinent and carefully considered analysis; the most significant portions are underscored. CINCNELM’s estimate is at Tab C.

3. USCINCEUR and CINCNELM agree in general with DIA’s appraisal, however USCINCEUR views the current threat to internal security as more passive than do the others.

4. The appraisals address the following topics:

a. General Degree of Seriousness of Current Threats to Internal Security. In outline the consensus is that the internal security situation in Iran should be considered as critical but not yet uncontrollable. It is a situation to which we should address immediate and serious attention, especially within the next 18 months, the most potentially critical period of the Shah’s directed revolution. Subsequently, the next 3 or 4 years will be critical until the Shah achieves more firm new political bases of support.

USCINCEUR believes that “In view of the mounting dissatisfaction among an increasing number of diverse and geographically dispersed elements in Iran, the current threat to internal security is believed to be greater than at any time since the Shah was forced to flee the country in August 1953,” and that there is “evidence of dissatisfaction in the Iranian Armed Forces”, and that this combined with widespread discontent present a potential serious threat to the government.

b. Extent of External Subversive Support and Identity of Sponsors, Especially in Regard to Current Indications that Such Support May Be Coming From the UAR.

With regard to foreign support, considering Egyptian President Nasir’s well-known animosity toward the Shah and the opportunities available to Nasir, it is considered probable that at least some Egyptian financial support was provided the Iranian religious leaders, possibly channeled thru the Shia in Iraq. It is doubtful if such support was a major factor behind the urban disturbances however.

Although there is some illicit arms traffic across the Persian Gulf, probably destined for tribal dissidents, there is no evidence that would link such smuggling with the operations of any foreign government.

c. Current Capabilities of Iranian Security Forces to Maintain Order (Army, Gendarmerie, National Police).

To date the Shah’s main political opposition, the National Front, and the major tribes who are traditionally anti-Shah have not committed themselves overtly to active participation. USCINCEUR believes that should additional trouble spots develop, the security forces would be incapable of coping with even a moderate increase in disorders similar to those continuing to exist in Fars. Additionally in view of the heavy commitment of forces (see Tab D) (Tribal/Urban Disorders, Casualties and Participants) in the urban centers, in Kurdistan and in the southern tribal areas “it is questionable where troops to reinforce these areas would come from.”

DIA states that “Prior to the recent outbreak of tribal dissidence in southwestern Iran, the IIA was considered capable of dealing successfully with any internal threats to internal security. The Army’s generally poor performance in controlling the tribal dissidence in the Fars-Khuzistan area has altered this appraisal. Although tribal insurgency in southwestern Iran now appears on the wane, the degree to which this diminution resulted from purely military control measures is speculative. However, we believe that the IIA still can maintain order in the face of localized outbreaks of tribal dissidence.”

The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie is capable of performing its assigned mission of maintenance of internal security, law and order in Iranian rural areas under normal conditions. It has only a limited capability to deal with problems of local dissidence and in the event of widespread or serious local disorder it must call upon the IIA for assistance.

Iran’s National Police, as evidenced by complete inadequacy in recent events, failed “through fear and lack of leadership” to demonstrate any control capability. Our AID-sponsored Public Safety Program deserves thorough review now.

d. Loyalty of Army and Its Morale, Especially in Face Increasing Demands on it for Internal Security Duties.

USCINCEUR estimates that the Army has so far proven loyal but there are sectors and cliques in the Armed Forces where evidence of serious dissatisfaction is present, and which could be exploited during widespread unrest.

DIA believes that, “overall morale in the IIA has generally been described as low, with some exceptions attributed to the capabilities of individual unit commanders. The morale of the IIA units participating in suppression of tribal disturbances in the southwest has been reported as very low, but with no indications as to variations between particular units. Much of this results from the Persian’s natural aversion to violence, particularly where personally involved. At least some improvement in morale among these units may be anticipated with the decrease in tribal hostilities and the even superficial appearance of military successes. In connection with the urban disturbances, the demonstrated effectiveness of the IIA has probably had a beneficial effect on the morale of the units involved.”

e. Possibility of Coalition on National Level of Dissident Elements in Urban Centers and Insurgent Tribal Areas.

DIA states that “the possibility of establishment of an effectively coordinated, centrally controlled coalition of diverse Iranian opposition groups is remote”, however, “effective coordination under unified or external leadership of opposition elements would constitute an extremely grave threat to governmental stability”.

USCINCEUR states that “until the Shah can consolidate his strength and prestige the government will remain vulnerable to possible overthrow”, and, “Iranian security forces would be hard pressed to deal effectively with the situation if insurgency increased simultaneously with urban and rural disorder.”

5. Of all the varying nuances in estimates of the threats, capabilities, loyalties, etc., the fact remains clear that a serious threat to internal security exists in one of our most strategic assets, in the face of a social and economic revolution, and that subversive forces would be alert to exploit any critical situations. The U.S. will be identified with whatever the outcome may be, and enhanced assistance in the whole spectrum of counterinsurgency is not only required but we are believed in Iran to be committed to provide it. USCINCEUR summarizes the immediate requirements most clearly as follows:

“Primary emphasis on US assistance in this problem is the responsibility of the Department of State. A straight-forward and forthright approach to the Shah and his governmental agencies appears most logical. This approach should be definitive in its recommendation and should clearly indicate the fallacy of military suppressive actions. It should provide a psychological theme, methods of disseminating the theme, mobilization of existing resources for distribution of subsistence items provided; programs to control and coordinate the land reform projects”.

“Specific assistance at this time should include:

a. US food supplies for tribal areas (to be issued by IIA under supervision of US military advisors).

b. Expedited police training under AID auspices emphasizing riot-control measures.

c. Special psychological operations assistance by USIA.

d. CINCEUR HQS, assisted by the MAAG and COMSOTFE, is presently finalizing a follow-on counterinsurgency Mobile Training Team Program for Iran. However, this is aimed at the longer term threat, particularly that of externally supported insurgency. We do not recommend hurried dispatch of training teams under present conditions.”

V. H. Krulak
Major General, USMC

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CJCS 091 Iran (13 June 63). Secret. A covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum was written at Taylor’s request.
1. According to the minutes of the Special Group (CI) meeting on June 13, the Special Group discussed a Department of State followup report. (Department of State, Special Group, Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 51)
2. All tabs are attached to the source text but not printed.