Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

259. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State ⁰

A-2919

London, May 31, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Transmitting Memcons re US-UK Persian Gulf Talks

REF

• Embtel 4204¹

Transmitted herewith are pertinent Memoranda of Conversation of US-UK talks on the Persian Gulf held on April 23–24, 1963, in London.² Foreign Office Deputy Under-Secretary Sir Roger Stevens was the principal UK participant, while Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot headed the US side. In accordance with Secretary Talbot’s wish, the attached Memoranda were shown to the Foreign Office in draft form, and are consonant with the extensive (60 pages) British record of the talks.

The talks showed a general identity of views between the US and UK on Persian Gulf and related problems. In response to Secretary Talbot’s specific inquiry, the British disclaimed any major concern about US actions in the Gulf. Divergent emphasis exists, however, on the two subjects set forth in the penultimate paragraph of this dispatch.

In essence, the UK’s position is as follows: The Persian Gulf remains a vital interest to HMG, and HMG retains its willingness and capability to preserve the British position there. In addition to its specific treaty commitments in the Gulf, HMG considers its presence there as (a) a deterrent to Communist penetration, (b) insuring the continued availability of oil to the UK and European economies on reasonable terms, and (c) a contribution to the peace and stability of the Middle East. Of these, the continued availability of cheap sterling oil is pre-eminent. Any disruption of this availability would seriously jeopardize the British balance of payments position. Kuwaiti investment in the British securities market, while once an important policy determinant, is today of declining importance. A slow drawdown of Kuwait sterling balances is taking place. Any sudden, radical withdrawal of Kuwaiti sterling balances in London would still be a source of serious concern to the British.

The focus of British interests is Kuwait, and the entire elaborate, costly structure of British military deployment in the Arabian Peninsula is geared speedily to implement, on the request of Kuwait, the Anglo-Kuwaiti defense agreement of 1961. The spearhead of British troop dispositions for this purpose is in Bahrain; Aden is the major logistic and command post; Sharja and Masira are staging posts; strategic reserves are positioned in Kenya and the UK. The British regard their military defense commitment from Kuwait along the rimland of the Arabian Peninsula to Aden as “indivisible”. Any disengagement from one point would adversely affect the others.

While Saudi Arabian stability is considered a potential future threat, HMG still sees the principal direct threat to Kuwait as Iraqi intentions. A more insidious danger is the prospect of a Nasser-dominated unity movement which, the British fear, could in certain circumstances prove irresistibly attractive to Kuwait. So long as the present Ruler of Kuwait lives, HMG believes he will not wish to dispense with his British defense commitment. Should a change of regime develop in Kuwait, the situation may alter and become more difficult to handle. A pro-Nasser revolt in Jordan would have profound implications in the Gulf, though less so than a change of regime in Saudi Arabia.

HMG has considered various alternative means of preserving the independence of Kuwait, e.g., a Great Power or UN guarantee and an Iraqi-Saudi pact, but has rejected them as inadequate or unfeasible. Though favoring Persian Gulf federation as a means of strengthening the viability of the Gulf states complex, HMG has no grand design for the area. It is not prepared to impose federation on them. It does not discount the possibility that some of the smaller states may eventually be absorbed by Abu Dhabi. Should the Anglo-Kuwait defense agreement at any time be abrogated by Kuwait, HMG’s present estimate is that the British position elsewhere in the Gulf, particularly having in mind Abu Dhabi’s prospects, probably still warrants the expense of maintaining a military commitment there. At the same time, however, HMG is acutely conscious of the political liabilities inherent in the British commitment to the Gulf states, both in terms of wider Anglo-Arab relations and domestic pressures at home.

Differences of emphasis exist between the US and UK on two points:

(1) Despite US urging, HMG is not yet persuaded that its early recognition of the YAR will further British interests in the Gulf and South Arabia. Though endorsing the current disengagement effort in Yemen, HMG still seeks some suitable peg on which eventual HMG recognition of the YAR can be hung without seeming to be appeasing Nasser or selling out the Aden Federation’s security.

(2) HMG remains unpersuaded that the mutuality of interests between oil producing and consuming countries is sufficiently compelling to be a reliable safeguard that the Arab states would continue the uninterrupted flow of needed oil to Europe’s expanding economy on present reasonable terms if they should somehow succeed in obtaining greater control of Gulf oil resources. Indeed, HMG is frank to say that, in its view, the present divided nature of the several oil producing countries of the Gulf constitutes the best safeguard to preclude “indecent behavior” by any one of them in respect of the West’s oil requirements. In this connection, HMG fears that the cost of its growing oil requirements in circumstances involving some unified Arab control of Gulf oil resources would substantially increase to the detriment of already delicate British balance of payments situation.

The Department is requested to determine any additional distribution of this airgram and its enclosures.

Comment: Though producing nothing startlingly new or different, the talks were useful insofar as they have provided HMG with a greater sense of security as regards US intentions in the Persian Gulf. The British may be expected to cite these talks for some time to come in support of coordinated US and UK policy decisions pertaining to the Gulf.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph J. Wagner
First Secretary of Embassy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Eilts and approved by Courtney.
1. Not printed. (Ibid.)
2. Attached but not printed. Additional documentation on the U.S.-U.K. talks in London on the Persian Gulf during April 1963 is ibid.; and ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Persian Gulf (General).