240. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary
(Brubeck) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Justification of US Aid to the UAR
[Page 519]
Pursuant to a request from Mr. Komer,1 we enclose a summary
justification of United States aid to the UAR. Detailed statements of aid and contributions of all types
and from all sources to Israel and the UAR
are attached.2
Classified materials, and arguments better not put in writing, for use in
briefing Congressmen, are being prepared and will follow shortly.
Enclosure4
JUSTIFICATION OF US AID TO
THE UAR
I. UAR
Policy Only Understandable in Context US Near East Policy Principal
Interests of US in Near East
- A.
- Limit Soviet influence and prevent Soviet domination.
- B.
- Maintain intercourse with area and use of communications routes
across it, e.g. Suez.
- C.
- Assure Israel’s well being.
- D.
- Insure access to oil on reasonable terms.
- E.
- Adequate identification with modernizing forces; growth of free
stable societies.
II. Principal Threats to Attainment of
US Interests
- A.
- Poverty and chaos of Near East which constitutes fertile feuding
ground for indigenous Communists and anti-Western
nationalists.
- B.
-
Regional Disputes.
[Page 520]
- (1)
- Arab-Israeli
- (2)
- Inter-Arab
Whenever these disputes reach such a boiling point that USG feels
compelled to intervene forcefully and openly to one side, e.g.
Israel or one particular Arab group as in 1958, Soviets and
other anti-US forces have great opportunity to expand their
influence in other NE states. USG
must retain its present moderating capacity with all principal
forces in NE; impossible if
US-UAR openly hostile to
each other.
- C.
- Understandable heritage of Arab distrust Western policies toward
Arab Near East.
III. Benefits to US from Aid to UAR
- A.
- Opportunity to discuss issues frankly and influence UAR policy (few non-negotiable
issues).
- B.
- Limit Soviet influence.
- C.
- Minimum agitation and action against vital Western
interests.
- D.
- Absence of incidents against US citizens and installations.
- E.
- Non-activation of Arab-Israel problem and cooperation with UN peace-keeping machinery.
- F.
- True neutrality by UAR on global
and cold war issues.
- G.
- Installation of Western technology and cultural influence in
UAR.
- H.
- Increased interrelationship of UAR
with free world in manifold economic, cultural, scientific and other
affairs.
- I.
- Modification of anti-US propaganda and favorable treatment of US
aid in UAR news media, setting tone
for rest of Arab world.
- J.
- Non-discrimination in issuance of visas.
- K.
- Continued UAR disposition to
suppress local Communist parties in Arab world and Africa.
- L.
- Increased commercial opportunities for US throughout area.
IV. Effects on US Interests if Aid Cut
Off
- A.
- Would be considered hostile act and UAR would have to react strongly—another “Aswan Dam
Incident”.
- B.
- Many years would be required to restore confidence and reinstitute
dialogue.
- C.
- Soviets would be greatly strengthened in their efforts to drive
Western influence and interests out of the Near East. Local
Communist parties would grow.
- D.
- Would cause UAR to side with
USSR on cold war issues.
- E.
- Western oil interests would be placed under greater
pressure.
- F.
- Would greatly heighten Arab-Israel tensions.
- G.
- “Hate Americans” campaign would unleash fanatics throughout Arab
area.
- H.
- Would not lessen UAR military
capacity vis-á-vis Israel.
V. Implications of Cairo Unity
Proclamation (4/17)
- A.
- Proclamation of unity, which not legal document, contained
reference in two of about 125 paragraphs to “liberation of
Palestine” and opposition to “Zionism and imperialism”; proclamation
itself clearly directed toward inter-Arab matters; aforementioned
passages standard formulation of long-standing Arab position.
- B.
- Despite provision for effort establish unified command,
proclamation envisages regional control of armies for indefinite
future; armies geographically separated; physical integration not
repeat not envisaged.
- C.
- Building of solid federation is long-term task. Cannot be done in
context of war against Israel.
- D.
- Establishment of Federation will increase pressure on Jordan but
several countervailing factors against serious political change
there.
- 1.
- Courage and leadership of Husayn.
- 2.
- Loyalty of Jordanian army.
- 3.
- Economic and political liabilities which Jordan would
entail for federation.
- 4.
- Possible Israel reaction.
- 5
- Publicly declared US interest in integrity of Jordan as
well as other states of area.
- E.
- Iraq’s entry in the Federation increases pressure on Kuwait but
latter protected by defense tie with UK and by general Arab desire that Iraq not obtain
Kuwaiti revenues for exclusively Iraqi use.
- F.
- Success of disengagement efforts in Yemen, declared US interest in
integrity of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia’s special internal
circumstances (diverse provincial structure and tribal society)
makes situation manageable in Saudi Arabia.
VI. Factors Bearing on Israel’s
Security
- A.
- Israel militarily superior to combined Arab forces. Internal lines
of communication and tight central control are assets Arab armies
would not enjoy.
- B.
- Danger of surprise attack reduced by Hawk surface-to-air
missiles.
- C.
- In event threat to peace in area, international factors loom
larger than local forces as demonstrated Suez 1956 and
Lebanon-Jordan in 1958.
- D.
- UAR has higher priority objectives
than attacking Israel, e.g., strengthening position in Arab world
and building economy for which Western aid required.
- E.
- UAR clearly believes that if it
starts war with Israel it would be engaging itself in war of unknown
proportions which it could not win and in which there would be
external intervention.
- F.
- Doubtful Soviets wish UAR attack
Israel since might force them to unwelcome confrontation with
West.
- G.
- Activities of German and other Europeans in UAR aircraft industry adds no
significant new military dimension; both parties can obtain all the
jets they want; reduces UAR reliance
on USSR in this field; manned
aircraft declining in significance; effective defenses in being;
West can control sources of materials and parts if need be.
- H.
- Production ground-to-ground rockets of more serious concern but do
not pose imminent threat view absence guidance system, small number,
500 lb. conventional warheads. No prospect for other types of
warheads. We actively seeking more information and examining
possible courses of action. Frontal public challenge to UAR would not serve useful purpose
since we would lose any ability to influence.
- I.
- No evidence Germans involved are ex-Nazis.
VII. Effect of US Aid on UAR Arms Purchases and
Programs
- A.
- Bulk of UAR armaments comes from
Soviets repayable by cotton exports undisposable in Western markets
at reasonable prices.
- B.
- UAR obtained quantities of arms
prior to institution of sizable US aid program.
- C.
- The input of any significant amount of US aid resources for UAR economic development began in
UAR
FY 1959. The UAR’s development budget has since increased from $132
million in FY 1959 to $281 million in
FY 1960, and to $756 million in
FY 1962. The input of US
resources for development purposes in FY 1962 equaled 24% of the UAR development budget.
- D.
- In the past three years, UAR
development budgets have increased by 300%, defense budgets by about
40%. In the FY 1962 UAR budget, the development budget
accounts for 42% of the total, the defense budget for 15%.
- E.
- UAR armed forces are not out of
proportion for nation of 27,000,000 (about 100,000-120,000).
- F.
- US aid mostly in form of surplus foodstuffs—balance is to
carefully selected development projects tied to US
procurement.
- G.
- UAR’s Yemen campaign conducted
mostly with Soviet supplies; financed largely with local currency;
believe no significant drawdown of foreign exchange essential to
development program.
- H.
- IMF stabilization loan, in which
US participated, designed to correct effects of bad harvest which
long preceded Yemen conflict. US aid not diverted to Yemen
campaign.
[Page 523]
VIII. Conclusions
- A.
- UAR’s activist policies have
created and likely continue create problems in area.
- B.
- Some of these problems would occur anyway as forces of
modernization take root and gain strength.
- C.
- US and West must learn to adjust to new situations if to stay
ahead of Soviets in cold war game.
- D.
- Problems created by UAR thus far
manageable, through combination urging restraint on Cairo and
strengthening affected areas; would become far less manageable if US
voluntarily destroys diplomatic leverage by adopting hostile policy
toward UAR.
- E.
- Though by no means a cure-all, economic cooperation is backbone of
long-term US policy which has gradually demonstrated significant
accomplishments. US can continue to effect improvements through it
provided we do not expect miracles overnight.
