237. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 0
1934. Jidda’s 919 to Department 1 and Deptel 2771 to Cairo.2 Careful study my memcons and recollections of conversations do not substantiate apparent Faysal understanding of Bunker-Nasser negotiations re security force. During Bunker talks Nasser stated UAR had not worked out detailed plan for size, character, and function of UAR troops after principal withdrawal. This, he said, would be dependent upon security problems YAR faced. What was made clear was that UAR would withdraw its “expeditionary” force, replacing it by training and security group consonant with Yemen needs. Neither Bunker nor I pressed for exact details since it seems clear that if such details insisted upon, UAR would protect itself by putting forward unrealistic maximum size remaining military group. Throughout discussion it was made clear minimum condition UAR withdrawal would be reasonable maintenance of YAR military in face of aftermath of fighting and traditional and recurrent tribal restlessness in Yemen. In view of unexpectedly large initial troop withdrawal of UAR even before disengagement underway, I suggest UAR will in fact get as many troops as possible out of Yemen and keep only the minimum necessary for sustaining reasonable security situation. Re Deptel 2771, Nasser again did not indicate detailed plan for replacing Egyptian units with YAR National Guard. He cited this as illustration of how he would proceed rather than as finished tactic.
I am seeking appointment with Ali Sabri later in week and will round up Yemen situation with him.