14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
Washington, August 7,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Review of United States Policy Toward Israel
An extensive and intensive review of our policy toward Israel has been
conducted in recent weeks. We were fortunate in having as part of the review
a thorough discussion of all aspects of our policy in the Near East at the
Chiefs of Mission Conference in Athens June 12–15. The results of our
examination are compatible in all respects with the extraordinary degree of
consensus achieved by the Conference, which concluded that the relatively
high standing of the United States among the Arabs, while still fragile,
provides us with a minor degree of maneuvering room in terms of adjustments
in policy with respect to Israel.
From the time we assisted at Israel’s birth in 1948 until the present, the
United States has had an unusually close relationship with, and has
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done a great deal for, Israel. We
strongly supported Israel’s entry into the United Nations in 1949. We
encouraged many other nations to recognize Israel and enter into diplomatic
relations. Economically, Israel has received assistance from the United
States unparalleled elsewhere, amounting to $665.9 million, or roughly $317
per capita, between 1952 and 1962. In addition, Export-Import Bank loans
amounting to $209.3 million were granted in this period. We have encouraged
Israel to broaden its horizons beyond the confines of the Near East and now
find her engaging in commerce and technical assistance programs practically
around the world. Over the years the Arabs have been made aware repeatedly
of our continuing deep concern for the security and well-being of
Israel.
Against this backdrop, Israel seeks from us a close military relationship, a
security guarantee specifically formulated for Israel, and access to a wider
range of military equipment including specifically the Hawk missile.
Frictions that have arisen between Israel and the United States are found in
Israel’s use of large scale retaliatory raids, Israel’s uncooperativeness
with the United Nations peacekeeping machinery in the Near East (also true
of the Syrians), Israel’s (as well as Arab) distrust of Dr. Johnson’s mission on the refugee question,
the question of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias, Israel’s objection to United
States initiative toward persuading other states not to establish diplomatic
missions in Jerusalem, Israel’s pursuit of a “direct negotiations”
resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, and our policy of
restraint on training third country nationals in Israel.
The enclosed memorandum details those measures which we are implementing. In
addition, I would appreciate your decision on several recommendations
presented in the enclosure. They relate to (a) sale of the Hawk missile to
Israel, should there prove to be no possibility within the next two months
of achieving (b) an informal understanding on arms limitation for the Near
East, and (c) an explanation to Israel of our legal position on the question
of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias.
In the near future I shall forward specific proposals for pursuit of an arms
limitation arrangement based on work now being done by the Departments of
State and Defense.
I believe the measures being taken and those recommended together constitute
a well-balanced and feasible policy which duly safeguards United States
national security interests and meets Israel’s needs realistically.
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Enclosure2
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL
The Department is proceeding with Israel as follows:
- 1.
-
Military Relationship Sought by
Israel. We shall avoid establishing any type of
special military relationship with Israel. To create what
would in effect be a military alliance with Israel would
destroy the delicate balance we have so carefully maintained
in our Near Eastern relations and would bring insufficient
compensatory advantages.
However in our view it would be useful and feasible further
to strengthen in the near future assurance given in the
President’s recent letter to Ben-Gurion of our continuing concern for the
security and well-being of Israel. We believe we have in the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (Tab A)3 a
suitable vehicle. That Declaration is to all intents and
purposes a security guarantee to both Israel and the Arabs.
(See paragraph 2. below regarding use of the Tripartite
Declaration with the Arabs.) We shall use an early
opportunity to reaffirm unilaterally (asking the British and
French not to follow our example) that portion of the
Declaration dealing with aggression. It might prove useful
to link such a strengthened assurance to our negotiations
with Israel on the Johnson mission. Our concern is to reduce
any urge Israel may feel to undertake a preemptive attack
against UAR air and
eventually missile installations and/or growing Syrian
ground strength. See Tab B.4
- 2.
- Jordan Waters. The President having
assured Israel in writing (Tab K)5 of our
support for Israel’s water program and having received Israel’s
assurances that its withdrawals will remain within the Johnston
plan allocations, we are now in a position to reassure the Arabs
that their legitimate water rights are protected and to
discourage Arab action against Israel’s water scheme. At such
time as we shall find it necessary to engage in further quiet
diplomatic activity to this end with the Arabs, we expect to
find it useful to reaffirm to them that that portion of the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 relating to aggression continues
to be an expression of United States policy. In the meantime we
shall encourage from behind the scenes Jordanian-Syrian
development of the Yarmouk
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(recently we have had an indication from an important UAR official that the UAR has decided not to embarrass
Jordan and Syria over their Yarmouk plan).
- 3.
- Strengthening of UN Peacekeeping Machinery. Israel has now
expressed its willingness to cooperate more fully with the
UN mechanisms in the Near
East. Meantime we have studied measures to improve the
effectiveness of the UN
machinery, and are proceeding along the lines of Tab C.6 Our efforts will be
directed impartially at the Arabs and Israel.
- 4.
- Retaliatory Raids. Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion has given
the President a vague assurance that means other than the
retaliatory raid (a response with large forces to an
accumulation of small-scale Arab hostile actions, thus
escalating the level of conflict considerably), will now be
employed in an attempt to prevent serious trouble on Israel’s
borders. (Ben-Gurion
letter at Tab K.) We have informed Ambassador Harman that we interpret
Ben-Gurion’s letter
as a pledge to abandon Israel use of the retaliatory raid. At
the same time we recognize that Israeli restraint over the long
haul is possible only if the Arabs show control and restraint.
We shall intensify our efforts with the Arabs.
- 5.
- Dr. Johnson’s Mission. In line with the
view of the Ambassadors at Athens we have agreed with Dr.
Johnson that if
possible at least a small start on his project should be made
prior to UN General Assembly
debate of the UNRWA item.
Whether Dr. Johnson will
be in a position to proceed toward this objective heavily
depends a) on the consent of the President to US support of the
project as well as the concurrence in principle of key
Congressional leaders, and b) on achievement by the US of a
private understanding with Israel. We shall present a proposal
to the President shortly.7
- 6.
- Diplomatic Missions in Israel. In line
with Ambassador Barbour’s
recommendation, and with the concurrence of our Ambassadors to
the Arab countries, we have informed Ambassador Harman that hereafter we shall
take no initiative to persuade other countries to establish
missions at Tel Aviv rather than at Jerusalem. However, we
retain the right to respond to queries from other states. We
shall give the Embassy in Tel Aviv greater latitude in
conducting business and accepting social engagements in
Jerusalem. This should serve to meet the Israeli complaint. See
Tab D.8
- 7.
- Direct Negotiations (Brazzaville)
Resolution. In mid-June Mr. Feldman informed Ambassador Harman that we expected to be
consulted before Israel undertook to campaign for a new direct
negotiations resolution
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in the next General Assembly. However, in his reply to the
President, Ben-Gurion
stressed the importance Israel attaches to the direct
negotiations principle, thus indicating we may have difficulty
in persuading Israel to desist. Ambassador Harman recently notified us of
Israel’s intent to proceed with its campaign. In the view of the
Ambassadors at Athens the direct negotiations issue holds danger
for the United States. Our first course is to dissuade Israel
and other countries from pursuing it. If despite our efforts
such a resolution is introduced we shall be prepared to vote
(but not campaign) against it provided Dr. Johnson has made some progress
and provided it is necessary at the time in support of our
tactical position in the debate. Our foreign policy interests
clearly would not be served by a vote in favor. We are
discussing this issue further with Ambassador Harman. See Tab E.9
- 8.
- Training of Third Country Nationals in
Israel. In accordance with the conclusions reached at
the Athens Conference we are revising existing instructions to
the field to permit, within reason, training of third country
nationals in Israel in conjunction with our AID programs, a) provided Israel’s
training facilities best meet our needs and b) without becoming
engaged in the Arab-Israel cold war in Africa. See Tab F.10
Decisions by the President Are Requested on the
Following:
- A.
-
Sale of Hawk Missile to Israel.
Provision of the Hawk would enable Israel to reduce
considerably its vulnerability to surprise air attack by
low-flying aircraft. Greater confidence in its defenses
would permit Israel the better to resist any temptation to
engage in preemptive attack against the UAR air strike capability.
(Conversely, significant reduction of Israel’s vulnerability
would remove one deterrent to Israeli preemptive attack.)
Principal factors operating against sale of the Hawk are: a)
existence of effective deterrents to attack by the UAR and of UAR vulnerabilities and
limitations, and absence of conditions requiring or
favorable to attack by the UAR; b) problems of production and training
schedules, and reactions from allies and friends; and c) a
strong preference first to seek Nasser’s reaction to a proposal for an arms
limitation arrangement.
However, since Israel has a military requirement for the
Hawk, since the Hawk is a defensive weapon only and since
United States intelligence clearly indicates that the UAR is in the process of
obtaining comparable missiles from the USSR, we recommend that if
within the next two months there is no serious prospect of
an arms limitation arrangement
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we offer the Hawk to Israel after
consultation with the British and discussion with the UAR. (See Tabs G and H)11
- B.
- Arms Limitation Understanding in the Near
East. The Chiefs of Mission Conference at Athens
proposed that an effort be made toward such an understanding
(see Tab I).12 The Conference envisioned face-to-face
meetings by the President with Ben-Gurion and Nasser as the initial step. Inevitably many
months of delay would be entailed in this approach. Therefore we
have in mind preparing a telegram instructing Ambassador
Badeau to talk with
Nasser in the name of
the President, explaining our considerations and seeking a
reaction from him. While we are not sanguine, we believe the
attempt should be made. A similar approach would be made to
Ben-Gurion if
Nasser’s response so
warranted. We shall submit detailed proposals shortly based on
work now being done by State and Defense.
- C.
-
Sovereignty Over Lake Tiberias. We
have the choice of letting Israel’s public claim to
sovereignty over Lake Tiberias go unchallenged, of stating
our position publicly, or of stating it either orally or in
writing to Israel, privately. At a later date we intend to
follow the latter course, with decision as to whether
presentation is to be oral or written to be made at the
time. The substance, in either event, would be that
contained in the draft at Tab J.13
Informally the Israelis have led us to believe our language
will be acceptable to them, though further Israeli attempts
to persuade us to their view seem likely.
A strategy timetable for implementing our recommendations is
at Tab L.14