Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

170. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)⁰

Washington, January 19, 1962.

Carl—

In wanting to discuss new Iran report Friday¹ George McGhee apparently had nothing in mind beyond showing that State has things in hand. Indeed purpose of report itself is to tell WH to keep its cotton-picking hands off this problem—it says no NSC action of any kind is needed. Just leave it to our diplomats, who with flexibility, skill and wisdom, will do all that can be done to save this flea-bitten country.

Indeed, this report is a vestigial remnant of the original TF exercise. It was proposed four months ago by me in order to close off TF effort by showing everybody that movement was underway (at that point Talbot was urging that Ken² and I leave him and Holmes alone).

Of course I still believe we are going to hell in a hack in Iran, and that our policy is not sufficient unto the need. Nor have I found anybody in State or elsewhere (except perhaps Holmes and his staff) who disagrees with first proposition. The desk officer (John Bowling), just back from Teheran, says that chief disagreement he had with Embassy was their surprisingly optimistic outlook. Note how new report itself reeks with pessimism, pointing out that “the underlying malady of the country” has not been cured. “Iran remains politically sick and economically disorganized …” “The Shah is either unwilling or unable to take the difficult and, to him, distasteful measures which would enlist full confidence and enthusiastic support of … his more politically conscious and articulate subjects.” The National Front “will probably sooner or later come to power.” The Shah’s character “is such as to make his years as the ultimate repository of power almost certainly numbered.” He “appears unwilling or unable to make the changes necessary to assure the support” of the Nationalists. Add all this up and you wonder why we’re not more worried about Iran.

The guts of the problem are illustrated on Page 2 of State paper. Are we really confronted with only “the two basic strategies” outlined? Note that way these are phrased makes us appear to be backing a losing proposition—instead of supporting “a revolutionary element which will probably sooner or later come to power” we “continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah whose character is such as to make his years … of power almost certainly numbered.” Put this way we are running a holding action which will sooner or later fail.

But there is also a middle course which was that recommended by the Iranian TF and approved by President in the moment of truth during last May’s crisis. It was to back a moderately progressive government in an attempt to take the wind out of the NF’s sails, risking the Shah’s displeasure if necessary but seeking to keep him in line. To say that the Shah won’t let this type of government succeed yet that we must confine ourselves to what the Shah will allow is tantamount to saying that sooner or later we will have an NF government in Iran with disastrous consequences. Indeed this is what the paper says.

If this is so, I don’t quite see the overriding risk in pushing the Shah harder. As Cuyler Young put it, we should have no qualms about “intervention”. He felt we are “damned if we do and damned if we don’t.” And the paper itself agrees. So why not take risk of pushing Shah harder in light of probability of failure if we don’t. This is the core of the long-standing TF divergencies on Iranian policy. Given the pessimistic consensus about the Iranian outlook, Ken Hansen and I have argued for a much more dynamic effort to avoid the otherwise inevitable result.

However, we have given up for the moment butting our heads against the stonewall of State, and of being told that one must accept in the last analysis the Ambassador’s judgment. Had you heard Holmes when he was back here last time, describing how he really shared the Shah’s fear of the Afghans and Iraqis and how we must insure Iran’s security as first priority, you would realize that this competent but traditionally-minded diplomat just doesn’t understand the essential nature of the problem we confront in Iran today. The first priority is rather how to accomplish the transition from a feudal regime to a modernized society without such chaos and upheaval as will permit Khrushchev to make good on his boast that Iran will fall like a ripe plum into his lap.

I argued that Phil should use this report as a vehicle for bringing forward the two immediate issues now confronting this Administration, i.e. how much military baksheesh to give the Shah and whether to have him here for a visit. But these subjects are merely mentioned in passing.

As the President put it, an extra $70 million spread over five years isn’t much; but the point is that giving it would symbolize our intent to continue the same half-baked policy as in the last decade,³ which was simply to try and keep things afloat, pandering when necessary to the Shah’s love of military panoply and his fears of external attack. The “$70 million” is important precisely because it is a test of whether we will continue along this road or whether we will at long last make a determined effort to force the Shah to face up to the fact that his real problems are internal, not external, and that if he doesn’t do more about them, his days are indeed “numbered.” Moreover, no one has even looked yet at whether the cool $300 million even the Steering Group is willing to waste on FY 1962/67 MAP for Iran could not be jiggered so as to give Pahlevi enough “glamor” equipment to keep him happy. (Note that average annual level of MAP to Iran in the comparable FY 1956/61 period was $62 million; the SG recommends $50 million annually which hardly indicates that we are abandoning Iran militarily.)

As to the Shah’s visit, Holmes is trying to use this as a lever to force favorable action on his $70 million by saying that we should not invite the Shah if we have to give him bad news. Of course Shah doesn’t even know what FY 62/67 MAP we’re contemplating (but Holmes argues that the only way we can get Shah to cut his army from 200,000 to 150,000 is to tell him something we have never told a MAP client before—how much they will get over a full five year period). I agree to the extent that a five year package looks more impressive than just $50 million a year.

I favor a visit by Shah for quite different reasons—because I feel that only JFK will be able both to tell the Shah the home truths which Ambassador obviously will not and to reassure him (with the Kennedy flair) of our unflagging determination to defend Iran. Moreover, let’s remember that Iran is now preparing its Third Development Plan and that we are committed to support this in a substantial way. My idea would be to tell Shah that we are giving him so much more of what we really think important, i.e. development aid, that he and we will have to take a few risks on the military side. And in the last analysis, Iranian army couldn’t fight its way out of a paper bag anyway, so it is the US which would have to defend him against any substantial attack. Why can’t we reassure him that if he is so threatened, he must (as he will have to anyway) rely on our support?

Recommendation: That we not send this report to President or put it on NSC agenda, since it calls for no action.

But that we tell State and Defense President wants their prompt recommendations on: (1) Preferred FY 63/68 MAP levels for Iran (i.e. decision on Steering Group vs. Holmes called for in draft MAP paper); (2) Comparable FY 63/68 projection of AID requirements so President can see both sides; (3) Timing of visit by Shah; and (4) Future policy toward Iran—are we pushing hard enough? These things can then be discussed in NSC.

R.W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 1/19/62–2/28/62. Secret.
1. The Iran Task Force Report of January 18 (Document 168) was placed on the agenda of the NSC Standing Group meeting for Friday, January 19. According to the Record of Actions for that meeting, the Standing Group: “Noted that the Department of State has prepared a report on activities and progress made in carrying out U.S. policy in Iran, as set forth in the approved report of May 15, 1961, of the Task Force on Iran, but postponed discussion of this report until the next meeting to be held on January 26, 1962.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, January 19, 1962) During 1962, the NSC Standing Group, composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, met every Friday at 2:30 p.m.
2. Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget and member of the Iran Task Force.
3. A marginal handwritten notation by Komer next to the first three lines of this paragraph reads: “Read Teheran 530, just in, as example of Holmes’ latest effort.” In telegram 530 from Tehran, Holmes reported on a recent conversation with the Shah (Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/1–1862)